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This essay questions the wisdom and the constitutionality of the packet of 
powers now held by the Chief Justice of the United States.1  Many of the current 
attributes of the position are relatively recent additions, generated during the twen-
tieth century through the interaction of a sequence of congressional decisions and 
the leadership of Chief Justices William Howard Taft, Earl Warren, Warren Bur-
ger, and William Rehnquist.  These jurists responded to new demands as national 
law grew in importance in the American polity, and they introduced new ideas 
that gave the federal judiciary the capacity to function as a programmatic, 
agenda-setting agency. 
                                                                                                                                 
† All rights reserved, 2006.  Judith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale 
Law School.  Lane Dilg, Yale Law School, J.D. 2004.   
1 This article, first presented as a talk at the Symposium, The Chief Justice and the 
Institutional Judiciary, in November of 2005 at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, builds on several others, including Judith Resnik, Democratic Responses to the 
Breadth of Power of the Chief Justice, in REFORMING THE COURT:  TERM LIMITS FOR SU-
PREME COURT JUSTICES 181 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Democratic Responses]; Judith Resnik, So Long:  Changing the Judicial 
Pension System Could Keep Judges from Staying on the Bench for Too Many Years, LEGAL AFF., 
July-Aug. 2005, at 20; Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory:  Demand, 
Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579 (2005) [hereinafter Resnik, Judicial 
Selection]; Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”:  Inventing the Federal District 
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 
(2002) [hereinafter Resnik, Inventing the District Courts]; Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, 
Jurisdiction as Injury:  Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 
(2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error]; and Lane Dilg, From First Among Equals to 
Chief Executive Officer:  The Powers and Duties of the Chief Justice of the United 
States (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Library).  Our thanks 
to current and former students Joseph Blocher, Marin Levy, Bertrall Ross, Laura 
Smolowe, Steven Wu, and Sofia Yakren, and especially to Chinelo Dike and Emily Te-
plin who worked so ably on the recent drafts, to Gene Coakley and Camilla Tubbs for 
all their efforts to locate relevant materials, to Vicki Jackson, Linc Caplan, Theodore 
Ruger, Linda Greenhouse, Robert Post, and Albert Yoon for helpful comments, and, 
with great appreciation, to Denny Curtis, Russell Wheeler, and Paul Carrington for 
thoughtful readings of and comments on an earlier draft.  Thanks are also due to Pro-
fessors Stephen Burbank and Theodore Ruger, who shepherded the Symposium of 
which this contribution is a part, and to the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review who hosted it.  
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The reconfiguring of judicial power and structure within the federal system 
took place as, more generally, democratic mandates were reinterpreted to insist both 
that women and men of all colors had rights enforceable by courts and that the 
judiciary ought to include individuals diverse enough to capture an expanding 
class of litigants.  Further, as concerns emerged about how, through popular elec-
toral processes, individuals could entrench their authority for unduly long periods 
of time, American democracy revisited its institutions of electoral politics in the 
hopes (not yet well realized) of imposing constraints on the power of elected officials 
to entrench their own or their parties’ power. 
It is the interaction among these factors—the developing democratic princi-
ples, the long-held commitments to separation of powers and independent adjudi-
cation, and the new range of tasks accruing to the Chief Justice—that makes trou-
bling the range of powers now possessed by the chief justiceship.  One individual 
can serve for decades as a life-tenured administrator-adjudicator.  With such ten-
ure in office, one person has a unique opportunity to forward positions through 
two channels:  by building a body of doctrine in case law and by building a set of 
policies in administrative directives. 
When an individual is asked to be instrumental on behalf of the billion-dollar 
agency called “The Federal Courts” (with some two thousand judges, thirty thou-
sand in staff, and hundreds of facilities) and also to be successful jurispruden-
tially as a disinterested adjudicator, one role cannot help but bleed into the other.  
Each role amplifies the power of, distracts from, and imposes costs on the other.  
Such conflation undermines democratic principles and the legitimacy of adjudica-
tion by giving the few individuals who hold the chief justiceship a disproportionate 
impact on American law. 
 The history of the developments of the twentieth century makes plain the 
plasticity of the packet of activities associated with the chief justiceship.  Because 
the powers are artifacts of custom and statute rather than the Constitution, Con-
gress as well as the Chief Justice can and should revisit these powers to revise the 
charter of that role. 
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I.  RARE POWERS, UNDEREXAMINED 
Chief justiceships turn over infrequently in the United States.  The 
new Chief Justice is only the seventeenth person since the founding of 
the United States to hold that position.2  Academic conferences on the 
office of Chief Justice are similarly rare.  The one predecessor to this 
Symposium, which was held in November of 2005 after the Senate con-
firmed Chief Justice John Roberts, occurred in 1982 when the University 
of Virginia convened a roundtable discussion while Warren Burger’s 
chief justiceship was in full swing.3  More frequent conversations are in 
                                                                                                                                 
2 See infra Appendix A, Tenure of Chief Justices of the United States, of Directors of 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and of Directors of the Federal Judicial 
Center, for a list of Chief Justices, running from John Jay, whose service began in 1789, 
through John G. Roberts, Jr., whose service began in 2005. 
3 See THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (White Miller Burkett Ctr. of Pub. Affairs 
1984) [hereinafter THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE].  Included in this volume is an ed-
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order in light of substantive changes in the portfolio of the Chief Justice, 
in the function of courts, and in democratic aspirations for adjudication. 
This contribution is predicated on four points.  Our first is to analyze 
the range of activities now undertaken by the Chief Justice.  The content 
of the role of Chief Justice stems not from the Constitution (which men-
tions the term only once, when discussing who presides in the event of 
an impeachment trial of the President)4 but from dozens of statutes en-
acted in an ad hoc fashion over many decades, from customs, and from 
the vision, decisions, and ambitions of those who have held the office of 
the Chief Justice.5 
Many facets of today’s chief justiceship are relatively new and not 
well known.  In earlier eras, the Court relied on long oral arguments 
rather than briefs; the Chief Justice did not—as happens today—cut ad-
vocates off mid-sentence at the end of thirty minutes.6  Moreover, when 
defending the judiciary from attack, Chief Justice John Marshall resorted 
to a nom de plume;7 today, the Chief Justice makes such arguments in 
an annual year-end report and in remarks before public forums such as 
the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute.8  The 
contemporary custom is that, when in the majority, the Chief Justice has 
the power to assign which Justice will write the Court’s opinion,9 with a 
circulation of drafts following thereafter.  In contrast, Chief Justice Mar-
shall appears to have written most of “the Court’s” decisions,10 and the 
                                                                                                                                 
ited transcript of discussions had at the 1982 Conference.  See Conference on the Of-
fice of Chief Justice [hereinafter 1982 Virginia Conference], reprinted in THE OFFICE OF 
CHIEF JUSTICE 155; see also Daniel J. Meador, Preface to THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE 
157, 157 (introducing the volume and describing the conference); Peter G. Fish, The 
Office of Chief Justice of the United States:  Into the Federal Judiciary’s Bicentennial Decade 
[hereinafter Fish, Office of Chief Justice], in THE OFFICE OF CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (describing 
at length the powers and duties of the Chief Justice at that time). 
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments. . . . When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice 
shall preside:  And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds 
of the Members present.”); see also infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra Appendix B, Statutory Duties of the Chief Justice of the United States; 
infra Part II. 
6 See Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office:  John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1421 (2006). 
7 See id. at 1446 (referring to Marshall’s newspaper essays defending the Court). 
8 See infra Part II.B.3. 
9 See Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729 (2006); see also S. Sidney Ulmer, The Use of Power in the Supreme 
Court:  The Opinion Assignments of Earl Warren, 1953-1960, 19 J. PUB. L. 49, 66-67 (1970) 
(arguing that Chief Justice Warren did not assign opinions equally among the col-
leagues who joined him in majorities and further that, in controversial and close cases, 
he often chose not to write the majority’s opinion). 
10 See Hobson, supra note 6, at 1445. 
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other Justices may or may not have seen the texts that are now read as 
constituting their judgments.11 
These aspects of the chief justiceship stem from the Chief’s service as 
the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Supreme Court.  Another set of 
tasks derives from service as the leader of the federal judiciary more 
generally.  One hundred years ago, that job was much smaller.  The fed-
eral courts themselves had both fewer judges and a smaller aegis; some 
one hundred federal judges, scattered across the nation, generally relied 
on the procedural rules of the different states in which they sat and 
looked to the Department of Justice as their spokesperson in Congress to 
present the judiciary’s needs for staff and facilities. 
Today, some two thousand judges populate the federal courts and 
share a set of national procedural rules that link their daily practices.  
These judges are supported by their own Administrative Office, some 
thirty thousand personnel working in more than eight hundred facilities 
around the United States, and funded by a budget in excess of five bil-
lion dollars annually.12  In addition to dealing with more than three 
hundred forty thousand civil and criminal filings,13 about sixty thousand 
appeals,14 as well as approximately a million and a half bankruptcy peti-
tions annually,15 resulting in thousands of decisions by district, magis-
                                                                                                                                 
11 See G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice:  The Nineteenth-Century 
Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1471 (noting that the “only people who would have 
access to the opinions of the Court accompanying dispositions of cases were the author 
of those opinions and the Court’s reporter,” and that “[t]he legal justifications ad-
vanced in Marshall Court opinions were thus typically the product of only one Jus-
tice”); see also id. at 1476 (noting the lack of evidence that the assignment system used 
today was in place).  For a discussion of the development of dissents and other changes 
in the Court’s practices, see Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Prac-
tice:  Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
1267, 1309-55 (2001). 
12 U.S. Courts Home Page, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/understanding_courts/89916.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
13 Table C:  U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pend-
ing During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2004 and 2005, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/C00mar05.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2006); Table D:  U.S. District Courts—Criminal Cases Commenced, Terminated, and 
Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2004 and 2005, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/D00Cmar05.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2006). 
14 Table B:  U.S. Courts of Appeals—Appeals Commenced, Terminated, and Pend-
ing During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2004 and 2005, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/B00mar05.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2006). 
15 Table F:  U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, Terminated, 
and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2004 and 2005, 
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trate, and bankruptcy judges,16 the federal judiciary has also become an 
educational institution (teaching judges) and a policy-making body (ad-
vising Congress). 
The development of a greater institutional presence for the federal 
judiciary has resulted in a larger set of powers accruing to the Chief Jus-
tice.  The expansion of the federal courts is tied to the growth of a na-
tional lawmaking regime in which Congress played a pivotal role—
crafting legal regimes that placed demands on the federal courts.  Sev-
eral Chief Justices—most notably William Howard Taft, Earl Warren, 
Warren Burger, and William Rehnquist—deserve significant credit for 
carving out new authority, for proposing and obtaining funds for new 
institutional structures, and for successfully persuading the other 
branches to support their visions.17  Most recently, under the guidance of 
Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, the federal judiciary has worked 
out an integrated programmatic agenda, advancing positions in Con-
gress about the allocation of power between the state and federal sys-
tems, between life-tenured and non-life-tenured federal judges, and 
about rights of access to courts.  These administrative proposals reflect 
the commitments of those Chief Justices to a limited role for federal 
constitutional, statutory, and common law rights—views they also es-
poused in judgments of the Supreme Courts that they led. 
Our second point requires a shift in focus from the federal judici-
ary’s internal development to the revamping of other government prac-
tices and constitutional commitments.  The thickening ranks within the 
judiciary are paralleled in the other branches, as new agencies, congres-
sional committees, and executive departments have come into being.  In 
all branches, the elaboration of bureaucratic structures has been accom-
panied by a concomitant delegation of tasks to staff.  In addition, new 
roles and expectations for adjudication have emerged.  From govern-
ments of emperors and kings to republican city-state burghers, adjudica-
                                                                                                                                 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/F00mar05.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2006). 
16 For statistics on matters disposed of by magistrate judges, as well as other duties 
performed by magistrate judges, see Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Ta-
ble S-17:  Matters Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges During the 12-Month Periods 
Ending September 30, 1994, and September 30, 2000 Through 2004, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/tables/s17.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
17 See generally ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE:  LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME 
COURT (1986); Fish, Office of Chief Justice, supra note 3; Judith Resnik, Constricting Reme-
dies:  The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003) [herein-
after Resnik, Constricting Remedies]; William F. Swindler, The Chief Justice and Law Reform, 
1921-1971, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 241 (1971); Edward A. Tamm & Paul C. Reardon, War-
ren E. Burger and the Administration of Justice, 1981 BYU L. REV. 447 (1981). 
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tion has long been an important part of the exercise of political author-
ity.18  But until recently, many of those governed had few juridical rights 
and were not permitted to be litigants, lawyers, or judges.  Further, gov-
ernments were not obliged to disclose their own activities and could not 
often be held to their own promises.  Judges served at the pleasure of the 
rulers who empowered them. 
Over centuries, democratic countries came to appreciate the need 
for judicial independence, translated as a requirement that jurists have 
some degree of separation from, rather than be subject directly to, the 
political control of executive and legislative authorities.  Furthermore, 
whole new sets of claimants—women and men of all colors and classes—
have gained the power to insist in courts on fair treatment from their 
governments, which are, in turn, obliged to explain their actions.  As 
new rights-holders gained competency to enforce rights through courts, 
the idea emerged that judiciaries ought to include individuals diverse 
enough to capture the expanded array of participants.  In eras when 
only men had juridical authority and in countries in which only whites 
had legal standing, judges were drawn exclusively from those pools.  In 
the contemporary world, where democratic commitments oblige equal 
access to power by persons of all colors whatever their gender and wher-
ever they live, the composition of a judiciary—if all-white or all-male or 
all-upper class or all from one area of the country—becomes a problem 
of equality and legitimacy. 
In many countries, “diversity” (variously defined to include geogra-
phy, expertise, and knowledge, as well as the demographic characteris-
tics of jurists) is now a dimension of governments’ aspirations, and this 
concern has affected judicial selection processes in many democracies.  
For example, by statute, Canada has a set-aside ensuring that its highest 
Court includes three Justices from Quebec,19 therefore well-versed in the 
civil law regime of that province (and likely to be francophones).20  The 
Treaty of Rome that chartered the International Criminal Court requires 
                                                                                                                                 
18 See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE:  ENG-
LAND, GERMANY, FRANCE (2005); JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS E. CURTIS, REPRESENTING 
JUSTICE:  FROM RENAISSANCE ICONOGRAPHY TO 21ST CENTURY COURTHOUSES, The 
Henry Jayne LaBarre Lecture, American Philosophical Society (Nov. 12, 2005) (copy 
on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
19 See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, s. 6 (1985) (Can.). 
20 Conventions supporting geographical diversity have also developed, with more 
Justices coming from the provinces with higher populations.  The expectation is that, of 
the remaining six Supreme Court jurists, three come from the Province of Ontario, 
one each from the Western and Northern Provinces, and one from the Maritimes.  See 
Supreme Court of Canada:  Current Judges, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/ 
judges/curjudges_e.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
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countries nominating judges to “take into account” the need for jurists 
with expertise in relevant bodies of law and to select jurists providing 
“representation of the principal legal systems of the world,” “[e]quitable 
geographical representation,” and “[a] fair representation of female and 
male judges.”21 
Moving inside the United States, within the federal system, selection 
processes for magistrate judges call for seeking applications from all 
qualified persons, with reference to “women, members of minority 
groups and individuals with disabilities.”22  Delaware provides that its Su-
preme Court include jurists of different political parties,23 while other 
                                                                                                                                 
21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 36(8)(a)(i)-(iii), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  The Treaty requires that the Court consist of at least eighteen 
judges, id. art. 36(1), (2)(a), with no two being “nationals of the same State.”  Id. art. 
36(7).  Article 36(3) calls on state parties to nominate persons either with “established 
competence in criminal law and procedure,” id. art. 36(3)(b)(i), or with “established 
competence in relevant areas of international law such as international humanitarian 
law and the law of human rights,” id. art. 36(3)(b)(ii).  Nominees are then put onto 
two lists, representing criminal law and international law (a nominee can be listed on 
both), from which State Parties make selections by secret ballot.  Id. art. 36(5)-(6)(a).  
When voting, State Parties must take into account diversity of nationality, geography, 
and representation of men and women; that obligation has been implemented 
through a weighted voting system that requires each State Party to vote for a minimum 
number of candidates from specified regional groups and a minimum number of male 
and of female candidates.  See Procedure for the Nomination and Election of Judges of 
the International Criminal Court, Annex 1, Res. ICC-ASP/3/Res. 6, § B(20)(b)-(c) 
(Sept. 6, 2004) available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-4-S-4-English.pdf.  Addi-
tionally, State Parties are to take into account the need for “judges with legal expertise 
on . . . violence against women and children.”  Id. § B(19).  See generally Cate Steains, 
Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  THE MAKING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE 357 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
22 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, AND REAP-
POINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES 11 (2002) (“To attract the greatest 
number of applicants, the public notice for a new appointment should be dissemi-
nated as widely as practicable so that all qualified members of the bar are aware of the 
opportunity to apply for the position.  The court should encourage applications from 
all qualified persons including women, members of minority groups and individuals 
with disabilities who can perform the essential functions of the position.  Consistent 
with the above, the court should consider transmitting the public notice to state and 
local bar associations and interest groups that focus on minorities.”); see also Regula-
tions of the Judicial Conference of the United States for the Selection, Appointment, 
and Reappointment of United States Bankruptcy Judges (promulgated by the Judicial 
Conference Mar. 2001), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/news/vacancies/ 
qualif.pdf (calling upon merit selection panels to “make an affirmative effort to iden-
tify and give due consideration to all qualified candidates, without regard to race, 
color, age (over 40), gender, religion, or national origin”).   
23 DEL. CONST. art. 4, § 3 (“Three of the five Justices of the Supreme Court in of-
fice at the same time, shall be of one major political party, and two of said Justices shall 
be of the other major political party.”).  This provision was added to the Delaware Con-
stitution in 1978, when that Constitution was amended to add two additional justices to 
the state supreme court.  See 61 Del. Laws 1638 (1978). 
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states make provisions for commissions nominating judges to have 
membership reflective of the diversity within their populations.24  
Pressures to change the demography of those serving as judges have 
also affected methods for judicial selection, with calls for democraticiz-
ing the process mounting in several countries.  In England and Wales, 
reforms of the Office of Lord Chancellor and the creation of a new Su-
preme Court have been coupled with the establishment of a commission 
to make recommendations for judicial appointments.25  And, in Canada, 
after hearings in the House of Commons in 2004, the Attorney General 
promised to open the process of gathering nominations and of vetting 
potential appointees.26 
                                                                                                                                 
24 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 4, § 8 (requiring that appointments to the state’s 
Judicial Council be made with “due consideration to area representation and without 
regard to political affiliation”); IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 16 (requiring that “[d]ue consid-
eration shall be given to area representation in the appointment and election of judi-
cial nominating commission members”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.291 (West 2005) (stating 
that the membership of the state’s judicial nominating commission should to the ex-
tent possible “reflect[] the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, as well as the geo-
graphic distribution, of the population within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
for which nominations will be considered”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 46.1 (West 2005) (pro-
viding that “[n]o more than a simple majority of the members [of the state’s judicial 
nominating commission] shall be of the same gender”); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. 6,  
§ 36.A (stating that the governor shall appoint ten nonattorney members to the state’s 
commission on appellate court appointments and that, to make such appointments, 
the governor shall appoint a nominating committee, the makeup of which “shall, to 
the extent feasible, reflect the diversity of the population of the state”). 
25 See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, pt. 3, § 26(5) (Eng.) (requiring that a 
commission select a recommended candidate); id. c. 4, pt. 4, c. 1, § 61 (establishing the 
Judicial Appointments Commission). 
26 See Press Release, Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler, Canada 
Department of Justice, New Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process 
Launched (Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/ 
doc_31586.html (announcing a new three-step appointment process for the Supreme 
Court of Canada that requires input from civic leaders, members of the legal commu-
nity, and territorial representatives in order to “ensur[e] greater transparency, in-
creased public involvement and meaningful Parliamentary input”).  The Liberal Party, 
then in power, came to focus on revamping procedures for judicial selection in part 
due to controversies unrelated to the judiciary.  Academics had for some time criti-
cized the appointments process for its centralization of authority and lack of transpar-
ency.  See, e.g., Jacob S. Ziegel, Merit Selection and Democratization of Appointments to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, CHOICES:  CTS. & LEGISLATURES, June 1999, at 1, 16, available 
at http:///www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol5no2.pdf (discussing criticisms of the 
confirmation process for the Supreme Court of Canada).  But change did not occur 
until 2004, when a Prime Minister, facing reelection, sought to distance himself from 
an investigation into corruption (the “sponsorship scandal”) and as groups, objecting 
to Canadian courts’ decisions protecting same-sex marriage, used criticisms of the se-
lection process as an argument for more public engagement with judicial candidates.  
See Kathleen Harris, PM Is ‘Mad as Hell’:  Scandal Sends Liberals Spiralling in Polls, TO-
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Insisting on input from more sources is one kind of constraint on 
executive prerogatives.  Another is limiting the tenure of individuals who 
hold office.  Many democracies do so for judges through mandatory re-
tirement or fixed terms of service.27  In the United States, efforts to limit 
the power of the individual serving as President came in the form of a 
constitutional amendment imposing a two-term limit.28  Interest in con-
straining  power can also be seen in campaign finance reforms, which 
seek to respond (though not yet well) to the ability of individuals, using 
electoral processes, to entrench their and their parties’ authority. 
Our third point derives from the interaction of the first two.  Given 
distrust of undue concentrations of power in one person and increased 
interest in including multiple perspectives in decisionmaking, the re-
cently expanded (but now seen as customary) repertoire of powers of 
the Chief Justice becomes troubling.  While the current Chief Justice is 
only the seventeenth individual in that line, the current President of the 
United States is the forty-second person to hold that office.29  Thus, the 
unexamined practice that the Chief Justice holds that position until vol-
untarily relinquishing it reduces the number of individuals who chair the 
Court—decreasing the range of persons who can take on the most visi-
ble role within the federal judiciary while enabling the centralization of 
power for decades in a single person. 
Other problems stem from the amalgam of responsibilities accruing 
to the chief justiceship.  The person holding that position must divide 
time between the demands on a Justice and the obligations of a senior 
administrator.  As a jurist, the Chief Justice works on a docket assumed 
to require the full-time attention of the other Justices on the Court.  
While Associate Justices regularly take on the occasional speech, the visit-
ing lectureship, or the writing of a book, all of these projects are episodic 
and typically can be deferred under the press of the Court’s business.  In 
                                                                                                                                 
RONTO SUN, Feb. 15, 2004, at 4; Kim Lunman, MPs Working on Hearings for Top-Court 
Nominees, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 23, 2004, at A4. 
 In 2006, under a new Prime Minister from another party, a proposed nominee was 
chosen and, for the first time in Canada’s history, presented to Parliament, whose 
members were permitted to ask limited questions in a televised hearing.  See Sean 
Gordon, Top Court Nominee Hints at Limited Role, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 28, 2006, at A1. 
27 See infra notes 242-48 and accompanying text. 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (“No person shall be elected to the office of the 
President more than twice . . . .”). 
29 President George W. Bush is known as the forty-third President but is the forty-
second person to hold that office; President Grover Cleveland served two nonconsecu-
tive terms.  See JOHN J. PATRICK, RICHARD M. PIOUS, & DONALD A. RITCHIE, OXFORD 
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 742-43 (2001). 
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contrast, as an administrator, the Chief Justice has a range of obligatory 
and relentless duties.   
Even with significant delegation, oversight is required.  Yet both the 
Chief Justice and those to whom leadership is delegated are largely shel-
tered from public view, thereby creating an administrative authority free 
of many of the constraints imposed on other agencies and offices.  That 
insulation is attractive, when the focus is on the role of the Chief Justice 
as a jurist.  The point of lengthy tenure is to enhance the ability to ren-
der decisions without fear of repercussions, and specifically, of being 
fired. Current as well as historical examples make plain that the drafters 
of the United States Constitution were right to try to protect judges from 
political retribution by interests both public and private.30 
But the administrative portfolio currently held for life by the Chief 
Justice cannot find its justification in the rationales protecting adjudica-
                                                                                                                                 
30 Indeed, whether the United States has done enough is a matter of debate.  One 
dimension of the underprotection of the federal judiciary is its funding.  During much 
of the twentieth century, the American Bar Association argued that federal judicial 
salaries were too low.  Some judges have also sued, arguing that a few congressional 
enactments that did not provide for protection of benefits or for cost-of-living increases 
violated the constitutional protection against diminution of judicial salaries.  See, e.g., 
Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting the claim of a 
class of judges that legislation denying cost-of-living pay increases to federal judges 
violated Article III’s Compensation Clause), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 911 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, dissenting); see also AM. BAR ASS’N & FED. BAR 
ASS’N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY EROSION:  A REPORT ON THE NEED FOR REFORM (2001), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/fedjudreport.pdf.  In addition to salaries, 
another concern is funding for facilities and administration.  See Fiscal 2005 Appropria-
tions:  Commerce, Justice, State:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, the 
Judiciary and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. 2-11 (2004), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/heyburn021904.pdf (statement of 
Hon. John G. Heyburn II, Chairman, Comm. on the Budget of the Judicial Conf. of 
the United States) (raising concern about the “crisis” facing the federal courts in light 
of the appropriations planned).   
 In contrast to the centrality of legislative decisions in the U.S. system, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court has concluded that the setting of amounts for judicial compensa-
tion should occur through methods less dependent on the will of a sitting parliament.  
See Reference on Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court, 3 S.C.R. 3, 94-117 
(Can. 1997).  Some state courts have explored a similarly doctrinal position.  See G. 
Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse, and 
Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12, 14-18 (2004) (describing an expanding doc-
trine of inherent judicial power to require financing and discussing a 2002 Kansas Su-
preme Court order requiring an increase in fees to provide funds). 
 Another concern is that Article III is currently interpreted as protecting only those 
judges chartered through its provisions.  Hundreds of persons—called magistrate, 
bankruptcy, and administrative law judges—hold federal adjudicatory power but are 
not, under current doctrine, sheltered by the protections of Article III.  See Judith Res-
nik, Judicial Independence and Article III—Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 
657-66 (1999). 
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tors from inappropriate oversight.  Rather, the packet of powers now en-
capsulated in the chief justiceship undermines judicial independence by 
embedding the judiciary in a series of instrumental agendas (some of 
which may well be appropriate, from administrative perspectives) that 
make their way into legislation and then return to the Court as legal 
questions to be adjudicated.  As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes 
warned decades ago,31 when judges become identified with program-
matic goals, questions emerge about the relationship between the judg-
ments rendered in adjudication and the goals espoused in administra-
tion.  Perhaps if federal judges lacked the power of judicial review, a 
form of pre-enactment advice could be useful.  But today’s system of 
double dipping—giving advice ex ante and providing adjudication ex 
post—offers the organized judiciary opportunities to influence legisla-
tion that federal courts will later be obliged to evaluate.   
If one kind of criticism is that the judiciary ought not take on that 
kind of advisory role, another addresses the representative function 
taken on by the Chief Justice and the judiciary’s policy-making body.  Do 
the hundreds of sitting federal judges all subscribe to certain proposi-
tions?  Presumably all want safe workplaces, reasonable compensation, 
help from support staff, and the protection of judicial independence, 
albeit differently interpreted.32  And certainly “the judiciary,” writ large, 
has a professional obligation to advance the rule of law and to provide 
justice fairly administered.  But beyond these general propositions, the 
judiciary is not supposed to represent any particular approach to social 
and political ordering, in order that it may serve as a disinterested adju-
dicator when conflicts emerge between special interest groups. 
But the leadership of the federal judiciary has not limited its input to 
abstract commitments to justice or to the practical needs of more judges 
and support services.  Rather, as is detailed below, under Chief Justices 
Burger and Rehnquist, the Judicial Conference of the United States (the 
judiciary’s policy-making body) advised Congress not to create new fed-
eral rights enforceable in federal court and to reallocate a good deal of 
federal adjudicatory power to non-Article III judges.  Furthermore, in 
                                                                                                                                 
31 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 1, at 961-63; Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial 
Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341, 386-87 (2004); infra notes 
223-32 and accompanying text. 
32 For example, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), the 
Court split five to four over the enforceability of a regulation limiting the kinds of 
statements to be made by judicial candidates for elected office; whether the regulation 
violated the First Amendment was debated in the context of disagreements about the 
appropriate posture of judges, the meaning of judicial “impartiality,” and the kind of 
campaign claims that candidates for judicial office could make. 
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speeches to the nation, these Chief Justices often suggested that their 
own approaches and prescriptions were institutional rather than per-
sonal—as if “the Article III judiciary” could (and should) speak in a uni-
fied voice about topics such as the import of federalism or the classes of 
litigants to whom Congress should grant rights of access to the federal 
courts. 
Our critique is not founded on standard objections to the “undemo-
cratic” power of the judiciary, sometimes described as the “counterma-
joritarian difficulty” about which constitutional theorists have puzzled.33  
Our position is that adjudication is a form of democratic ordering, and, when 
judicial power is exercised within the confines of adjudication, the result-
ing judgments provide one appropriate avenue for realizing the range of 
commitments in a constitutional democracy. 
Nor is our premise that law is separate from politics.  Instead, pre-
cisely because law expresses a form of politics, because rights of access to 
courts endow certain individuals with the ability to forward yet other po-
litical goals through law, and because judges—when adjudicating—have 
to make judgments that determine which persons have what rights and 
remedies, the judiciary as an institution should be chary of taking on too 
many nonadjudicatory roles and, in particular, ought to abstain from 
weighing in on the question of who among us ought to be given new 
rights and remedies in courts.  Its leadership ought not to suggest that 
“the Federal Courts” have, as a corporate body, opted for one of several 
competing approaches to these basic questions that have occupied the 
American legal regime from its inception.  The more frequent the exer-
cise of a corporate judicial voice on such issues, the less the judiciary re-
tains its character as an institution issuing judgments predicated on, con-
strained by, and tethered to the records of specific cases. 
Our fourth and final point is to address the question of what kinds 
of changes are constitutionally permissible and pragmatically appealing.  
Because the powers of the Chief Justice are artifacts of custom and stat-
ute rather than the Constitution, revisiting the practices that have so 
enlarged the Chief Justice’s charter is possible.  Further, because these 
powers are problematic from the various standpoints outlined above, 
reconsideration is appropriate and necessary.  The new Chief Justice 
could—as he may be doing—use the occasion of this change in leader-
                                                                                                                                 
33 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 4-5 (1980) (offering an analysis of the “central function” and “at the same time 
the central problem[] of judicial review:  a body that is not elected or otherwise politi-
cally responsible in any significant way is telling the people’s elected representatives 
that they cannot govern as they’d like”). 
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ship as an opportunity to reconfigure its parameters.34  In addition, statu-
tory revisions are in order to reduce the eclectic array of duties assigned 
to the Chief Justice.  Most importantly, the Chief Justice ought not to 
have the power to assign individual judges to subject-matter-specific 
courts or to chair the Judicial Conference of the United States.  In addi-
tion to altering the statutory powers of the chief justiceship, new legisla-
tion is needed to impose term limits, so that more people with a variety 
of skills and views are able to hold the office.35 
These interventions are responsive to contemporary problems but 
ought not to be seen as a structure that will necessarily endure through-
out the next century.  The history of the federal courts and of the Office 
of Chief Justice is replete with examples of change, driven by a mixture 
of what is politically plausible and useful.36  The powers that reside in the 
chief justiceship now pose a problem for democracy that ought to be 
addressed by various institutions of government, and whatever judg-
ments are made at this juncture will, in time, need to be revisited. 
II.  AN ODD CONFIGURATION OF AUTHORITY 
A.  Running the Court 
A few facts help to underscore the distance between the role played 
by a Chief Justice of a Supreme Court that in its early years camped out 
with a small number of helpers in makeshift quarters on the ground 
floor of the Capitol,37 and the role that the Chief Justice now plays as the 
Court works in the imposing 1935 Cass Gilbert building.  Today’s Su-
preme Court has a staff of over four hundred fifty and a budget of more 
than sixty million dollars annually.38  The Chief Justice is the senior offi-
                                                                                                                                 
34 See infra note 311 and accompanying text. 
35 Others have proposed that all Supreme Court Justices’ terms be limited.  See 
generally REFORMING THE COURT:  TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Roger 
C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) [hereinafter REFORMING THE COURT].  
36 See generally RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 2005) (1989) (providing an overview of those developments 
and excellent diagrams detailing the expansion of the federal judicial system).  The 
classic history of the federal courts through the Taft era is FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES 
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:  A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM (1927). 
37 See ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, & KENNETH S. 
GELLER, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 7-8 (8th ed. 2002) (detailing the Court’s various 
quarters prior to 1935); The Supreme Court—Its Homes Past and Present, 27 A.B.A. J. 283, 
283-89 (1941) (describing the same and including pictures). 
38 See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2007—APPENDIX, at 49-50, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ 
fy2007/pdf/appendix/jud.pdf. 
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cial on the Court.  As Peter Fish well described in the 1980s,39 that posi-
tion puts the Chief Justice in charge of a diverse array of activities, from 
admitting lawyers to the bar of the Supreme Court to policing the public 
and the private sessions of the Court.40  The Chief Justice plays a role in 
generating norms about the time allotted for arguments, the shape and 
pace of discussions, and the scheduling of cases accepted for considera-
tion.41 
 As lawyers who seek Court review know well, the Court also promul-
gates its own, special rules of practice, again under the superintendence 
of the Chief Justice.42  Moreover, unlike the rulemaking that governs the 
practices and procedures of the lower courts, the Supreme Court does so 
free of statutory obligations for public notice and comment and of re-
quirements that Congress have time to consider rules before they be-
come effective.43 
                                                                                                                                 
39 Fish, Office of Chief Justice, supra note 3, at 19-36. 
40 The administrative aspects of the chief justiceship may obscure the intellectual 
leadership of some Chief Justices in altering the Court’s jurisprudence.  Steamer has 
also noted the importance of the Chief Justice’s ability to “mass the Court” (a phrase 
he attributed to Taft).  See STEAMER, supra note 17, at 8. 
41 See Alan B. Morrison, Opting for Change in Supreme Court Selection, and for the Chief 
Justice, Too, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 35, at 203, 219-21 (discussing Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s influence on the scheduling and acceptance of cases). 
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000) (providing that the Supreme Court and the lower 
courts shall prescribe rules for the conduct of their business). 
43 See id. § 2071(b) (providing that “any rule prescribed by a court, other than the 
Supreme Court . . . shall be prescribed only after giving appropriate public notice and 
an opportunity for comment”).  The Court’s rule-making procedures have changed 
over time.  In the early days, the Clerk catalogued orders, collected chronologically 
with amendments added periodically.  Beginning in the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, Chief Justices added structure to the process:  Chief Justice Fred Moore Vinson by 
creating a committee of Justices to review the Court’s rules, Chief Justice Warren by 
designating a group of lawyers to serve as advisors, and Chief Justice Rehnquist by ap-
pointing members of the Court to a rules subcommittee that, on some occasions, has 
published draft rules circulated for public comment before their adoption.  See Ben-
nett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, Supreme Court Rules:  The 2003 Revisions, 213 F.R.D. 
505, 506 (2003) (describing the rule-making process under Chief Justice Rehnquist); 
Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Supreme Court’s New Rules, 68 HARV. L. REV. 20, 38-39 
(1954) (describing the 1952 appointment of a committee of Justices by Chief Justice 
Vinson, as well as Chief Justice Warren’s subsequent request that a “representative 
group of attorneys” convene to provide advice to the Court’s committee); see also Wil-
liam H. Allen & Alex Kozinski, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 312, 312 (1980) (book review) (reviewing the Court’s 1980 Rules, which arrived 
“with little fanfare . . . [and] had the immediate effect of depreciating every practitio-
ner’s investment” in an authoritative manual of the Court’s rules); Kenneth S. Geller & 
Mark I. Levy, Rules for the 90s:  Revision to High Court Procedures, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1990, at 
70, 70 (1990) (noting that the Court provided “no explanation of the background and 
purposes of the new rules” nor did it comment on changes). 
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The Chief Justice is also the executive manager of the Court.  From 
supplies for and maintenance of the building to its staff, their holiday 
parties, and relations with the media, the Chief Justice either takes con-
trol or assigns such responsibilities to others.44  The federal statutes that 
create the offices of the Court’s clerk, reporter, library, archivist, and 
curator give oversight responsibilities to the Chief Justice.45  Much of this 
daily work is delegated to others and, since Warren Burger’s tenure, to 
an Administrative Assistant appointed by and reporting directly to the 
Chief.46  The Chief Justice is also charged with the sad task of certifying 
the disability of Justices.47  And, the Chief is the diplomatic host for the 
Court as it welcomes foreign jurists, members of the national and state 
governments, and the public. 
While many such duties are predicated on statutes, others arise from 
customs that, as other contributions detail,48 have changed over time.  
Ready examples of the fluidity come from the tenure of William 
Rehnquist, who undertook some tasks with a flair that generated news.  
He added colored stripes to his robe,49 convened what he termed 
“Christmas” parties,50 kept a fast pace for the Court’s conferences, and 
                                                                                                                                 
 When making two revisions effective in 2005, the Court did not provide opportu-
nities for notice and comment.  See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, Supreme Court 
Rules:  Minor 2005 Changes, 228 F.R.D. 262, 262 (2005) (supporting the “usefulness of 
the Court’s adopting and following a practice” of enabling public comment but noting 
that “minor changes” that “almost inevitably” flow from extant rules may appropriately 
be exempted). 
44 For example, Steamer reports that Chief Justice Burger oversaw the remodeling 
of the bench to create an arrangement that permitted the Justices, formerly seated in a 
straight line, to see each other; Burger also ordered that the inside of the Court’s foun-
tains be painted blue.  STEAMER, supra note 17, at 178. 
45 The Court’s Clerk, Marshal, Reporter, and Librarian are provided for by statute.  
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 671-674 (2000).  Under these provisions, those appointments are made 
by the Supreme Court, with the Chief Justice designated to approve the “necessary 
assistants and messengers” for the Clerk’s Office, id. § 671(c), “necessary assistants and 
other employees” for the Marshal’s Office, id. § 672 (b), “necessary professional and 
clerical assistants and other employees” for the Reporter, id. § 673(b), and “necessary 
assistants” for the Librarian, id. § 674(b).  Further, the Chief Justice approves the Mar-
shal’s regulations for the building, 40 U.S.C. § 6102 (2000 & Supp. II 2002), and the 
Marshal’s regulations for policing the building, id. § 6121. 
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 677 (a)-(b) (2000). 
47 See id. §§ 371-372. 
48 See Linda Greenhouse, How Not To Be Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1365 
(2006); Hobson, supra note 6; Natalie Wexler, In The Beginning:  The First Three Chief 
Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1373 (2006); White, supra note 11. 
49 See Henry J. Reske, Showing His Stripes:  Operetta Inspires Chief Justice To Alter His 
Robe, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 35, 35 (describing the four gold stripes that the Chief Jus-
tice added to his black robe in 1995). 
50 See Craig Timberg, Sing-along Strikes a Sour Note:  Chief Justice’s Selection of ‘Dixie’ 
Distasteful, Some Say, WASH. POST, July 22, 1999, at B1 (discussing songs chosen by the 
  
2006] RESPONDING TO A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 1591 
led the Court in a dramatic reduction of the number of cases docketed 
for decision.51  Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg captured the array 
of powers stemming from many sources when, in her statement mourn-
ing the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, she described him as the “fair-
est, most efficient boss” she had ever had.52  The appellation “boss” is an 
important addition to the more common accolade of the Chief Justice as 
the “symbol of the Court.”53   
This sketch of a significant packet of powers should not be read as 
ignoring the constraints on that authority.  The ability of the Chief Jus-
tice to “boss” colleagues and staff has its limits, some generic to manag-
ers and others specific to this job.  Advice to business leaders regularly 
includes a reminder of their dependence on those who work for them.  
The Chief Justice is particularly reliant on collegial accord because many 
                                                                                                                                 
Chief at the Fourth Circuit’s Judicial Conference and also noting that “Rehnquist 
ha[d] been . . . resisting calls for the Supreme Court’s annual Christmas Party to be 
renamed a ‘Holiday Party,’ and that he led “the singing of several Christmas carols and 
had a 25-foot tree erected at the [C]ourt”); see also Tony Mauro, Roberts Adheres to Prece-
dent on High Court Revelry, LAW.COM, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
newswire_article.jsp?id=1134641110755 (registration required, on file with the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review) (describing the concerns raised in the late 1980s 
about the focus on “Christmas,” Chief Justice Rehnquist’s insistence on using that 
term, and the invitations issued under Chief Justice Roberts in 2005 to the annual 
“Christmas Recess Party”). 
51 See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 403, 403 (1996) (providing data on the Court’s plenary docket, which in the 1988 
Term included oral arguments and a written decision in 147 cases and by the 1995 
Term involved hearing and deciding only 77 cases). 
52 See Statement of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Statements from the Supreme Court 
Regarding the Death of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist (Sept. 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/pr_09-04-05b.html (adding that 
“William H. Rehnquist used to great effect the tools Congress and tradition entrusted 
to him”). 
53 See Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist, Hearings Before the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist To Be 
Chief Justice of the United States, 99th Cong. 1, 2 (1986) (opening statement of Chairman 
Strom Thurmond), reprinted in 12 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  HEAR-
INGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS 312 (Roy M. 
Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1989), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ 
congress/senate/judiciary/sh99-1067/browse.html (follow “Chairman Strom Thur-
mond” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter HEARINGS AND REPORTS].  At 
that hearing, Senator Edward Kennedy offered a parallel comment, that the Chief 
Justice “symbolizes the rule of law in our society; he speaks for the aspirations and be-
liefs of America as a Nation.”  Nomination of William H. Rehnquist To Be Chief Justice of the 
United States, Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Together with 
Additional, Minority, and Supplemental Views, S. EXEC. REP. No. 99-18, at 14 (1986) (sup-
plemental views of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy), reprinted in 12A HEARINGS AND REPORTS 
1549 (follow “Hon. Edward M. Kennedy” hyperlink). 
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with whom the Chief Justice works have life tenure.54  Further, because of 
strong norms of collegiality and a shared affection for the Court as an 
institution, the Chief Justice may be especially solicitous of the views of 
colleagues on the Court and in the lower federal judiciary.55  Astute 
Chief Justices carefully use their authority over opinion assignment56 and 
appointments to special courts and committees to forward agendas co-
operatively and to appease dissenters.57  Of course, insiders can recount 
instances in which the Chief Justice was unable to achieve a particular 
outcome and, on occasion, outsiders also learn of discord within.58 
B.  Running the Federal Judicial System, Itself Transformed 
The Constitution mentions a “Chief Justice”59 but does not use to-
day’s term:  “Chief Justice of the United States.”  Neither did the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, which described “a chief justice” joining “five associate 
justices” on the Supreme Court.60  At some point thereafter, the title “the 
                                                                                                                                 
54 As Justice William O. Douglas commented, the “Chief Justice has as associates men 
who are sovereign in their own right, not men picked, like Cabinet officers, to do his bid-
ding[;] . . . his tact and persuasiveness are his only appeal.”  William O. Douglas, Earl 
Warren—A Tribute, 58 CAL. L. REV. 3, 4 (1970). 
55 See DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED:  THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 1-10 (1988) (dis-
cussing Earl Warren’s selection of judges to serve on a special ad hoc committee of the 
Judicial Conference when a proposal surfaced to split the Fifth Circuit and members of 
the Judicial Conference did not agree on a response). 
56 See Ulmer, supra note 9, at 11; see generally Wahlbeck, supra note 9. 
57 See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitutde, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. 
REV. 699 (1995).  
58 For example, Earl Warren had presumed that his fellow Justices would—as he 
thought right—agree to disclose their finances, an obligation then being applied to lower 
court jurists.  Several of the Justices balked at a mandatory regime, and the Chief Justice 
could not bind them.  See 1969 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States 42-43 (June 10, 1969); Edward Ranzal, 52 U.S. Judges Balk at Curb on Activities, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1969, at 1 (stating that a majority of Justices rejected Chief Justice 
Warren’s suggestion that the Supreme Court adopt these rules).  The Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act now requires Justices to make such disclosures.  See Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 
Stat. 1824, 1851, 1861 §§ 301, 308(9) (Oct. 26, 1978) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
app. 4 §§ 101(11), 109(10)).  Chief Justice Rehnquist also met opposition from mem-
bers of the Judicial Conference when he sought to limit state prisoners’ use of habeas 
corpus.  See Stephen L. Wasby, The Revolt of the Chief Judges, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 445 
(2001). 
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
60 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73.  Also noted is that the Chief 
Justice, and other Justices, had the power to certify writs of error.  Id. § 25.  Congress 
also designated chief justices for territorial courts.  See, e.g., 1 SEN. EXEC. J. 282 (June 
26, 1798) (statement of President John Adams) (announcing the nomination of the 
Chief Justice of the Mississippi Territory); 9 SEN. EXEC. J. 340 (June 22, 1854) (state-
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Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States” came into use.61  
After the Civil War, when the victorious North wanted to impress a fed-
eral stamp upon the nation, another title, “Chief Justice of the Union,” 
was suggested.62  Beginning around 1866, the nomenclature now com-
mon—Chief Justice of the United States—appeared in the text of federal 
statutes.63 
In 1888, Melville W. Fuller took the current title as part of his com-
mission, as have Chief Justices thereafter.64  But in 1888, the title—Chief 
Justice of the United States—was inapt.  Fuller did not have a range of ways 
to communicate to or affect the work of lower federal courts, nor did 
those judges have ready means of connecting to each other.65  The ad-
ministrative needs of the federal judiciary were met in the early decades 
primarily by the Department of Treasury66 and then by the Department 
of the Interior67 before coming under the bailiwick of the Department of 
Justice, created in 1870.68 
Even as the twentieth century began, the hundred or so life-tenured 
federal judges, who were dispersed across the nation as they handled 
                                                                                                                                 
ment of President Franklin Pierce) (announcing the nomination of the Chief Justice of 
the Territory of Nebraska); 18 SEN. EXEC. J. 154 (Jan. 23, 1868) (statement of President 
Andrew Johnson) (announcing the nominations of the Chief Justices of the Territory 
of Utah and the Territory of Arizona). 
61 Fish, Office of Chief Justice, supra note 3, at 9. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 10 (citing Act of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 205; Judiciary Act of April 10, 1869, 
ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44; Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1089).  The term “Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States” was also used in some statutes.  Id. (citing Act of 
June 17, 1910, 36 Stat. 469).  Some attribute the change in nomenclature to the persis-
tence of Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, who reportedly insisted that Senators refer to 
him using that title when he presided at the impeachment hearings for President An-
drew Johnson in 1869.  See William A. Richardson, Chief Justice of the United States, or 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States?, reprinted in 49 NEW ENG. HIST. & 
GENEALOGICAL REG. 275, 277 (1895); see also CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REUNION, 1864-88, pt. 1, at 738 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 6, Paul A. Freund ed., 1971). 
64 See Richardson, supra note 63, at 278. 
65 See PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 8-
9 (1973) (noting occasional correspondence). 
66 See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, 1 Stat. 65 (establishing the Department of Treasury with 
responsibility for disbursing all appropriated money from the Treasury and receiving 
all revenues, including funds for and from the federal courts). 
67 See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, § 4, 9 Stat. 395 (transferring court-related powers from 
the Department of Treasury to the Department of Interior, which was established by 
this act). 
68 See Act of June 22, 1870, §§ 1, 2, 15, 18, 16 Stat. 162 (establishing the Depart-
ment of Justice and the offices of Attorney General and Solicitor General, and transfer-
ring to the Department of Justice authority for the finances of the federal courts and 
the responsibility of publishing court opinions “deem[ed] valuable for preservation”). 
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about thirty thousand cases a year, were mostly left to their own devices.  
They relied in large part on the procedural rules of the states in which 
they sat and they had few formal channels, outside of published opin-
ions, through which to communicate with each other.  As Chief Justice 
William Howard Taft complained in the early 1920s, each judge was left 
to “paddle[] his own canoe.”69 
1.  A New Federal Bureaucracy 
Taft’s leadership changed that isolation, as he helped bring into be-
ing the institutional presence of the federal judiciary; he launched a pro-
ject that his successors, most notably Chief Justices Warren, Burger, and 
Rehnquist, elaborated.70  Taft successfully pressed Congress to expand 
the number of jurists and to license judicial meetings to examine the 
business and needs of the judiciary.  One dimension of these changes 
can be seen through the data provided in the table below, which outlines 
the number of judges and the duration of their service during three time 
periods.71 
                                                                                                                                 
69 William Howard Taft, Adequate Machinery for Judicial Business, Address Before the 
Judicial Section of the Am. Bar Ass’n, reprinted in 7 A.B.A. J. 453, 454 (1921). 
70 Even as Taft expanded the role, his duties as Chief Justice were “minimal” when 
compared to those of Burger.  See STEAMER, supra note 17, at 13.  For other discussions, 
see generally Fish, Office of Chief Justice, supra note 3; Post, supra note 11; Theodore W. 
Ruger, The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1551 (2006); Ruger, supra note 31. 
71 This table, jointly authored by Professor Resnik and Stephen Wu, Yale Law 
School, Class of 2005, reflects a series of decisions about how to count the length of 
service of jurists.  Explanations and sources are provided in Resnik, Judicial Selection, 
supra note 1, at 648-58 chart 4 & app.  The underlying information comes from gov-
ernment databases on judges and their length of service.  See Members of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2006); Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Federal Judicial Center, 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj; see generally Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor’s Lost?  
Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges:  1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029 (2003). 
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Table 1:  Lengths of Service of Article III Judges:   
Contrasting Snapshots, 1800s/2000s 
  
Federal Judges Whose Service Began Between 1789-1809 
 
 
Court 
# of Judges 
or Justices 
Avg. Length 
of Service 
Avg. Age  
at Start 
Avg. Age  
at Death 
Supreme  16 14 years 47 years 67 years 
Lower  47 16 years 43 years 64 years 
 
Federal Judges Whose Service Terminated Between 1833-1853 
 
 
Court 
# of Judges  
or Justices 
Avg. Length 
of Service 
Avg. Age  
at Start 
Avg. Age  
at Death 
Supreme  9 20 years 49 years 70 years 
Lower  36 14 years 47 years 65 years 
 
Federal Judges Whose Service Terminated Between 1983-2003 
 
 
Court 
# of Judges 
or Justices 
Avg. Length 
of Service 
Avg. Age  
at Start 
Avg. Age  
at Death 
Supreme  6 24 years 57 years 88 years 
Lower  530 24 years 52 years 75 years 
 
Comparison of Lengths of Service: Lower Court Judges, 1800s/2000s 
 
 
Year Range 
# of Judges  
or Justices 
Avg. Length  
of Service 
Avg. Age  
at Start 
Avg. Age  
at Death 
1789-1809 47 16 years 43 years 64 years 
1833-1853 36 14 years 47 years 65 years 
1983-2003 530 24 years 52 years 75 years 
 
 
As this table details, in the twenty years after the founding of the 
country, some sixteen people served for fourteen years as Justices; forty-
seven lower court judges were on the bench for an average of sixteen 
years.  Jumping forward almost two hundred years, the departure data 
provides one window into how much the ranks have swelled.  Looking at 
roughly the last twenty years (between 1983 and 2003), 530 lower court 
judges left the bench after serving, on average, for twenty-four years.  
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During that same interval, the six departing Supreme Court jurists simi-
larly averaged about twenty-four years in that position.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist (who is not included in this data set because his service ter-
minated in 2005) sat on the Court as either an Associate or Chief Justice 
for a total of thirty-three years.72    
The growth in the number of judges is paralleled by the develop-
ment of the federal judiciary’s organizational shape.  In 1922, Congress 
chartered the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,73 and in 1939, it au-
thorized the creation of an Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
(AO), which took over and revamped the tasks of budgeting and data 
collection, previously undertaken by the Department of Justice, and then 
developed new projects.74  With the 1948 reorganization of the parts of 
the U.S. Code dealing with the courts, the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges was renamed the Judicial Conference of the United States.75  In 
1967, Congress chartered the Federal Judicial Center (FJC);76 the Chief 
Justice is the permanent chair of its Board.77  The FJC was charged with 
augmenting the research and teaching capacities of the judiciary.  The 
FJC responds to research requests made by the Judicial Conference and 
its committees, launches its own projects, and conducts training sessions 
for judges—including “baby judges” school (the judiciary’s two-week 
program for training new judges)78 and special seminars. 
In addition to chairing the FJC Board and having line authority over 
the Director of the AO, the Chief Justice presides at meetings of the Ju-
dicial Conference and is authorized by statute to submit reports of its 
                                                                                                                                 
72 See infra Appendix A, Tenure of Chief Justices of the United States, of Directors of 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and of Directors of the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter. 
73 See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (creating a conference of 
senior circuit judges “to advise [the Chief Justice] as to the needs of [each] circuit 
and . . . the administration of justice in the courts of the United States”). 
74 See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 601-613 (2000)). 
75 Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 902 (June 25, 1948). 
76 See Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, ch. 42, § 620, 81 Stat. 664 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 621 (2000)); see also Russell R. Wheeler, Empirical Research 
and the Politics of Judicial Administration:  Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 31 (1988); see generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE FEDERAL 
COURT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES:  AN INTRODUCTION FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATORS IN OTHER COUNTRIES (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURT 
SYSTEM]. 
77 28 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).  The Chief Justice also appoints three of the seven 
members of the Federal Judicial Center Foundation Board, which can accept funds to 
be used by the FJC.  Id. § 629. 
78 “Baby Judges School” Jump Starts Learning Process, THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 2005, at 1. 
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proceedings to Congress.79  Although specifically chartered by statute 
only to appoint the members of a standing committee on judicial disci-
pline,80 the Chief Justice (upon consultation with others) selects some 
two hundred fifty people who sit on the more than two dozen commit-
tees of the Judicial Conference.81  Those committees are staffed, in turn, 
by administrative personnel supervised by the Director of the AO and 
supported by FJC staff.  The various administrative wings share head-
quarters in one of Washington’s major buildings, named in the early 
1990s after Justice Thurgood Marshall and located adjacent to Union 
Station.  The day-to-day management of the entire judicial enterprise 
and its $5.4 billion budget falls to the Director of the AO.82 
But it is the Chief Justice who today selects and has the power to 
remove the Director.83  Individual directors’ tenures are, as is detailed in 
                                                                                                                                 
79 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000). 
80 See id. (“If the Conference elects to establish a standing committee [on disci-
pline], it shall be appointed by the Chief Justice . . . .”). 
81 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS:  JURISDIC-
TION OF COMMITTEES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judconf_jurisdictions.htm (last visited May 7, 2006) [hereinafter COMMITTEES OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE] (describing the committees of the Judicial Conference and 
their areas of responsibility).  In 2004, the Judicial Conference, which had been relying 
on twenty-four committees, split the Facilities and Security Committee into two sepa-
rate committees.  See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES 5 (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/ 
sept05proc_final.pdf; see also Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Councils & 
Conferences, http://www.uscourts.gov/understanding_courts/89914.htm (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2006) (listing the committees before the division of the Facilities and Security 
Committee). 
82 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602, 604 (2000) (creating the Administrative Office and 
vesting all of its functions and powers in the Director, including supervision of court 
administrative personnel, disbursal of funds, and collection of statistical data on the 
business of the courts for submission to the Judicial Conference, the Attorney General, 
and Congress). 
83 See id. § 601 (stating that the AO is to be “supervised by a Director and a Deputy 
Director appointed and subject to removal by the Chief Justice of the United States, 
after consulting with the Judicial Conference”).  In practice, Chief Justices have long 
been central to the selection of the Director of the AO.  Statutory authority to appoint 
the Director, however, resided with the Court as a whole until 1990.  Federal Courts Study 
Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 307, 104 Stat. 5089, 5112 
(Dec. 1, 1990) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 601 to provide for appointment by the Chief Jus-
tice).  As the House Report supporting the revision put it:  “the Administrative Of-
fice . . . does not serve the Supreme Court per se, for which reason, vesting the Su-
preme Court with authority to appoint the Director of the Administrative Office is 
illogical,” but the Chief Justice “works on a daily basis with the Director of the Adminis-
trative Office and has an obvious and substantial interest in naming a qualified person 
to fill this major judicial branch position.”  Federal Courts Study Committee Imple-
mentation Act of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 101-734 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6860, 6863-64.  The 1990 legislation stemmed from a recommendation made by the 
Federal Courts Study Committee, an entity chartered by Congress in 1988 and which 
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Appendix A, linked to those of the Chief Justices with whom they work.  
Most recently, for example, Leonidas Ralph Mecham, who was ap-
pointed in 1985 under Warren Burger and continued when William 
Rehnquist assumed that position in 1986, served as AO Director 
throughout Rehnquist’s tenure and resigned shortly after the Chief Jus-
tice’s death in 2005.84 
 Academics might respond to this description of the Chief Justice’s 
responsibilities with a proverbial “so what.”  A catalogue of powers on 
paper does not necessarily correspond to changes with implications for 
democratic theory and constitutional interpretation.  The details below 
will, we hope, make plain that what the infrastructure of “administrative” 
functions permits is a profoundly new set of opportunities for the Chief 
Justice to shape American law through methods less visible and accessi-
ble to law professors and the public than that of opinion writing.  Given 
America’s constitutional commitments not only to separation of powers 
but also to constrained and visible power, the Chief Justice’s expanding 
jurisdiction is increasingly countercultural. 
                                                                                                                                 
filed its report with Congress in 1990.  See Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (Nov. 19, 1988); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 150 (1990). 
84 See Longtime AO Chief Mecham to Step Down, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at 3 (de-
scribing his retirement, at age 77, after he had “reigned over the administrative side of 
the judicial branch with a strong, behind-the-scenes hand”).  Other Chief Justices and 
directors also worked interdependently.  See, e.g., Richard A. Chappell, Looking Back at 
Federal Probation, 66 FED. PROBATION 3, 5 (2002) (describing the creation of the AO in 
1939 and discussing its first Director, Henry Chandler, who served under Chief Justice 
Hughes and who had a particular interest in the probation system; Chandler influ-
enced Hughes’ decision to create a Judicial Conference committee focused on per-
formance standards for probation officers).  Warren Olney III—described by one biog-
rapher as “perhaps Warren’s closest personal acquaintance outside his family for the 
great bulk of Warren’s public career”—served as Director for the majority of Warren’s 
term as Chief Justice.  G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 97-98 (1982); 
see also Wheeler, supra note 76, at 39 (noting that Olney was a “close associate” of War-
ren during Warren’s tenure as Governor of California).  Rowland Kirks, a friend of 
Warren Burger before his appointment, took on the job soon after Chief Justice Bur-
ger’s tenure began in 1969 and remained in the position until Kirks died in 1977.  See 
Jean Hailey, Rowland Kirks, Administrator of U.S. Courts, Dies, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1977, 
at C12.  Director Kirks was succeeded by William Foley, who served until replaced by 
Ralph Meachan in 1985.  See generally THE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS:  SIXTY YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE UNITED STATES JUDICIARY 
(Cathy A. McCarthy & Tara Treacy eds., 2000); infra Appendix A, Tenure of Chief Jus-
tices of the United States, of Directors of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and 
of Directors of the Federal Judicial Center. 
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2.  Policymaking Through the Judicial Conference 
These various aspects of the administrative charter to the Chief Jus-
tice came into being through congressional responsiveness in the 1920s 
to the concerns of William Howard Taft.  He made several proposals, 
including that a council of judges meet annually;85 as noted, Congress 
responded by creating the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.86 
Initially, the nine senior circuit judges were charged with advising 
the Chief Justice about the “needs of [their] circuit[s] and as to any mat-
ters in respect of which the administration of justice in the courts of the 
United States may be improved.”87  Transcripts (stored in the National 
Archives) exist for about the first twenty years of the annual meetings.88  
Discussion consisted of oral reports from the senior circuit judges, de-
scribing how the individual judges with whom they worked were (or were 
not) managing to stay abreast of the work, as well as whether to request 
more judgeships.  As the decades advanced, topics ranged from better 
salaries, facilities, and supplies to concerns about rules of procedure, 
sentencing laws, and the need to provide indigent defendants with law-
yers.89 
By mid-century, the Judicial Conference took on its current form.  
Chief Justice Earl Warren deserves credit for persuading the circuit 
judges to permit trial-level judges to join their ranks.90  Today, the Chief 
Justice presides over a Judicial Conference of twenty-seven members.91  
                                                                                                                                 
85 See Taft, supra note 69, at 454.  Also proposed was reorganization of the judiciary 
and alteration of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to make most of it discretion-
ary.  See id.; William Howard Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A. J. 34 (1922); 
Hon. William Howard Taft, The Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice 
in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601 (1922); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certio-
rari:  Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 
1660-1704 (2000); Swindler, supra note 17, at 248. 
86 See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838; see also supra note 73 and 
accompanying text.  In 1937, Congress added the chief judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and in 1948, the Conference of Senior 
Circuit Judges was renamed the Judicial Conference of the United States.  See Act of 
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 902 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000)). 
87 Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838. 
88 See Judicial Conference Meetings Records, Record Group (RG) 116, National 
Archives, Washington D.C.; see also Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 1, at 940 n.50 (de-
scribing how these materials are organized). 
89 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 1, at 955-58; Resnik, Constricting Remedies, 
supra note 17, at 269-79. 
90 District judges became a part of the Conference in 1957.  Act of Aug. 28, 1957, 
Pub. L. No. 85-202, 71 Stat. 476 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000)). 
91 28 U.S.C. § 331 (authorizing the Chief Justice to call annual and special meet-
ings and to preside at them, as well as to excuse attendance of individuals and to 
“summon” replacement judges). 
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By statute, the chief judge of each federal circuit attends, as does the 
Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade.  In addition, each cir-
cuit sends a district judge, who serves for a term of three to five years.92  
The Conference now meets twice yearly and, aided by staff from the AO 
and the FJC, relies on an Executive Committee and more than two 
dozen standing committees appointed by the Chief Justice, some de-
voted to rulemaking and others addressing topics such as technology, 
criminal justice, and international judicial relations.93   
In terms of the issues considered, in the early 1930s, the Conference 
was self-conscious about its own charter and concerned that its authoriz-
ing legislation did not permit it to consider a broad set of questions.  
The Conference sought legislative revision to expand its mandate,94 but 
Congress did not respond directly.95  Yet, over the decades, the Judicial 
Conference took on a wider set of concerns.96 
                                                                                                                                 
92 Id. 
93 For example, the Committee on International Judicial Relations includes judges 
and a “liaison member from the State Department,” and its “mission” includes coordi-
nating “the federal judiciary’s relationship with foreign judiciaries and other organiza-
tions interested in international judicial relations and the establishment and expansion 
of the rule of law.”  Preface to FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, supra note 76.  For the current 
committees of the Judicial Conference, see COMMITTEES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 81. 
94 See Transcript at 335 (Oct. 3, 1930), in Judicial Conference Meetings Records, 
supra note 88, in Box 6 (Oct. 1929-Oct. 1930), Folder 1930 (Minutes and Transcript 
with index). 
95 The Conference asked a few times for authorization to make recommendations 
with regard to “changes in statutory law affecting the jurisdiction, practice, evidence 
and procedure.”  See, e.g., 1930 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, reprinted in U.S. ATT’Y 
GEN. ANN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1930 6; 1931 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, re-
printed in U.S. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1931 4, 12 (including the 
same request, to avoid “any question as to the scope of the authority which the Con-
gress intended to confer upon the Conference”); 1932 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, 
reprinted in U.S. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1932 6, 12 (expressing in-
tent to “renew its recommendation as to the advisability of this legislation”).  Although 
not amending the provision creating the Conference, Congress did give the Supreme 
Court the power to make rules of “practice and procedure.”  See Rules Enabling Act of 
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415; 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 
(2000)).  Revisions were made to the section dealing with the Conference in 1948, but 
they were intended to be stylistic rather than substantive.  See Revision of Titles 18 and 28 
of the United States Code:  Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on 
H.R. 1600 & 2055, 80th Cong. 3 (1947) (statement of Rep. Edward J. Devitt) (com-
menting that the 1948 revisions to the U.S. Code did not alter the directive to the Con-
ference).  The 1948 revisions did include the provision that the Chief Justice should 
“submit to Congress an annual report of the proceedings of the Judicial Conference 
and its recommendations for legislation,” explained by the Revisor’s Notes as “au-
thoriz[ing] the communications to Congress of information which now reaches that 
body only because [it is] incorporated in the annual report of the Attorney General.”  
See Revisor’s Notes, Legislative History of Title 28, United States Code, Judiciary and 
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For example, during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, the Con-
ference took up what was then called “protracted” and is now termed 
large-scale or complex litigation.  At the Conference’s behest, Congress 
created the multidistrict litigation (MDL) panel,97 which determines 
whether to consolidate cases filed in different federal courts around the 
country and involving similar claims (such as those concerning injuries 
from airplane crashes or allegations of antitrust or securities violations).  
During the Warren era, the Judicial Conference also began to sponsor 
educational programs, aimed at teaching judges how to handle both 
protracted and more ordinary cases.  Warren is also credited with having 
been instrumental in obtaining congressional support in the mid-1960s 
to create the FJC.98  Other areas of concern for Warren were bail reform, 
reconsideration of the bankruptcy system, and establishment of public 
defender organizations for criminal defendants in the federal courts.99  
In addition, Warren guided discussions at the Judicial Conference that 
culminated in a recommendation to the American Law Institute that it 
study federal jurisdictional grants.100  The outcome was a 1969 ALI pro-
posal to broaden federal question jurisdiction by dropping the amount 
in controversy requirement while narrowing diversity jurisdiction some-
what.101 
By most accounts, however, the profound changes in agenda-setting 
occurred during the tenure of Warren Burger.  Whatever the factors 
                                                                                                                                 
Judicial Procedure at A1, A45 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Gaunt & 
Sons, U.S. Government Documents, 1971); see also Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra 
note 17, at nn.304-06 and accompanying text. 
96 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 1, at 957-96 (providing examples of positions 
taken by the Judicial Conference). 
97 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).  For the history of that innovation and a comparison of 
its development with that of class actions, see generally Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to 
“Litigation,” 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991). 
98 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 1, at 942-49; Swindler, supra note 17, at 253-
55; Earl Warren, Address to the American Law Institute, 40 A.L.I. PROC. 25, 27 (1963); 
Wheeler, supra note 76, at 38-41. 
99 Warren, supra note 98, at 30-32. 
100 See 1956 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, reprinted in U.S. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1956 at 15; Earl Warren, Address to the American Law Institute, 36 
A.L.I. PROC. 27, 31-34 (1959). 
101 See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 4 (federal question jurisdiction), 2-3 (diversity jurisdiction) (1969).  One 
scholar has noted that in another context—a case study regarding proposed creation 
of a federal district court in San Diego—Warren served as a quiet participant and 
showed concern about what form of engagement was appropriate in light of his role.  
See Carl Baar, When Judges Lobby:  Congress and Court Administration (Aug. 1969) 
(unpublished two-volume Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago), available for pur-
chase at http://resources.library.yale.edu/online/viewrecorddetpublic.asp?whatcaseedit=960 
(also on file with the Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania). 
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(different professional backgrounds, Congresses with whom they inter-
acted, personal styles, political attitudes, judgments about the utilities of 
visible interventions or about judicial role, or jurisprudential philoso-
phies) influencing Earl Warren’s more circumspect stance, Chief Justice 
Burger took a different tack.  As one commentator put it, within short 
order of assuming that position, Chief Justice Warren Burger had intro-
duced a new type of activism into the role of Chief Justice:  leader of law 
“reform” of both the federal and the state systems102 in a fashion 
“broader than anything in the nation’s judicial experience.”103  In 1974, 
Chief Justice Burger described his own first five years as full of “pro-
gress,” evidenced by initiatives that included the creation of the Institute 
for Court Management to train administrators for state and federal 
courts, the establishment of Circuit Executive positions in the federal 
courts, the development of grievance procedures for prisoners, and the 
chartering of the National Center for State Courts to link state courts.104   
Chief Justice Burger’s administrative interests reflected his attitudes 
towards federalism and his skepticism about some of the Warren Court’s 
constitutional reforms.105  Burger encouraged state courts to improve 
                                                                                                                                 
102 Swindler, supra note 17, at 241-42; see also id. at n.6 (citing a 1971 speech in 
which the Chief Justice stated that he had an “obligation to be concerned about the 
problems of state courts as well as the federal courts because the problems of justice 
are indivisible”). 
103 Id. at 264.  “Activism” is the term used by others to capture Burger’s efforts at 
court reform and his work as Chair of the Judicial Conference.  See Arthur R. Landever, 
Chief Justice Burger and Extra-Case Activism, 20 J. PUB. L. 523, 523 (1971) (“The term 
‘activism’ as used in this paper relates to the Chief Justice’s myriad activities in judicial 
administration . . . .”); see also Tamm & Reardon, supra note 17, at 452 (commenting on 
the degree to which Burger expanded the role of the Chief Justice); Comments of 
Jeffrey B. Morris, 1982 Virginia Conference, supra note 3, at 169 (characterizing Bur-
ger’s tenure as a “watershed” in the federal judiciary’s relations to state courts). 
104 Letter from Warren E. Burger to Chesterfield Smith, President of the American 
Bar Association (Aug. 8, 1974), reprinted in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION:  TEXT AND READ-
INGS 70-73 (Russell R. Wheeler & Howard R. Whitcomb eds., 1977) [hereinafter JUDI-
CIAL ADMINISTRATION]; see also Swindler, supra note 17, at 245 (describing the incorpo-
ration of the National Center for State Courts in 1971 as “traceable to the Chief Jus-
tice’s affirmative proposals”); Tamm & Reardon, supra note 17, at 454-92 (detailing 
initiatives to Congress on state-federal relations); STEAMER, supra note 17, at 188-92 
(discussing those agendas).  As Burger’s Administrative Assistant, Mark Cannon, put it, 
“The very existence of the Institute for Court Management, the National Center for 
State Courts, the State-Federal Judicial Councils, the National Institute of Corrections, 
and others are due to him.”  1982 Virginia Conference, supra note 3, at 170. 
105 Other commentators have also noted Burger’s efforts to use his administrative 
position to advance his vision of the proper role of federal courts and the centrality of 
state court decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Tamm & Reardon, supra note 17, at 492-99.  Fur-
ther, in his jurisprudence as in his speeches, Chief Justice Burger argued that many 
decisions were “more properly left to the determination by the States and the people 
than to the courts operating under the broad mandate of the Fourteenth Amend-
  
2006] RESPONDING TO A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 1603 
their own processes,106 in part as a means of enhancing advocates’ abili-
ties to argue to the Supreme Court that it, in turn, ought to constrain 
the reach of national powers in both civil and criminal contexts.107  Ob-
jecting to “added burdens” on the federal courts,108 Chief Justice Burger 
also sought to cut back on federal court jurisdiction—for example, by 
advancing proposals to abolish diversity jurisdiction109 and to limit pris-
oner litigation.110  Other techniques aimed at curbing use of courts, 
                                                                                                                                 
ment.”  Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).  The decision in Gordon reversed the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which had concluded that West Virginia’s 
requirement that incurring public debt required a supermajority vote violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, stating that the 
Supreme Court of West Virginia had correctly read the mandates of Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962), and of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to require invalidation of 
the West Virginia system; the supermajority rule had, between 1964 and 1968, resulted 
in rejection of a series of efforts to increase public school funding through special 
bonds.  Gordon, 403 U.S. at 8; Lance v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Roane, 170 S.E. 2d 
783, 788-91 (W. Va. 1969). 
106 See Swindler, supra note 17, at 247 n.20 (citing a speech given by the Chief Jus-
tice before the National Association of Attorneys General on proposals for “self-help”). 
107 See id. 
108 Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, Remarks of Warren E. 
Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, Before the American Bar Association Mid-Winter Meet-
ing 1 (Feb. 23, 1975), reprinted in STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:  ANNUAL REPORTS 
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Shelley L. 
Dowling ed., 2000) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE]; see also War-
ren E. Burger, Report on Problems of the Judiciary, Remarks of Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice 
of the United States, Before the American Bar Association 3 (Aug. 14, 1972), reprinted in AN-
NUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE (stating that additional federal judges are needed 
“not because anyone in the system wants this expansion,” but because “there is no es-
cape from constantly enlarging the federal judicial establishment except to adopt new 
judicial methods and improve performance . . . and to have Congress carefully scruti-
nize all legislation that will create more cases”). 
109 Warren E. Burger, Address to the American Law Institute (May 20-23, 1975), in 52 
A.L.I. PROC. 29, 37-38 (1975) (stating that “something must be done” about the court’s 
docket and recommending that Congress abolish diversity of citizenship, eliminate 
three-judge district courts, and remove all mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court not constitutionally required). 
110 Burger was eager for prisons to develop grievance procedures to be used as a 
predicate to or in lieu of federal litigation.  See Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The 
Condition of the Judiciary, Year-End Report 5 (Jan. 3, 1976), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS 
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (urging that “[f]ederal judges should not be 
dealing with prisoner complaints which, although important to a prisoner, are so mi-
nor that any well-run institution should be able to resolve them fairly without resort to 
federal judges”); see also Warren E. Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch, Remarks 
of Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States to the American Bar Association 12 (Aug. 
6, 1973), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (recom-
mending that Congress create “a statutory administrative procedure for federal prisons 
to provide for hearing prisoner complaints . . . and require that these procedures be 
exhausted before any proceeding could be filed in federal courts”); Chief Justice War-
ren E. Burger, Year-End Report on the Judiciary 12-13 (Dec. 29, 1980), reprinted in ANNUAL 
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promoted by Burger, were expanded reliance on alternative dispute 
resolution111 and on long-range planning.112 
Commentators described Chief Justice Burger as using his authority 
over committee appointments as a means of advancing his agendas.  
Those chosen to serve on an Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules 
were said to be more sympathetic to “a law enforcement perspective” 
than had been individuals selected under Chief Justice Warren113 (who 
might in turn have been characterized as more responsive to concerns 
about fair process for defendants).  The appointments that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist made to committees have also been argued to be partisan.114  
Further, as rule-making committees came in the 1960s and thereafter to 
serve as “continuing bodies,” their powers grew, thereby enhancing the 
impact of the Chief Justice’s ability to influence committees’ composi-
tion and charters.115 
                                                                                                                                 
REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (discussing the need to improve prison 
conditions and for rehabilitation, as well as the utility of grievance procedures as a 
means of expediting the petition process and reducing the federal courts’ caseload). 
111 See Warren E. Burger, Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 5 (Jan. 1, 1978), 
reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (reporting that the 
Judicial Conference, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the ABA sponsored a 1976 
conference at which participants “probed at and challenged traditional assumptions of 
our justice system, particularly the view that litigation in the courts is the best means to 
resolve disputes”); Chief Warren E. Burger, Year-End Report 3 (Dec. 31, 1978), reprinted 
in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (describing an experimental 
arbitration program in three district courts and stating that the program provides 
“hope . . . that many cases may be diverted away from the federal courts, with savings 
for all—in less time than in courts”); Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Year-End Report on 
the Judiciary 3 (Dec. 31, 1979), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, su-
pra note 108 (stating that the Federal Judicial Center, in cooperation with the Depart-
ment of Justice, was evaluating the experimental programs in the district courts and 
that “[l]essons in the states suggest that court-annexed arbitration may reduce substan-
tially the time and costs of resolving certain types of civil disputes”); Chief Justice War-
ren E. Burger, Year-End Report on the Judiciary 5 (Dec. 29, 1980), reprinted in ANNUAL 
REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (stating that “[o]ften, minor disputes 
may be more effectively resolved, at less time and cost through informal channels 
rather than through extensive litigation in courts”). 
112 See J. Clifford Wallace, The Future of the Judiciary:  A Proposal, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 
361, 361-62 (1991) (describing Chief Justice Burger’s request in 1980 that Judge Wal-
lace help map a strategy for long-range planning). 
113 See Carl Baar, Federal Judicial Administration:  Political Strategies and Organizational 
Change, in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 104, at 97, 109 n.25. 
114 See Jeffrey Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post:  The Continuing Odys-
sey of Discovery “Reform,” 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 250-51 (2001) (“In short, under 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Committee process has been ideologized and politicized 
to the point where its credibility is subject to serious question.”). 
115 Baar, supra note 113, at 106-07; see also id. at 109 n.28 (noting that “Chief Justice 
Burger has both criticized Supreme Court decisions on criminal procedure and sup-
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When Chief Justice Rehnquist came into office in 1986, his man-
agement approach was sufficiently distinct to prompt Linda Greenhouse 
to call Burger a “negative model” for Rehnquist.116  However much their 
styles varied, the agendas of Chief Justice Rehnquist forwarded much of 
what Chief Justice Burger had begun.  To augment the judiciary’s insti-
tutional resources devoted to planning, an “Office of Judicial Impact 
Assessment” came into being in 1991 inside the AO to focus on antici-
pating the effects of proposed legislation.117  That process proved com-
plex and controversial.  One issue was how to count the costs and the 
benefits of proposed new causes of action, new federal crimes, or of dif-
ferent remedies.  Another was the challenge of estimating the number of 
claims that would be brought if a new law were to be enacted.118  In gen-
eral, the focus has been on predicting whether and how much federal 
court dockets would change; projections of additional filings have gen-
erally been assumed to have negative consequences.119  
In the early 1990s, under Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Judicial Con-
ference created a committee on Long Range Planning; in 1995, it put 
forth the judiciary’s first (and currently only) Long Range Plan, making 
                                                                                                                                 
ported increased responsibilities for the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Rules”) (citation omitted). 
116 Greenhouse, supra note 48, at 1367. 
117 See Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary:  Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating 
the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 271 (2000); see also LONG-RANGE 
PLANNING FOR CIRCUIT COUNCILS:  SPEECHES PRESENTED AT THE MEETING OF THE JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1992) (discussing the need 
to do so at a circuit level as well). 
118 The idea of assessing the “impact” of proposed legislation on courts was pro-
moted by Chief Justice Burger in his 1970 State of the Judiciary Address and thereafter.  
See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Remarks on the State of the Judiciary, Before the American Bar 
Association 18 (Aug. 10, 1970), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
supra note 108 (urging creation of a Judiciary Council to advise Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the Judicial Conference on matters affecting the federal courts and to report 
to Congress on the impact of any proposed legislation likely to enlarge federal jurisdic-
tion); Warren E. Burger, Report on Problems of the Judiciary, Remarks of Warren E. Burger, 
Chief Justice of the United States, Before the American Bar Association 3 (Aug. 14, 1972), re-
printed in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (suggesting that 
“every piece of legislation creating new cases be accompanied by a ‘court impact state-
ment’”); Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, Remarks of Warren 
E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, Before the American Bar Association 11 (Feb. 23, 
1975), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (stating that 
because Congress undertook no “impact study” of the Speedy Trial Act, “we [referring 
to the Administrative Office] have undertaken to do so” and providing the results of 
that study); see also Tamm & Reardon, supra note 17, at 474-75. 
119 See generally CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION ON THE 
WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS:  PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (A. Fletcher Mangum ed., Fed. 
Jud. Ctr. 1995). 
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ninety-three recommendations.120  Included was a request that Congress 
have a presumption against enacting any new rights for civil litigants, if 
those actions were to be enforced in federal court, as well as a presump-
tion against prosecuting more crimes in federal courts.121  The Judicial 
Conference formally adopted that position as its policy, and the Confer-
ence also endorsed many other recommendations related to the alloca-
tion of power among state, federal, and administrative adjudicators and 
to the structure of decisionmaking and administration within the federal 
courts.122 
To summarize, under the leadership of the last three Chief Justices 
and with the support of the AO and the FJC, the Judicial Conference has 
enlarged its own purview in a variety of directions, and the Chief Justice’s 
job has changed.  In many respects, the judiciary’s growth resembles that 
of other administrative agencies seeking to equip themselves to dis-
charge assigned tasks.  As concerns grew that demands of the cases filed 
exceeded the resources provided by Congress to decide them, the Fed-
eral Judicial Center developed and the Judicial Conference approved a 
“weighted case” system for the district courts to document why more 
slots were needed in particular courts.123  Further, when seeking re-
sources for building courthouses or for staffing the Probation Depart-
ment, paying public defenders, and keeping abreast of the workload, the 
judiciary has learned that it needs to provide data to a sometimes unin-
                                                                                                                                 
120 See LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (Jud. Conf. of the U.S. 1995), 
166 F.R.D. 49 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN].  Congress had originally 
charged the Federal Courts Study Committee—a body that it created—with developing 
such a plan.  See Federal Courts Study Act, supra note 83, § 102, 102 Stat. at 4644 (creat-
ing the Federal Courts Study Committee to “examine problems and issues currently 
facing the courts of the United States” and to “develop a long-range plan for the future 
of the Federal judiciary”).  The congressionally-created committee encouraged the 
Judicial Conference to enhance its own long-range planning capability.  See REPORT OF 
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 83, at 146. 
121 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 120, at 23, 166 F.R.D. at 83 (detailing Rec-
ommendation 1); id. at 24-25, 166 F.R.D. at 84 (detailing Recommendation 2); id. at 
28-29, 166 F.R.D. at 88-89 (detailing Recommendation 6). 
122 The Conference formally adopted the ninety-three recommendations but did 
not specifically approve the commentary of the drafting committee.  See Memorandum 
from L. Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conf. of the United States, in LONG RANGE 
PLAN, supra note 120, at 1, 166 F.R.D. at 51. 
123 The Conference revised its case weighting system in 2004.  See ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, Caseload Highlights, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 22-
23 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/front/caseload.pdf; PATRICIA LOMBARD & 
CAROL KRAFKA, 2003-2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 
2005), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/pages/665. 
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terested, unreceptive, or critical Congress.124  Under the leadership of 
several Chief Justices, the Judicial Conference and the AO have sup-
ported arguments for the judiciary with documentation in order to per-
suade Congress to provide resources. 
But the parameters of the lobbying efforts on behalf of the judiciary 
and its leadership require further examination.  While proposals for bet-
ter facilities or more staff fall under the rubric of requests that would be 
made by any organization hoping to protect or to improve its own situa-
tion, other recommendations—such as taking stances against increasing 
the ranks of life-tenured judges, against more avenues to the federal 
courts through congressional enactment of specific new civil causes of 
action and federal crimes, or for transferring more responsibility from 
federal courts to administrative adjudicators—embody serious questions 
of constitutional law and of policy.  While the Judicial Conference once 
categorized a range of matters as issues of “legislative policy” about 
which it should not comment, the Conference now regularly lets Con-
gress know its views on an array of pending bills.  The Chief Justice and 
the Conference have become important presences in the legislative 
process.125 
Furthermore, the retrenchment in federal rights enforcement that 
marked the jurisprudence of both the Burger and Rehnquist chief jus-
ticeships can also be seen in the administrative agendas that they per-
sonally championed and that the Judicial Conference, under their lead-
ership, often endorsed.126  Through a host of discretionary judgments, 
                                                                                                                                 
124 See, e.g., Where the Money Goes:  A Look At How The Judiciary’s FY 2005 Budget Is 
Divided, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 2005, at 1 (describing that about a quarter of the judici-
ary’s budget supports courthouses, as the federal judiciary has to pay “rent” to the 
General Services Administration for the use of facilities).  The federal judiciary has 
often used the term “crisis” to capture concerns about insufficient funds.  See, e.g., Press 
Release, Leonidas R. Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office (Dec. 20, 2005) 
(announcing his retirement and stating that he would have retired earlier had the 
judiciary not been in “the midst of a debilitating financial crisis”); As Workload and Re-
sources Head in Opposite Directions, Crisis Looms for Federal Courts, THIRD BRANCH, Mar. 
2004, at 1.  In 2006, Representative Sensenbrenner and Senator Specter, chairs of the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees respectively, introduced new legislation to 
limit judicial rent to the actual costs of operating and maintaining judicial accommo-
dations.  See Judiciary Rent Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 4710, 109th Cong. (2006); A Bill 
To Provide Relief for the Federal Judiciary from Excessive Rent Charges, S. 2292, 109th 
Cong (2006). 
125 Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 17, at 281-91; see also 2004 JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 123, at 2 (reporting that “[a]t the direction 
of the Judicial Conference, the Administrative Office continued to pursue an active 
legislative agenda” in 2004). 
126 See also Carolyn Dineen King, Commentary, A Matter of Conscience, 28 HOUS. L. 
REV. 955, 961-62 (1991) (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s advocacy of “congres-
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these Chief Justices have used their status as presiding officers to shape 
institutional decisions about what jurisdictional and remedial powers 
ought to reside in courts and agencies, both state and federal. 
3.  Addressing the Nation 
In addition to guiding the Judicial Conference as it adopts formal 
policy through voting and influencing the work of the AO and FJC, the 
Chief Justice has an independent platform from which to speak.  Chief 
Justice Taft and his successors went regularly to the American Bar Asso-
ciation and to the American Law Institute to give major addresses on 
their views of the judiciary’s needs and priorities.127  Proposals to do 
more surfaced periodically,128 and, in the 1980s, Chief Justice Burger ini-
tiated another practice:  providing annual “state of the judiciary” reports.  
While not quite the dramatic presentation to joint houses of Congress 
that some had suggested,129 the Chief Justice’s annual statements, now 
customarily released on January 1, gain some attention in the national 
news as they recap one year and set out concerns for the next.130 
Reading the statements of the different Chief Justices serving be-
tween the 1920s and today, certain issues—the size of dockets, the needs 
for regularization and rulemaking, and support of and funding for the 
judiciary—are regularly addressed.  But under Warren Burger and Wil-
liam Rehnquist, another theme—curtailing the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral district courts—came into sharp relief.  On several occasions, Burger 
opined against enlarging federal jurisdiction:  “[T]he federal court sys-
tem is for a limited purpose . . . . People speak glibly of putting all the 
problems of pollution, of crowded cities, of consumer class actions and 
                                                                                                                                 
sional restraint in creating federal causes of action” and his concerns about keeping 
federal judgeships as prestigious positions, attractive to talented individuals). 
127 See FISH, supra note 65, at 50. 
128 See id. at 315-16 (describing Chief Justice Warren’s support for a “State of the 
Judiciary” speech). 
129 See E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., The Chief Justice Should Address Congress, 56 A.B.A. J. 
441, 441 (1970) (citing such a suggestion made in 1953 by William P. Rogers).  Pretty-
man argued that the “new and frightening set of figures on the growth of litigation” 
warranted more attention, planning, and financing, and that public support could be 
generated through such national addresses that would pressure Congress to be more 
forthcoming in response to the judiciary’s requests.  Id. at 441, 444.  According to Peter 
Fish, when Warren Burger proposed going to the Congress to deliver such addresses, 
the Nixon White House objected that such presentations could overshadow those of 
the President.  See Fish, Office of Chief Justice, supra note 3, at 117.  Fish also recounts that 
Judge Biggs had proposed that the Chief Justice address Congress.  FISH, supra note 65, 
at 315-16. 
130 See Sofia Yakren, Chief Justices’ Addresses to the ALI and the ABA, March 2, 
2003 (memorandum on file with the authors). 
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others in the federal courts.”131  Chief Justice Burger objected to liberal 
standing doctrine, too “expansive” interpretations of federal statutes, too 
many prisoner petitions, and too narrow understandings of the immu-
nity of government officials.132 
While changing the format somewhat in terms of the style and tim-
ing of the yearly reports, William Rehnquist also used that medium to 
insist that too many issues were before the federal courts.133  For exam-
ple, in one address, he cited as problematic new civil causes of action, 
such as the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (nicknamed the “Dead-
beat Dad Act” and aimed at using federal courts to enforce support obli-
gations of out-of-state parents).134  In another year-end report, he op-
posed the creation of new federal crimes, “such as those involving juve-
niles and handgun murders.”135  Chief Justice Rehnquist also identified 
whole sets of cases, such as those filed under the Federal Employee Li-
ability Act (FELA) and the Jones Act, as candidates for Congress to re-
move from the federal docket.136    
                                                                                                                                 
131 Warren E. Burger, Remarks on the State of the Judiciary, Before the American Bar 
Association 17 (Aug. 10, 1970), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
supra note 108; see also Warren E. Burger, Address to the American Law Institute, 49 A.L.I. 
PROC. 23, 29 (1972) (“Our basic system of justice, of course, lies within state power and 
it should remain that way, with Federal Courts functioning, as the Constitution in-
tended they should, as courts of special and limited jurisdiction.”). 
132 Warren E. Burger, Address to the American Law Institute, 57 A.L.I. PROC. 29, 33-34 
(1980); see also id. at 32-33 (attributing the “litigation explosion” in part to federal 
courts’ “expansive, rather than restricted” interpretation of new statutes providing 
federal causes of actions “along with a narrowing of the scope of immunity of govern-
ment officials”); Warren E. Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch, Remarks of War-
ren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, to the American Bar Association 12-13 (Aug. 6, 
1973), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (suggesting 
that prisoners’ claims be resolved by informal grievance procedures or administrative 
hearings, and that habeas cases be referred to “magistrates” or to special masters). 
133 See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text; see also William H. Rehnquist, The 
1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 6 (Jan. 1, 1998), reprinted in ANNUAL RE-
PORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (stating that “the Effective Death Penalty 
Act and the [Prison Litigation Reform Act] appear to be promising examples of how 
Congress can reduce the disparity between resources and workload in the federal judi-
ciary without endangering its distinctive character”). 
134 See William H. Rehnquist, Address to the American Law Institute, 75 A.L.I. PROC. 
55, 58 (1998) (stating that “one senses [about this and other bills] from the context in 
which they were enacted that the question of whether the states are doing an adequate 
job in this particular area was never seriously asked”); Child Support Recovery Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (Oct. 25, 1992) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 228). 
135 William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 5 (1993), 
reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108. 
136 See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judici-
ary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 3 (citing a recommendation from the Federal Courts 
Study Committee, described, supra notes 83 and 120). 
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Interested in limiting the role of courts, both Chief Justices Burger 
and Rehnquist also encouraged reliance on alternative dispute resolu-
tion.137  Their commitment to such alternatives can be seen in their pub-
lic speeches and in the jurisprudence of the Court.  During the chief 
justiceships of both Burger and Rehnquist, the Court moved away from 
the case law of earlier decades that had refused to enforce contracts re-
quiring arbitration in lieu of pursuing federal statutory claims in court.138  
In the 1980s and thereafter, plaintiffs who had signed contracts to arbi-
trate were sent to privately run dispute resolution programs to present 
their claims under federal securities, Truth-in-Lending laws, or state anti-
discrimination statutes; the Court concluded that, as long as such resolu-
tion programs provided a sufficient method to vindicate such rights, con-
tracts that precluded litigation were enforceable.139 
                                                                                                                                 
137 See supra note 111 (providing examples of Chief Justice Burger’s admiration for 
alternative dispute resolution programs); William H. Rehnquist, 1986 Year-End State-
ment 5 (1986), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108. 
138 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (declining to enforce the par-
ties’ arbitration clause when a plaintiff’s claim was based on section 12(2) of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 and discussing arbitration as too flexible and unregulated to serve as 
a substitute for adjudication), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (reinterpreting the Securities Act to permit 
enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements, lauding arbitration for its flexibility 
and informality, and noting that adjudication and arbitration both were forms of dis-
pute resolution). 
139 During Burger’s tenure, the Court initiated this line of cases when it decided 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  As the Court 
there explained its view:  “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution 
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”  Id. at 628.  The Court later relied on 
Mitsubishi to hold in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991), that 
an arbitration clause contained in an application to register as a securities representa-
tive with the New York Stock Exchange barred federal court review of a statutory age 
discrimination claim so long as the alternative forum provided an adequate means to 
vindicate statutory rights.  More recently, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 
444, 453 (2003), the Court relied on these earlier precedents to hold that an arbitrator 
rather than a federal court must decide whether an arbitration clause contained in a 
standard loan agreement required arbitration of a class dispute.  See also Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006) (reversing the Florida Su-
preme Court’s ruling that an arbitration clause could not be severed from an allegedly 
unlawful contract, and holding that the question of the contract’s validity must be sent 
to arbitration).  Further, although some lower courts had carved out a view that claims 
of discrimination in employment ought to be differently handled, the Court disagreed 
in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).  For further discussion, see generally 
Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 
(1996); Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings For and Ensuring 
Against the Harms of Sexual Harrassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARRASSMENT LAW 
247-71 (Catharine MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). 
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During the last few years of his tenure, Chief Justice Rehnquist also 
regularly addressed the values of judicial independence.  He criticized 
Congress and the Executive for engaging in behavior that, he believed, 
suggested that the coordinate branches of government did not suffi-
ciently appreciate what an independent judiciary brings to a thriving 
democracy.140  In his last such annual report in 2004, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist objected specifically to attacks against individual judges’ rul-
ings but noted that the President could, through selection, seek to ap-
point judges more congenial to his point of view.141  On January 1, 2006, 
Chief Justice Roberts carried on the “30-year-old tradition,” with a short 
statement focused mostly on the need for better funding for the judici-
ary and better salaries for judges.142 
4.  Lobbying the Congress 
In the literature on judicial lobbying, Burger is infamous—with 
many commentators citing in particular his impact on the design of the 
bankruptcy system.  When considering what came to be known as the 
1978 reforms, members of Congress contemplated creating life-tenured 
judgeships for bankruptcy judges.143  The Judicial Conference took a po-
sition against that proposition, and the Chief Justice was a very present 
lobbyist opposed to conferring Article III status on bankruptcy judges.144 
                                                                                                                                 
140 See, e.g., Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 2004 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Rehnquist, 2004 Year-End Report] 
(discussing the “crisis” in funding and the attacks on the judiciary); see also Chief Jus-
tice William H. Rehnquist, Key Note Address, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 263, 267, 271-74 (1996) 
(discussing the value of judicial independence and appropriate and inappropriate ways 
to criticize and to influence the courts). 
141 See Rehnquist, 2004 Year-End Report, supra note 140, at 2-3 (stating that “public 
reaction to judicial decisions, if it is sustained and widespread, can be a factor in the 
electoral process and lead to the appointment of judges who might decide cases differ-
ently” but arguing that “Congress’s authority to impeach and remove judges should 
not extend to decisions from the bench”); see also Russell R. Wheeler, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist as Third Branch Leader, 89 JUDICATURE 116, 118-19 (2005) [hereinafter 
Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist] (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s comments on 
judicial independence and attacks on the judiciary). 
142 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, 2005 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD 
BRANCH, Jan. 2006, at 1. 
143 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 7 (1977) (discussing House Bill No. 8200 and ex-
plaining that bankruptcy judges would become Article III judges, appointed by the 
President upon the consent of the Senate to life terms). 
144 See Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:  The Chief Jus-
tice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7-12 (1985). 
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Although Burger’s personal efforts at persuasion annoyed some 
members of the Senate,145 the legislation enacted bore signs of his im-
pact.  Instead of Article III status, Congress authorized bankruptcy 
judges to serve for fourteen-year terms.146  Yet these jurists also had juris-
dictional authority over both “core” and “related” bankruptcy matters.147  
In 1982, a plurality of the Supreme Court, not including Chief Justice 
Burger, concluded that this broad a grant of jurisdiction exceeded the 
constitutional limits of delegation to jurists lacking Article III tenure and 
salary protections.148  Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, in turn, insisted that 
Congress need not respond by undertaking “a radical restructuring of 
the present system of bankruptcy adjudication.”149 
The Court stayed its mandate to enable Congress to revise the bank-
ruptcy system,150 but new legislation was not immediately forthcoming.151  
In the interim, the AO, at the request of the Judicial Conference, im-
plemented an “emergency rule” under which district courts delegated 
bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy judges in a manner understood to 
be constitutional.152  Chief Justice Burger used the opportunities of his 
1982 and 1983 year-end reports to praise the effectiveness of the interim 
measures and to inveigh against granting bankruptcy judges Article III 
                                                                                                                                 
145 See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 47, 90 (1997) (quoting Senator Dennis DeConcini describing Burger as 
having “not only lobbied, but pressured and attempted to be intimidating”); Nancy L. 
Ross, Carter Expected to Sign Revised Bankruptcy Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1978, at D8 
(noting that “[s]everal legislators accused the Chief Justice of breaching the doctrine 
of separation of powers”). 
146 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 
2657-58 (1978).  The statute authorized bankruptcy judges to continue service beyond 
the 14-year term until such time as a successor was appointed and took office.  Id. 
147 See id. § 241(a), 92 Stat. at 2668-69. 
148 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion) (Brennan, J. joined by Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.); id. at 
89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by O’Connor, J.); id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting); id. at 92-118 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J.).  
The exact parameters of the unconstitutionality have since been a source of debate.  
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988); Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 
56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581 (1985). 
149 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
150 Id. at 88 (staying judgment until October 4, 1982); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982) (granting the Solicitor General’s motion 
to stay the judgment until December 24, 1982). 
151 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 1094 (1982) (de-
clining, on December 23, 1982, the Solicitor General’s motion to extend the stay). 
152 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (1982) (directing the Administrative Office to im-
plement an emergency rule). 
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status.153  The federal judiciary did not, according to the Chief Justice, 
support “casually resorting to creation of specialized [Article III] 
courts.”154  In 1984, Congress passed a revised version of the statute that 
narrowed the jurisdictional grant somewhat and did not give life tenure 
to bankruptcy judges.155 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist pursued a similarly focused campaign, 
when he opposed aspects of the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA), legislation that was first introduced in 1990 and enacted in 
1994. This multi-faceted statute had provisions for new federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction, funding for programs to protect victims of violence 
(with special attention paid to college campuses), enforcement of inter-
state protection orders, and a new civil rights damage remedy in federal 
court for victims of violence motivated by gender.156  It was the proposed 
new cause of action—permitting private damage actions in federal dis-
trict court—that drew the Chief Justice’s ire.  After an initial draft was 
introduced in the early 1990s, the Judicial Conference chartered an Ad 
Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence, appointed by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, to review the pending statute. 
                                                                                                                                 
153 See Warren E. Burger, 1983 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 5 (1983), reprinted in 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108 (explaining that “due to con-
gressional inaction following [Northern Pipeline], bankruptcy cases ha[d] been heard 
under a model interim bankruptcy rule recommended by the Judicial Conference of 
the United States” and that given the effectiveness of this rule, “[n]o extravagant, long-
range expansion of the bankruptcy system is justified, and there is no need whatever to 
create 300 or more Article III ‘lifetime judgeships’ to deal with a passing problem”). 
154 Warren E. Burger, 1982 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 2-3 (1982), reprinted in 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108; see also id. at 3 (stating that 
creation of “specialized Article III courts” would be “a remedy worse than the ‘dis-
ease’”). 
155 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-353, § 104, 98 Stat. 333, 336 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2000)).  More con-
flict between the Courts and Congress followed.  In addition to setting bankruptcy 
judges’ terms and defining their jurisdiction, the 1984 Act retroactively extended the 
terms of the bankruptcy judges then in office.  William Foley, Director of the AO, 
thought that provision of questionable constitutionality and refused to authorize the 
pay for judges sitting with extended terms.  Bankruptcy judges and commentators criti-
cized Foley’s action, and Director Foley eventually relented.  See Bankruptcy Judge Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1984, at D18; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Burger Said To Support Ban on Bank-
ruptcy Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1984, at A35; Stuart Taylor, Jr., U.S. Official Won’t Pay 
Bankruptcy Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1984, at D1. 
156 See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40304, 
108 Stat. 1796, 1902-42 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.) [herein-
after VAWA]. 
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The Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendation of opposition157 became 
official federal judicial policy.158  The Chief Justice explained that posi-
tion in his 1991 year-end report, stating that the “broad definition of 
criminal conduct is so open-ended, and the new private right of action 
so sweeping, that the legislation would involve the federal courts in a 
whole host of domestic relations disputes.”159  Relying on claims that a 
flood of lawsuits (tens of thousands, with costs estimated to range from 
“$44 million dollars and 450 work years” to “$81 million dollars and 922 
work years”160) would follow if women had federal remedies for gender-
based violence, the Judicial Conference reported to Congress that it did 
not support enactment of the new civil rights remedy of VAWA. 
After the draft legislation was modified in response to the concerns 
raised by both state and federal judges and its scope narrowed, the Judi-
cial Conference took no position on the propriety of enacting the civil 
rights remedy and supported aspects of the legislation related to educa-
tion on fair treatment in courts.161  In 1994, with the support of attorneys 
general from some forty jurisdictions and many others, VAWA came into 
being.  That version of the legislation included the provision of new fed-
eral jurisdiction (supplemental to that available in state courts) giving 
civil remedies to victims of gender-motivated violence.162    
                                                                                                                                 
157 Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Vio-
lence 1, 7 (1991). 
158 See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1991, at 1 (objecting that the proposed private 
right of action was too “sweeping”). 
159 Id. at 3. 
160 A first estimate in 1991 put the annual cost to the judiciary as $62.5 million and 
691 work years; a second, in January of 1992, suggested “$44 million and 450 work 
years,” and a third, in June of 1992, offered an estimate of $81 million and 922 work 
years.  See Violence Against Women:  Victims of the System:  Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 10 (1991) (quoting an Office of Judicial Impact 
Assessment estimate); Office of Judicial Impact Assessment, Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Judicial Impact Statement:  Violence Against Women Act of 1991, S. 15 as Re-
ported 2 (Jan. 8, 1992); Office of Judicial Impact Assessment, Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Judicial Impact Statement:  Violence Against Women Act of 1991, S. 15 as Re-
ported 1 (June 8, 1992).   
161 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (1993) (“[T]he Conference takes no 
position on specific provisions of the proposed Violence Against Women Act . . . .”). 
162 See VAWA, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302(c), 108 Stat. 1796, 1941, which pro-
vided: 
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence 
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in sub-
section (b) shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of 
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Thereafter, the Chief Justice continued his criticism of VAWA.  In 
1998, in a speech before the American Law Institute, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist cited the civil rights remedy of VAWA (as well as other stat-
utes) as an inappropriate expansion of federal jurisdiction.  In his view, 
“traditional principles of federalism that have guided this country 
throughout its existence” should have relegated these issues to state 
courts.163  In 2000, in United States v. Morrison, the Chief Justice wrote the 
majority opinion that ruled, five to four, that Congress lacked the power 
under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment to 
create the civil rights remedy of VAWA.164  
And, as discussed above, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dislike of the ex-
pansion of federal remedies was not limited to his administrative and 
adjudicative opposition to VAWA.  More generally, he guided the Judi-
cial Conference, and he selected colleagues to lead the Conference’s 
long-range planning that developed policies discouraging Congress from 
the creation of new federal rights.165  Constitutional scholars often speak 
of the “Rehnquist Court” but ought instead call his era the “Rehnquist 
Judiciary” to capture his effectiveness, of which doctrinal developments 
in the Court were only one aspect. 
5.  Appointing Judges to Special Courts and Committees 
Yet another aspect of the powers held by the Chief Justice is impor-
tant:  the authority to select sitting jurists to serve on specialized courts 
and on committees.  In the federal system, Congress has created a series 
of courts staffed by life-tenured judges already commissioned and tem-
porarily assigned an extra obligation.  Rather than using a system that 
mixes elements of randomness with purposive sampling (for example, 
drawing one name by lot from judges grouped by circuits), Congress has 
endowed the Chief Justice with the power to pick individual judges to sit 
on particular tribunals. 
                                                                                                                                 
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and 
such other relief as a court may deem appropriate. 
163 See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at Monday Afternoon Session, 
May 11-14, 1998, in A.L.I., 75TH ANNUAL MEETING:  REMARKS AND ADDRESSES, at 57, 58 
(1998) (citing bills on juvenile crime, the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, the Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, and the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, in 
addition to VAWA).  According to press reports, the Chief Justice also decided that the 
AO should not resist budget cuts aimed at cutting off funds for gender and race bias 
task forces.  See Bruce D. Brown, Judiciary Won’t Fight for Court Bias Studies, AM. LAWYER, 
Nov. 13, 1995, at 1. 
164 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
165 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing the LONG RANGE 
PLAN); see also King, supra note 126, at 961. 
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Specifically, the Chief Justice appoints the seven judges on the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,166 the body created in the 1960s at 
the behest of the Judicial Conference to decide whether to consolidate 
cases pending around the country and to centralize pretrial decision-
making in a judge designated by that panel.  The Chief Justice also 
chooses the eleven judges who sit for seven-year terms on the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court167 (now frequently in the 
news), which, since 1979, is reported to have approved more than 18,000 
government requests for surveillance warrants.168  Furthermore, the 
Chief Justice selects the three judges comprising the appellate body em-
powered to review FISA Court denials of government requests—an activ-
ity that reportedly rarely occurs.169  The Chief Justice holds the power to 
select the five judges who constitute the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 
chartered in 1996 to respond if and when the Department of Justice files 
cases seeking to deport legal aliens suspected of aiding terrorists.170  Until 
recently, the Chief Justice also designated the three members of the spe-
cial division of the D.C. Circuit charged with appointing independent 
counsels.171  As a result of these various statutes, according to Professor 
                                                                                                                                 
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2000). 
167 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a),(d) (2004); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1842(b)(2) (2000 & 
Supp. I 2001) (authorizing the appointment by the Chief Justice of Magistrate Judges 
to hear applications to install wiretaps); id. § 1862(b)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. I 2001) 
(authorizing the Chief Justice to appoint a magistrate judge to hear applications for 
subpoenas). 
168 See FISA Annual Reports to Congress, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
agency/doj/fisa/#rept (follow “FISA Annual Reports to Congress” hyperlink; then 
follow hyperlink for desired year) (last visited May 7, 2006).  For discussion of the FISA 
Court and the Chief Justice’s appointment power more generally, see Ruger, The Judi-
cial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, supra note 31, at 365-67. 
169 See FISA Annual Reports to Congress, supra note 168; see also In re Sealed Case, 
310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that neither FISA nor the 
Fourth Amendment barred the government from procuring a FISA warrant for the 
primary purpose of prosecuting a foreign agent where foreign intelligence gathering 
was also a significant purpose). 
170 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).  The provision for 
appointment is 8 U.S.C. § 1532. 
171 See 28 U.S.C. § 49(d) (1994).  Although the statute authorizing the Chief Justice 
to appoint members to the special division has not been repealed, the provision of the 
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994 authorizing the division to appoint 
special counsels expired in 1999.  See 28 U.S.C. § 599.  The division remains in exis-
tence only to monitor ongoing investigations and to dispose of petitions for attorneys’ 
fees in concluded investigations.  See id.; see also U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels, 
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/internet.nsf/content/Independent+Counsel 
(describing the current activities of the special division).  As Professor Ruger has 
noted, commentators criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist’s appointment of Judge David 
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Theodore Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist made “over fifty such special 
court appointments,” a total that Ruger noted was greater than the num-
ber of judicial appointments made during the first several decades of the 
United States.172 
That this appointment authority is an important power can be seen 
from opposition to the idea of the Chief Justice wielding it.  In the first 
decades of the twentieth century, Taft (both before and after he became 
Chief Justice) sought to detach the appointment of judges from a posi-
tion on a particular court.  Taft argued that Congress ought to depart 
from its practice (which persists today) of making line-by-line authoriza-
tions of individual judgeships designated for a specific district or circuit 
court.  Instead, Taft wanted Congress to commission eighteen “judges-at-
large” to be dispatched at the discretion of the Chief Justice.173  Given 
that the lower federal courts had, in 1914, about 126 judges,174 the Taft 
proposal would have both increased the ranks of the judiciary by four-
teen percent and helped to produce a cohort more affiliated with the 
national system than a particular locality. 
Upon becoming Chief Justice in 1921, Taft continued to support the 
creation of his “flying squadron of judges,”175 which was presented as 
draft legislation to Congress by the Attorney General.176  The concept 
was rebuffed, in part because opponents were concerned that the Chief 
Justice would dispatch judges supportive of the national edict on Prohi-
bition to recalcitrant jurisdictions and in part because it undercut local 
                                                                                                                                 
Sentelle, a former Republican party official, to head this division.  See Ruger, The Judi-
cial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, supra note 31, at n.10 and accompanying text. 
172 Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, supra note 31, at 343. 
173 See Taft, Adequate Machinery for Judicial Business, supra note 69, at 454 (proposing 
the idea of “judges at large”). 
174 Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System:  1922-1947, 
31 F.R.D. 307, 322 (1963). 
175 See Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, supra note 31, at 356; 
Taft, The Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, supra 
note 85. 
176 See Additional Judges, U.S. District Courts:  Hearings on S. 2432, 2433, 2523 Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 11 (1921).  Taft is said to have drafted an initial 
version of this legislation but sought to keep a low profile.  See Jeremy Buchman, Judi-
cial Lobbying and the Politics of Judicial Structure:  An Examination of the Judiciary Act of 
1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 9-14 (2003) (discussing Taft’s strategic efforts to minimize his 
role); Walter F. Murphy, Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court Bureaucracy:  A Study in 
Judicial Administration, 24 J. POL. 453, 455 (1962) (describing Taft’s role); see also 62 
CONG. REC. 202 (1922) (statement of Sen. Walsh) (commenting that the proposal had 
been made by the Chief Justice and forwarded by him to the Senate and House Judici-
ary Committees). 
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politicians’ patronage possibilities.177  Understood then was the potential 
that the power to select appointees and to make assignments could affect 
the outcomes of cases. 
Although Taft formally lost that fight, he won a congressional license 
for the Chief Justice to reassign judges (upon request of the borrowing 
court) temporarily from one court to serve on another.178  Several stat-
utes now authorize “lending” practices within circuits,179 but only the 
Chief Justice can designate district and circuit court judges to serve on 
courts outside the circuits to which they are appointed.180  While the 
Chief Justice no longer does that work personally but relies instead on 
the Judicial Conference Committee on Intercircuit Assignments to ap-
prove requests,181 the Chief Justice appoints that committee and retains 
the power to allocate judges.182 
More generally, and in conjunction with the Director of the AO, the 
Chief Justice appoints many committees, some of which are standing 
                                                                                                                                 
177 See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC. 4862 (1922) (statement of Sen. Shields) (“The action of 
the antisaloon interest in favoring this bill simply forecasts that its representatives will 
attempt to influence the Chief Justice to assign judges selected by them solely for the 
purpose of trying prohibition cases and without regard to the interest of other litigants 
of greater importance and the mass of the business pending in the courts.”); id. at 4858 
(statement of Sen. Shields) (“The Chief Justice has no more to do with the judges of 
the district courts of the United States, and with the trial of cases, and procedures in 
those courts, or the congestion of business in them, than does King George.”); see also 
DAVID H. BURTON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT:  IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 125-27 (1986); 
Murphy, supra note 176, at 458; Robert Post, Traditional Values and Positive Law:  The 
Case of Prohibition in the Taft Court Era (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
178 See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 3, 42 Stat. 837, 839. 
179 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291(b), 292(b) (2000). 
180 See id. § 291(a) (providing for temporary transfer of circuit judges to other cir-
cuits); id. § 292(d) (providing for temporary transfer of district judges to act as circuit 
or district judges in other circuits or on the Court of International Trade); see also id.  
§ 293(a) (authorizing the Chief Justice to transfer Court of International Trade judges 
temporarily to perform judicial duties in any circuit upon showing of need); id.  
§ 294(a) (authorizing the Chief Justice to assign willing and able retired Justices to 
perform judicial duties in any circuit); id. § 294(b), (d) (authorizing the Chief Justice 
to assign senior judges to perform judicial duties in any circuit); 48 U.S.C. §§ 1614, 
1821, 1424 (2000) (authorizing the Chief Justice to designate judges to sit on territorial 
courts in the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam, respectively).  
The Chief Justice may not assign an active judge to perform judicial duties in another 
circuit unless the chief judge of the circuit (or of the court in the case of the Court of 
International Trade) from which the judge will be transferred first consents.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 295 (2000).  For further discussion of visiting judge practices and procedures in the 
federal district courts, see JENNIFER EVANS MARSH, THE USE OF VISITING JUDGES IN THE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS:  A GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL (Fed. Jud. 
Ctr. 2001). 
181 Fish, Office of Chief Justice, supra note 3, at 110. 
182 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-295, 331. 
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committees of the Judicial Conference and others of which are groups 
convened (like the Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence, dis-
cussed above183) to review a particular issue.  As decades of scholarship 
about federal court rulemaking activities have made clear, a line between 
“practice and procedure” and “substantive rights” is hard to draw.184  As 
Judicial Conference committees craft rules that create or narrow oppor-
tunities for access to courts (through pleading and class action require-
ments, for example) or for information disclosure (through discovery 
and disclosure obligations), the range of opportunities for plaintiffs and 
defendants change.185  The appointment power gives the Chief Justice 
the ability to select particular people who shape these decisions. 
Further, given that lower court judges average twenty-four years on 
the bench,186 the Chief Justice can also come to know the approaches of 
individual judges and to rely on some specially.  Appointment powers 
thus permit the Chief to reward certain judges by putting them in the 
limelight (or the hotseat, depending on one’s viewpoint)—as rulemak-
ers, as opinion shapers, as adjudicators on specialized courts or courts in 
other federal jurisdictions, and as emissaries to Congress or to jurists 
from other jurisdictions.187  Because committee work can be interesting 
and enables those involved to step back from individual cases to consider 
structural issues, the Chief Justice has the ability to endow some jurists 
with significant social (or juridical) capital—and to marginalize others.188 
C.  Additional and Peculiar Powers:  From the Smithsonian to Garnishment 
A review of yet other statutory powers of the Chief Justice reveals an 
odd assortment of assignments running with the position.  Some of the 
                                                                                                                                 
183 See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. 
184 See Lori A. Johnson, Creating Rules of Procedure for Federal Courts:  Administrative 
Prerogative or Legislative Policymaking?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 23-24 (2003) (summarizing 
those debates). 
185 See Baar, supra note 113 (discussing Burger’s appointments); Stempel, supra 
note 114 (discussing Rehnquist’s appointments).  Russell Wheeler noted that 
“Rehnquist no doubt favored Republican-appointed judges,” but argued that consider-
ing data that focused on Conference committee chairs and excluded ad hoc commit-
tees, did so “not as much as meets the eye.”  Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note 
141, at 118. 
186 See supra Table 1, Lengths of Service of Article III Judges: Contrasting Snap-
shots, 1800s/2000s. 
187 See Little, supra note 57, at 737 (“Executive officials occasionally solicit nomina-
tion advice from present and former members of the judiciary.”).  
188 Our concern is not that this is an unconstitutional delegation of power, but 
rather that it is an unwise allocation of power.  See infra note 310 and accompanying 
text. 
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duties relate to the judiciary, and others are further afield;189 many are 
delegated and given little attention.  For example, Congress has author-
ized the Chief Justice to promulgate regulations on garnishment of the 
wages of members of the judicial branch.190  The Chief also has rule-
making power to prevent disclosure of classified information by the fed-
eral courts.191  Moving outside the federal courts (and potentially raising 
an important question of the power of Congress to do so), the Chief Jus-
tice approves selections of persons to sit on special North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute resolution panels.192  In terms of 
other kinds of appointment powers, the Chief Justice is statutorily as-
signed to designate two of the eleven members of the Citizens’ Commis-
sion on Public Service and Compensation193 and one of the fifteen 
members of the National Historical Publications and Records Commis-
sion.194 
 Congress has also authorized the Chief Justice to assist the Library of 
Congress in purchasing books for the law library195 and to recommend 
individuals to serve on the Board of Trustees of the James Madison Me-
morial Fellowship Foundation.196  In addition, the Chief Justice serves on 
various boards, including the Smithsonian Institution (of which, through 
custom, the Chief Justice serves as chancellor),197 the National Gallery of 
Art,198 and the Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden.199  Some Chief 
Justices take on more; Warren Burger served as an honorary chairman of 
                                                                                                                                 
189 See infra Appendix B, Statutory Duties of the Chief Justice of the United States. 
190 See 5 U.S.C. § 5520a(J)(1)(e) (2000) (expressly allowing the Chief Justice to 
delegate this authority). 
191 18 U.S.C. app. § 9 (2000). 
192 19 U.S.C. § 3432 (2000). 
193 2 U.S.C. § 352 (2000). 
194 44 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000). 
195 2 U.S.C. § 135 (2000). 
196 20 U.S.C. § 4502 (2000). 
197 Id. § 41; see Act of Aug. 10, 1846, 9 Stat. 102 (establishing the Smithsonian Insti-
tution and designating the Chief Justice a constituting member of that organization 
and a member of its Board of Regents).  While not specified, the tradition has been 
that the Chief serves as chair.  See Tamm & Reardon, supra note 17, at 450. 
198 20 U.S.C. § 72 (2000); see Act of Mar. 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 51, 52 (establishing the 
National Gallery of Art and stating that its board “shall be composed as follows:  The 
Chief Justice of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
and the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, ex officio; and five general trustees 
who shall be citizens of the United States, to be chosen as hereinafter provided”). 
199 20 U.S.C. § 76cc (2000); see Act of Nov. 7, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-788, § 3, 80 Stat. 
1403, 1404 (Nov. 7, 1966) (establishing the Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden 
and providing that its “Board of Trustees shall be composed of the Chief Justice of the 
United States and the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, who shall serve as ex 
officio members, and eight general members”). 
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the Supreme Court Historical Society and on various other boards.200  
Chief Justices also take time to visit law schools, to attend circuit confer-
ences, and to be a presence in many venues around the country and the 
world.  These tasks may seem trivial or ceremonial, but according to 
those who have served within the judiciary, the work—for example, 
chairing the Smithsonian Board—involves real contributions of time and 
energy.201    
Further, as is familiar, Presidents have sometimes turned to Chief 
Justices to take on other tasks.202  Twentieth-century examples include 
chairing investigations such as the 1960s Warren Commission inquiry 
into the assassination of President Kennedy and arbitrating border dis-
putes in the 1930s between Guatemala and Honduras.203  In short, just as 
the Chief Justice is both a “boss” and a symbol of the Supreme Court, the 
Chief Justice is also a practical as well as an iconic leader of the federal 
judiciary.  Time and again, individual Chief Justices have proven to be 
the judiciary’s most effective lobbyists, the judiciary’s most visible 
spokespersons, and the nation’s most important judicial leaders. 
III.  THE ANOMALY OF LIFE-TENURED MULTI-TASKING 
A.  Mixing Roles 
The concentration of the powers of adjudication and administration 
in the chief justiceship prompts questions about how one role affects the 
other.  Through the obligation to multi-task, the Chief Justice is dis-
tracted from being either a full-time adjudicator or administrator.  When 
the two roles are combined, a well-intentioned and astute Chief Justice, 
aiming to forward only legally appropriate policy proposals, has to think 
                                                                                                                                 
200 Tamm & Reardon, supra note 17, at 451. 
201 See Comment of Jeffrey Morris, 1982 Virginia Conference, supra note 3, at 167-
68 (describing the “relentlessness” of the Chief Justice’s many ceremonial, diplomatic, 
managerial, and other tasks).  Morris, who served as a Judicial Fellow and Research 
Associate during Chief Justice Burger’s term, offered as examples the countless jurists 
from other countries that Chief Justice Burger entertained and his attendance in Sep-
tember of 1980 at a two-day meeting of the Smithsonian Board of Regents, followed by 
a two-and-a-half day meeting of the Judicial Conference, shortly before the Court’s 
1980-1981 Term began. 
202 In the early days of the Republic, Chief Justices undertook significant extrajudi-
cial duties.  Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth, for example, served as the foreign ambas-
sadors to England and France, respectively, and Marshall concurrently acted as Chief 
Justice and as Secretary of State.  See Wexler, supra note 48; Russell Wheeler, Extrajudi-
cial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 123 (1973). 
203 Robert P. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 9, 32, 34-35 (1970). 
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simultaneously about the administratively desirable, the politically feasi-
ble, and the constitutionally plausible. 
But none of those categories exists ex ante.  Adjudication can re-
frame administrative possibilities, just as administration can make clear 
why constitutional parameters ought to be reexamined.  As is analyzed 
below, the interaction between roles is complex and at times contradic-
tory, as the amalgam both amplifies the power of the individual serving 
as the Chief at a potential cost to the collective power of the Court and 
puts at risk the disinterested quality required of adjudication. 
One worry is distraction:  in principle, being a Justice is a full-time 
position.  Given the expanding demands of the chief justiceship, the 
person so denominated becomes both a part-time Justice and a part-time 
administrator—neither of which is desirable, as Phillip Kurland noted in 
the early 1970s.204  And whatever choices Associate Justices make to 
travel, lecture, or write, the portfolio they select is of their own choosing, 
with a flexibility that the Chief Justice as administrator does not have. 
Hence, one kind of critique is managerial.  The Chief Justice’s cur-
rent tasks—ceremonial head, diplomat, manager, speaker, planner, ca-
reer-enhancer, policymaker, adjudicator, intellectual leader, CEO, trus-
tee, rulemaker, museum trustee—are implausible from a bureaucratic 
perspective.205  In personal terms, the challenge of endurance has been 
noted repeatedly by those close to the process.  Warren Burger himself 
described how he spent “four to six hours a day on administrative mat-
ters apart from my judicial work” and that such a schedule was “not pos-
sible—not physically possible—to continue” for too long.206 
                                                                                                                                 
204 Philip B. Kurland, The Lord Chancellor of the United States, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, 
at 11, 28 (arguing that the Chief Justice of the United States is “not particularly well 
equipped . . . to supervise substantive or procedural law reform throughout the na-
tion”). 
205 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 
VA. L. REV. 1031, 1041-44 (1979) (describing the Chief Justice’s duties and concluding 
that “[i]t requires no empirical data beyond that already available to conclude that the 
array of duties involved in administering the entire judicial system, combined with the 
responsibility of presiding over and participating in the adjudicative business of the 
Supreme Court, places upon the Chief Justice a workload that can be carried only by 
one of nearly superhuman energy”); see also Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note 
141, at 120 (predicting that the Chief Justice’s considerable administrative power will 
at some point require a shifting of some duties to the Judicial Conference or the Su-
preme Court). 
206 Landever, supra note 102, at 530-31 (citing Exclusive—Interview with the Chief 
Justice, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 14, 1970, at 32, 44) (emphasis added by Lan-
dever omitted); see also Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Address at the American En-
terprise Institute for Public Policy Research’s Conference on the Role of the Judiciary 
in America (Dec. 14, 1978), quoted in Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Admini-
stration, supra note 205, at 1044 (“If the burdens of this office continue to increase as 
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 Of course, in practice, the Chief Justice delegates to others, but 
unlike dozens of comparable federal positions regulated by statutes re-
quiring senatorial confirmation,207 the three high-level officials in the 
judiciary’s bureaucracy obtain their jobs through the Chief Justice.  The 
first, the Director of the AO, is the most powerful.208  While outsiders 
may have little sense of the managerial authority of the Director, insid-
ers—including life-tenured judges—have found themselves constrained 
by policies promulgated by the Director who, if protected by the Chief 
Justice, may be able to prevail over disgruntled Article III judges.  A rare 
public glimpse of this form of conflict occurred when, without notifica-
tion, the AO began to monitor judges’ computers to learn about per-
sonal use, having “installed software to detect downloading of music, 
streaming video, and pornography.”209 
A second important position, created in 1972 at Chief Justice Bur-
ger’s behest, is the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice, a posi-
tion designed to “relieve the Chief Justice of many of the time-
consuming details involved in the nonadjudicative responsibilities of the 
office.”210  Apparently, concern about the degree of authority devolved 
                                                                                                                                 
they have in past years, it may be impossible for the occupant to perform all the duties 
well and survive very long.”).  At the 1982 roundtable at the University of Virginia, a re-
tired executive, who joined a group of law professors, government officials, and practicing 
lawyers, was debriefed by members of Chief Justice Burger’s staff about the scope of the 
job; the businessman commented that he thought the job “physically impossible.”  See 
1982 Virginia Conference, supra note 3, at 189 (statement of J. Wilson Newman, former 
Chairman and CEO, Dun & Bradstreet).  Mark Cannon, the Chief Justice’s Administra-
tive Assistant, also described the “relentlessness of the job” of the Chief Justice.  Id. at 170 
(statement of Mark Cannon); see also Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of the Chief Judge in a 
Modern System of Justice, reprinted in JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 104, at 144 
(proposing that the chief jurist should have fewer opinions to write than other judges 
on a court and ought to delegate more to others). 
207 For example, within the Department of Justice and in addition to the Attorney 
General, several other high ranking officers (the Deputy Attorney General, the Solici-
tor General, the Inspector General, the Associate Attorney General, and various Assis-
tant Attorney Generals) are presidential nominees requiring senatorial confirmation.  
The United States Attorneys and United States Marshals in each district do, as well.  See 
28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 504, 504a, 505, 506, 507, 541, 561 (2000). 
208 As Appendix A, The Tenure of Chief Justices of the United States, of Directors of 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and of Directors of the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter, makes plain, the Director’s tenure is tied to the Chief Justice’s.  See also supra note 
84 (discussing close relationships between Chief Justices and Directors of the AO). 
209 See Neil A. Lewis, Rebels in Black Robes Recoil at Surveillance of Computers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2001, at A12 (reporting that Judge Kozinski drafted and distributed an 
“18-page legal memorandum arguing that the monitoring was a violation of [an] anti-
wiretap statute”); Wasby, supra note 58, at 471-74 (detailing the episode). 
210 S. REP. NO. 92-616 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1977, 1979; see Act 
of Mar. 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-238, 86 Stat. 46 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 677 
(2000)); see also S. REP. NO. 92-616, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1977-80 (discuss-
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under Chief Justice Burger to a single individual (Mark Cannon, who 
held the position for many years), prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist to 
limit the term of his own Administrative Assistants somewhat.211 
The third position, Director of the Federal Judicial Center, came 
into being in 1967 when the FJC was established.212  The Chief Justice 
chairs the FJC’s nine-member Board213 that selects the Director. The cus-
tom has developed that the Director serves a limited term, ranging from 
about four to seven years.214  Retired Justice Tom Clark took that post 
first, and he has been followed by one law professor and several Article 
III judges, all of whom have enjoyed more independence than many 
other senior administrators. 
The Chief Justice has also been in the position to mediate the ten-
sions that have arisen between the authority of the AO and the FJC, 
whose mandates overlap to some degree. As a reporter covering a dis-
pute in the mid-1990s put it, both the AO and the FJC “serve the same 
masters:  Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the U.S. Judicial Conference, 
and almost 2,000 federal judges.” 215  That article quotes the AO Director 
                                                                                                                                 
ing the many “nonadjudicative responsibilities” of the Chief Justice and explaining that 
an administrative assistant could relieve the Chief Justice in a relationship that would 
be “a close one involving constant and personal contact, some of it of a confidential 
nature”); Letter from Rowland Kirks, Director of the Administrative Office, to Spiro 
Agnew, President of the Senate (Mar. 6, 1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1980-81 (transmitting a draft bill to create the office).  By statute, the position has a 
salary not to exceed that of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts.  28 U.S.C. § 677(a).  For descriptions of some of the work performed by 
the Administrative Assistant, see Mark W. Cannon & Warren I. Cikins, Interbranch Coop-
eration in Improving the Administration of Justice:  A Major Innovation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1981). 
211 Mark Cannon acted as Administrative Assistant for fourteen years—from 1972 
(when the position was created) to 1986, the end of Chief Justice Burger’s tenure.  In 
contrast, several of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Administrative Assistants held the position 
for two-year terms.  See Charles Lane, Serving in the Chief Justice’s Shadow, WASH. POST., 
Feb. 7, 2005, at A19.  Rehnquist’s last Administrative Assistants, James Duff and Sally 
Rider, served for four and five years, respectively.  See id at A19. 
212 See 28 U.S.C. § 620 (2000). 
213 In addition to the Chief Justice, the Director of the Administrative Office and 
seven judges (two circuit judges, three district judges, one bankruptcy judge, and one 
magistrate judge) elected by the Judicial Conference sit on the Federal Judicial Center 
Board.  28 U.S.C. § 621(a).  While the Chief Justice and the Director of the AO are 
permanent members, the seven elected judges serve four-year terms and may not be 
reelected.  Id. § 621(b)-(c). 
214 See infra Appendix A, Tenure of Chief Justices of the United States, of Directors of 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and of Directors of the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter. 
215 See Robert Schmidt, A Turf War Over Training Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 29, 
1997, at 1 (discussing the “turf” battle in which, as funds for the judiciary became 
tighter, the FJC and the AO vied for support). 
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as calling for the abolition of the FJC as an independent entity, and de-
scribing the FJC as an “agency out of control . . . with its own agenda that 
has at times opposed the Judicial Conference.”216  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reportedly supported the FJC, and an ad hoc Judicial Confer-
ence committee, appointed by the Chief Justice, thereafter rejected the 
suggestion to fold the FJC into the AO.217  In short, the federal judiciary 
has attributes familiar to many bureaucracies, complete with internal 
disputes and power struggles whose outcomes are affected by the Chief 
Justice, who as the CEO, can choose how involved to be in the policy-
making of these subdivisions of the judiciary. 
As the thicker description of the administrative apparatus of the fed-
eral judiciary makes plain, the Chief Justice has a significant amount of 
work, even if minimally involved in superintending the judicial enter-
prise.  One problem is that the two sides of the job, adjudication and 
administration, compete with each other for time and attention.  An-
other concern is that each role constrains and influences the other in 
ways that can be undesirable.  For example, however insistent Warren 
Burger might have been as a lobbyist, he did not have available to him all 
of the persuasive techniques that other lobbyists have used.218  Being an 
adjudicator ought to hamstring how the Chief Justice functions as a po-
litical operative,219 for, unlike others who walk the halls at the Hill to 
garner support or opposition for particular legislative initiatives, the 
Chief should have few promises or threats to make.  However, once at-
tuned to administrative challenges, the Chief Justice as adjudicator may 
see more readily why doctrine should change to make possible func-
tional responses (such as delegation of tasks to non-life-tenured judges) 
to truly challenging problems (such as too many cases). 
On top of distraction and constraint, the dual roles also permit am-
plification of authority.  While synergy is often applauded, here it poses 
problems of various sorts.  For Chief Justices who stay long enough in 
that office, the capacity to maneuver administratively as well as through 
adjudication may give the Chief forms of leverage that could encroach 
on the power of the Supreme Court itself.  A Chief Justice’s ability to use 
                                                                                                                                 
216 Id. at 1; see id. (discussing the FJC’s creation, in response to the conflict, of its own 
strategic planning committee, which noted that the FJC’s “research activity, or at least the 
manner of its dissemination, has been at odds with the judiciary’s efforts to develop consis-
tent policy on important issues and present that policy in a coherent manner”).  
217 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (Mar. 10, 1998). 
218 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paridigm Found:  Redefining the Judiciary’s 
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1221-22 (1996). 
219 See id. at 1191-1206 (considering whether constitutional and ethical constraints 
proscribe lobbying authority). 
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administrative directives and programs to reframe legal parameters can 
undercut caselaw generated through collaborative efforts of the other 
Justices. 
Further, a Chief Justice can shape the Court’s doctrine to make fea-
sible certain kinds of administrative innovations that once seemed legally 
troubling.  Examples include Chief Justice Burger’s insistence on delega-
tion of authority to judges without life tenure,220 and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s efforts to restrict habeas corpus through rulemaking.221  Al-
though initially faced with what commentators have styled a “revolt” or 
“rebuff” in the Judicial Conference, Rehnquist was able—by staying fo-
cused over many years—to limit habeas petitions through Court-made 
doctrine and interpretations of congressional legislation.222 
Yet, as the Chief Justice gains power, erosion of certain other forms 
of authority is also a risk.  Chief Justice Hughes (whose term, from 1930 
to 1941, spanned a period before and after the 1939 creation of the Ad-
ministrative Office) is identified with raising the concern that admini-
stration and lobbying involve judges in political conflicts that could po-
tentially undermine the understanding that the Court’s decisions are 
legally, rather than politically, motivated.223  Hughes also worried that, 
                                                                                                                                 
220 See Countryman, supra note 144, at 7-12 (discussing Burger’s activities related to 
bankruptcy legislation).  Chief Justice Burger also sought—administratively and adju-
dicatively—to enhance the authority of magistrates, who in 1990 gained the title “mag-
istrate judge.”  In 1975, Chief Justice Burger gave a speech arguing that “[t]he statutes 
relating to United States magistrates should be clarified to give them broader powers, 
subject to final decision by a district judge, in order to release district judges for full-
scale trials.”  Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, Remarks of War-
ren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, Before the American Bar Association 7-8 (Feb. 
23. 1975), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 108.  A year 
earlier, he had argued in dissent: 
The Federal Magistrates Act was both “designed to create an upgraded lower 
tier judicial office,” and “intended . . . to cull from the ever-growing workload 
of the U.S. district courts matters that are more desirably performed by a 
lower tier of judicial officers.”  The Court’s holding that federal magistrates 
may not conduct evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus cases is both 
inconsistent with the new status of magistrates . . . and serves to defeat the ob-
jective of the Act, described by Senator Tydings, its principal sponsor, “to pro-
vide district judges with more time to devote to the actual trial of cases and the 
writing of opinions.” 
Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 475-76 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
221 See Linda Greenhouse, Vote Is a Rebuff for Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1990, 
at A16 (describing that the Judicial Conference as a whole modified proposals, which 
had been made by a special committee appointed by the Chief Justice, to limit habeas 
corpus). 
222 See Wasby, supra note 58, at 464-71; Greenhouse, supra note 221, at A16. 
223 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
  
2006] RESPONDING TO A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 1627 
were any misbehavior of judges or staff in lower courts to occur, the 
linking of the lower and high courts through the AO could tarnish the 
image of the Supreme Court.224  Hughes may have been particularly 
sensitive to hostility directed at judges, as he came into the position of 
Chief Justice not long after Congress had debated whether to create a 
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.  One member of the House had 
warned that such a group would be a “propaganda organization for 
legislation for the benefit of the Federal judiciary,” “self-seeking,” and 
aimed at performing “a legislative function” incompatible with judicial 
work.225  Further, during Hughes’ tenure, a painful debate took place 
about the constitutionality of the New Deal and of the Court-packing 
plan. 
On several occasions, Chief Justice Hughes counseled caution in the 
judiciary developing an administrative apparatus and speaking in unity.  
For example, in the early 1930s, members of Congress proposed the 
abolition of diversity jurisdiction.226  During that era, progressives saw the 
federal courts as bastions of property interests and as hostile to unions.  
Moreover, federal enforcement of Prohibition was yet another source of 
antipathy from some towards the federal judiciary.  In terms of the spe-
cific question of diversity jurisdiction, as Edward Purcell has explained, 
corporate defendants were able to remove cases from state courts to fed-
eral courts and thereby to impose significant litigation costs on less well-
to-do plaintiffs.227   
While progressives therefore sought to limit resort to the federal 
courts, many federal jurists were proponents of diversity jurisdiction, 
which represented a significant percentage of the federal docket and 
which, until Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,228 was also a major source of 
federal lawmaking.229  Despite that judicial enthusiasm for and interest in 
                                                                                                                                 
224 FISH, supra note 65, at 136-37; see also id. at 114 (noting that “the public behav-
ior of some judges,” including that of a Second Circuit judge who reportedly accepted 
bribes, fueled congressional antipathy toward the judiciary during the 1930s). 
225 62 CONG. REC. 202-03 (1921) (statement of Rep. Lea). 
226 See Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Hearings on S. 937, S. 939, and S. 3243 
Before Subcomm. of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong. 1-25 (1932). 
227 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY:  FEDERAL DIVERSITY JU-
RISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 20-27 (1992). 
228 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
229 Indeed, a 1951 committee report reaffirmed that position, explaining that “diver-
sity jurisdiction has been recognized from the beginning as essential to the proper admini-
stration of justice under the dual sovereignty established by our Constitution.”  Report of 
the Committee on Venue and Jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference, at 6, 11, in Judi-
cial Conference Meetings Records, RG 116, supra note 88, Box 54 (Mar. 1951–Sept. 
1951). This study committee, chaired by Judge John Parker of the Fourth Circuit, came 
into being because of renewed proposals to abolish diversity jurisdiction. 
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protecting diversity jurisdiction, Chief Justice Hughes argued that it 
would not be wise for the Conference to advance a collective viewpoint.  
To record opposition formally would, he explained, put judges in a “very 
vulnerable position” that would “weaken . . . their prestige, and their in-
dependence, if they appeared to be campaigning in their own inter-
ests.”230  Hughes urged that individual judges make contact with bar as-
sociations but that no collective action be undertaken.  Similarly, in the 
wake of the Court-packing controversy, when the Administrative Office 
was created in 1939,231 Hughes was hesitant, again seeing the risk that 
administrative agendas or errors could reflect negatively on the Court.232 
Yet, as the discussion above of the positions taken by Chief Justices 
Burger and Rehnquist illustrates,233 the approach of Chief Justice 
Hughes has been replaced by a very different stance.  The Conference 
now regularly records its views.  Moreover, rather than protest against 
divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction, the Judicial Conference, with 
Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist at its helm, has supported divesti-
ture of many forms of federal jurisdiction, diversity included.234  Further 
(and in some respects as Chief Justice Hughes feared), we have gained 
the capacity to compare administrative stances and adjudicative out-
comes.  We can review, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s comments 
in speeches, the Judicial Conference’s calls under his leadership for re-
trenchment in federal jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, and the con-
                                                                                                                                 
230 1932 Transcript at 241-42, in Judicial Conference Meetings Records, RG 116, 
supra note 88, Entry 4; see also FISH, supra note 65, at 69 (recounting that position). 
231 See Peter Graham Fish, Crises, Politics, and Federal Judicial Reform:  The Administra-
tive Office Act of 1939, 32 J. POL. 599, 604-07 (1970) (arguing that struggles over status, 
including the failed Court-packing effort, prompted judges to be interested in control-
ling their own administration); FISH, supra note 65, at 124 (quoting Hearings on S. 188 
Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 9 (1939) (statement of D. 
Lawrence Groner)) (stating that judges moved to “‘clean their own house, rather than 
be subject to the embarrassment and destruction of our theory of government by hav-
ing it done by someone else’”). 
232 See FISH, supra note 65, at 127-28. 
233 See supra Part II.B.2. 
234 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE 8-9, 52 (1977); Warren E. Burger, Year-End Report on the Federal Judici-
ary 3-4 (Jan. 1, 1978), reprinted in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 
108 (stating that the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice had reported a bill “curtailing a large segment of [diversity] 
jurisdiction” and opining that “[w]ith few exceptions, [diversity] cases belong in the 
State courts and their transfer from 397 Federal district judges to approximately 6,000 
State court judges of general jurisdiction will impose no significant new load on the 
State courts”). 
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stitutional decisions in cases such as United States v. Lopez235 and United 
States v. Morrison.236  In both of those decisions,  the Chief Justice was part 
of a bare majority concluding that Congress lacked the constitutional 
power to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts over the kind of claims 
the “administrative” judiciary had advocated be curtailed. 
In addition to the amplification of certain forms of authority at a 
cost to (or erosion of) other forms of authority, another kind of problem 
is the well-intended but inappropriate conflation of the administratively 
desirable with the legally permissible.  If the federal bench did not exer-
cise the power of judicial review, then perhaps judicial consideration of 
pending legislation on topics including the Court’s own authority would 
be less troubling.  Moreover, such advisory processes could be formal-
ized and regulated, as is illustrated by the practices in France of its Con-
seil Constitutionnel, which has a fixed period of time to consider a law’s 
legality before that provision becomes effective.237  There, the Conseil’s 
charge is to render legal judgments on a law’s permissibility, not its de-
sirability. 
In contrast, the criteria for Judicial Conference evaluation are un-
specified, leaving unclear what metrics are used.  While one might balk 
at the Conference offering its opinion on the constitutionality of a law, 
that seems the most appropriate (if legally off-putting) tack to take, for 
the added value provided by judges comes from their expertise on the 
law rather than from a subset of judges assessing a proposed law’s poten-
tial trade-offs or utilities—tasks which are within the bailiwick of the leg-
islative branch.  Yet the Judicial Conference and the Chief Justice do not 
discuss directly the constitutionality of proposed bills but often comment 
instead on the bills’ wisdom and the possible effects such enactments 
could have on their workload. 
The two roles (advisor ex ante and adjudicator ex post) cannot help 
but bleed into one another.  Many important legal questions are inde-
                                                                                                                                 
235 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its power under 
the Commerce Clause when, in the Gun Free School Zones Act, it made it a federal 
offense to knowingly possess a firearm in a local school zone). 
236 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Morrison). 
237 1958 CONST. art. 61 (Fr.) (providing for the Conseil Constitutionnel’s pre-
implementation review of legislation).  French law provides a separate entity—the 
Conseil Constitutionnel—to consider the constitutionality of laws.  The Conseil reviews 
Acts of Parliament after they are approved but before publication.  Once a law has 
passed through or by the Conseil, the French courts have no power to strike it down on 
grounds of illegality.  See generally Roger Pinto, Elisabeth Zoller, Henri Ader, & Wallace 
Baker, A Primer on French Constitutional Law and the French Court System, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 365, 368-74 (1997). 
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terminate, with answers changing over time.  One such example is the 
issue on which Chief Justice Burger spent much of his personal capital—
life tenure for bankruptcy judges.  The question was (and remains) how 
much of the power of judgment should and can constitutionally be de-
volved to federal adjudicators who lack the Article III attributes of life 
tenure and protected salaries.  As an administrator, Chief Justice Burger 
did not want bankruptcy judges to have life tenure.  Of the various rea-
sons that he and others proffered, one major argument was (and is) that 
qualified individuals would not be interested in Article III judgeships if 
too many slots were open.238  As an adjudicator, Burger believed—unlike 
other members of the Court who found the 1978 bankruptcy reforms 
gave too much power to non-tenured judges—that the broad grant of 
jurisdictional authority was constitutional.239  His views as the chief ad-
ministrator, appropriately attuned to the needs of the federal courts, 
may well have affected his understanding of the constitutionality of out-
sourcing adjudication to non-Article III actors.  Indeed, he should not 
have supported any administrative innovation that he thought was not 
constitutionally viable. 
Just as synergy is typically extolled but here does harm, so too multi-
tasking is often celebrated but here has a negative effect.  Were the job 
of adjudication not so peculiar, the rich repertoire of prerogatives of the 
Chief Justice would be less troubling (holding aside the problems of 
concentration of power, which raise different kinds of concerns in de-
mocratic polities, as is discussed below).  But adjudication is purposefully 
unlike other forms of decisionmaking.  Judging is a role that, when fully 
inhabited, situates the person so endowed both with unusual power over 
other persons’ lives and property and with unusual constraints, in terms 
of the kind and nature of information received and the kinds of dis-
course permitted.  Ethics rules and customs seek to extract judges from 
other activities in order to enshrine role delineations that are much 
harsher than those of many other government posts.240  Yet the Chief 
                                                                                                                                 
238 See Countryman, supra note 144, at 9 (observing that some argued that increas-
ing the number of Article III judges would “dilute” the status of those positions). 
239 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92 (1982) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
240 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004), available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/mcjc_home.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006); CODE OF CON-
DUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ 
ch1.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).  The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 
adopted by the Judicial Conference, requires, for example, that judges refrain from 
engaging in political activities and admonishes judges against commenting on the mer-
its of pending actions or participating in extrajudicial activities that might create an 
actual conflict in a current or future proceeding or even an appearance of impropri-
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Justice, the most visible icon of adjudication in the country, is now the 
least protected from having to function in realms appropriately labeled 
political. 
B.  Undue Accumulations of Power 
The packet of powers now possessed by the Chief Justice is thus un-
duly enabling and also disabling, with one set of tasks either constraining 
or invading the work to be done under the other rubric.  In addition, 
the concentration of power undermines democratic governance that is 
committed to distributing and accounting for power. 
 The distance between the Chief Justice’s packet of powers, as it has 
evolved in the United States, and those of other high court justices, illu-
minates the anomalous American federal position.  Take the length of 
tenure.241  Many other democracies shape the mandate of their high 
court jurists by requiring either retirement at a fixed age or a term of 
office limited to a specified number of years.242  For example, both Aus-
tralia and Israel set the age of retirement at seventy,243 and India requires 
its Supreme Court judges to step down at sixty-five.244  In Canada, man-
datory retirement comes at seventy-five.245 The constitutional courts of 
                                                                                                                                 
ety.  See id.  The Code allows judges to engage in extrajudicial activities to “improve the 
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice” so long as doing so “does not 
cast reasonable doubt on the capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come 
before the judge.”  Id. at Canon 4. 
241 A different cut has been offered by political scientist Kevin McGuire, who de-
tails that, holding aside some highs and lows, the median term for Justices on the Su-
preme Court tends to be about fifteen years.  See Kevin T. McGuire, Are Justices Serving 
Too Long?  An Assessment of Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 JUDICATURE 8, 12 (2005). 
242 See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Sys-
tems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 23 (2001). 
243 Until 1977, when the Constitution was amended by a referendum, Australian 
High Court judges were appointed for life; judges appointed after the date of that 
amendment serve until the age of seventy.  See AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 72 (“The ap-
pointment of a Justice of the High Court shall be for a term expiring upon his attain-
ing the age of seventy years, and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of the 
High Court if he has attained that age.”); see also id. (providing that judges of “other 
courts created by the Parliament,” that is the federal courts, must also retire at age 
seventy).  Israeli law has a similar requirement.  See Basic Law:  The Judiciary, 5744-
1984, 38 LSI 101, §§ 1-24 (Isr.) (providing for judges’ terms to end upon resignation, 
removal, or “retirement on pension,” now set at seventy years); see also The State of 
Israel, The Judicial Authority, http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/system/index.html (fol-
low “The Judges” hyperlink) (last visited May 7, 2006). 
244 INDIA CONST. pt. 5, ch. 4, § 124, cl. 2. 
245 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26 § 9(2) (1985) (Can.) (“A judge shall cease 
to hold office on attaining the age of seventy-five years.”). 
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Germany and France rely on another system:  fixed terms.246  The new 
International Criminal Court has adopted that model, providing for a 
nine-year non-renewable term.247  Within the United States, Massachu-
setts, Vermont, New Jersey, and New Hampshire authorize lifetime 
judgeships, yet also require retirement at age seventy.248 
Moreover, the chief justiceship’s mixture of an unending term and 
so much unfettered and relatively invisible discretion is not readily as-
similated into either the model of adjudication or administration.249  Ju-
rists on appellate courts work collectively; they must persuade others of 
the correctness of their views in order to prevail.  And because both con-
stitutional and common law traditions mandate openness in courts, most 
decisions are explained by reasons that are available to public scrutiny 
and then revisited as new cases arise.  In contrast, the administrative 
powers of the Chief Justice are neither officially shared nor constrained 
by obligations of accounting other than very general reports to Congress. 
The many grants of power to the Chief Justice contrast sharply with 
the shape of authority of other executive officials.  Even as we currently 
have a President who asserts extraordinary powers, he still cannot con-
tinue in office beyond the end of his second term.  Heads of independ-
ent agencies generally also have limited terms, and cabinet members 
serve at the pleasure of the President.  But currently, the Chief Justice 
                                                                                                                                 
246 In Germany, judges serve for a twelve-year nonrenewable term.  Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBl.I at 243, last 
amended by Gesetz, July 16, 1998, BGBl.I at 1823 (F.R.G.).  In France’s special constitu-
tional body, the Conseil Constitutionnel, members serve for a nine-year, nonrenewable 
term.  See 1958 CONST. art. 56 (Fr.). 
247 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 36, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (describing the initial election of judges with staggered terms and other 
than those selected through that initial process, generally prohibiting the service in 
office of more than nine years and barring eligibility for reelection). 
248 Massachusetts’s 1780 constitution was amended in 1972 to include a retirement 
provision.  MASS. CONST. amend. art. XCVIII.  New Hampshire’s constitution has, since 
1792, required judges to retire at the age of seventy.  N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 78.  In 
New Jersey, judges and justices serve for a seven-year term and, once reappointed, ob-
tain life tenure with mandatory retirement at seventy.  N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI.  In 
Vermont, after selection by appointment, the mandatory retirement age is “not less 
than seventy years of age, as the General Assembly may prescribe by law, or, if the Gen-
eral Assembly has not so provided by law, at the end of the calendar year or at the end 
of the term of election” in which the judge turns seventy.  Retired judges may serve by 
appointment for special assignments.  VT. CONST. ch. II, § 35.  In contrast, Rhode Is-
land imposes no time or age limits, instead providing justices on its supreme court with 
service during “good behavior.”  R.I. CONST. art. 10, § 5; see also infra Appendix C, Ten-
ure and Methods of Selection of State Chief Justices. 
249 Judith Resnik & Theodore Ruger, Op-Ed., One Robe, Two Hats, N.Y. TIMES, July 
17, 2005, § 4, at Week in Review 13; see generally Resnik, Democratic Responses, supra note 
1. 
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has lifetime consolidated authority over the administration of both the 
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, and does not have legal 
obligations to share that power with other jurists or administrators, nor 
to explain decisions made. 
Further, in contrast to increased insistence on accountability for, 
and transparency in, governance, the chief justiceship has accumulated, 
during the twentieth century, power that is neither easily seen nor re-
quired to be explained.  As Ronald Dworkin has suggested, during the 
nineteenth century, parliamentary processes were seen as best express-
ing the hopes of democracy; such faith was, however, undermined by the 
rise through majoritarianism of fascism.250  In response, and around the 
world, countries have turned to judiciaries as important contributors to 
democratic republics.  In the United States and abroad, individuals have 
gained rights to call their governments to account, and to do so often 
through courts.  In parallel fashion, statutory regimes such as the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA)251 impose obligations of openness in 
decisionmaking. 
Yet much of the administrative work of the chief justiceship and the 
federal judiciary’s other policymaking bodies have no such obligations.  
The judiciary has a statutory exemption from both FOIA252 and Title 
VII.253  Additionally, as mentioned above, while Congress has mandated 
                                                                                                                                 
250 Ronald Dworkin, Presentation, The Secular Papacy, in JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY 
DEMOCRACY:  AN INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION 67, 75-77 (Robert Badinter & 
Stephen Breyer eds., 2004). 
251 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-557 (2000). 
252 Id. § 551(1)(A) & (B) (exempting the federal courts and Congress from the 
requirements of FOIA by excluding those two entities from the definition of “agency”). 
253 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (defining employer so as to exempt federal gov-
ernment employees from protection under the statute); see also 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2000) 
(exempting the United States government from coverage under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(1) (2000) (excluding the U.S. gov-
ernment from coverage by the Americans with Disabilities Act).  In 1995 and 1996, 
Congress enacted laws—the Congressional Accountability Act and the Presidential and 
Executive Office Accountability Act—overriding the Title VII exemption with respect 
to the legislative and executive branches by making Title VII and other laws applicable 
to employees in those branches.  See Congressional Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
1, § 102, 109 Stat. 3, 5 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1302); Presidential and Executive 
Office Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-331, § 402, 110 Stat. 4053, 4054 (1996) 
(codified at 3 U.S.C. § 402). 
 Congress did not pass a similar act with respect to the courts but instead required 
that the Judicial Conference prepare a report, to be submitted to Congress by the 
Chief Justice, evaluating the application of Title VII and other laws to judicial employ-
ees and recommending any legislation needed to protect judicial branch employees.  
See § 502, 109 Stat. at 41-42.  Thereafter, the Judicial Conference stated that it was “well-
established judiciary policy and practice to follow the equal employment opportunity 
principles applicable to private sector and government employers.”  JUDICIAL CONFER-
  
1634 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1575 
openness in rulemaking for the lower courts, the Supreme Court has 
authority to make its rules without any such obligation.254 
C.  Representation Undermining Disinterest 
A different kind of democratic failure comes to light when one con-
siders the platform that Chief Justices have erected.  Both Chief Justices 
Burger and Rehnquist often suggested that their various comments rep-
resented positions of “the federal judiciary.” As a procedural matter, the 
official mechanism from which positions emerge and become “policy” is 
the Judicial Conference, which takes formal votes on specific questions.   
But how does this group of under thirty know how to vote and speak 
on behalf of the twelve-hundred-plus Article III judges and the eight-
hundred-or-so non-life-tenured judges?  The majority of the members of 
the Judicial Conference—the appellate court judges—cannot rely on 
their selection mechanisms to validate their representation, for they ob-
tain their seats because they are the chief judges of their respective cir-
cuits.  That position, in turn, derives from a statutory system that gives it 
to judges who have not yet reached the age of sixty-five but are senior to 
their other colleagues, in terms of when they were appointed to the 
bench.255  The district court representatives on the Judicial Conference 
serve for a term, with each circuit setting up its own manner of selection, 
including some reliance on elections.256 
                                                                                                                                 
ENCE OF THE U.S., STUDY OF JUDICIAL BRANCH COVERAGE PURSUANT TO THE CONGRES-
SIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995, at 6 (1996).  The Conference’s report further 
explained that “[d]ifferences between current judiciary practice and the underlying 
CAA laws lie mainly in the details of enforcement and dispute resolution,” and that 
“[t]he primary goals of the judiciary in addressing potential changes to current policies 
are to retain enforcement within the judicial branch structures . . . , to avoid unneces-
sary bureaucracy, and to remain sensitive to legitimate needs of the individual judges 
and courts.”  Id. at 15. 
 Beginning in 1981, before the 1996 legislation, the Administrative Office pub-
lished an annual Fair Employment Practices Report that included some demographic 
data about the judiciary’s workforce.  See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE 
JUDICIARY FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, 25TH ANN. REP. (2005) 1-3 (providing a his-
tory of the report); see also Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1111-13 (2003) (discussing the statistics provided in the 2002 re-
port); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR 43 (2004) (dis-
cussing a new “Fair Employment Practices System,” utilized by the AO in the prepara-
tion of the Fair Employment Practices report and by the federal courts in the collec-
tion and distribution of demographic and employment dispute resolution informa-
tion). 
254 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
255 28 U.S.C. §§  45(a), 136(a) (2000). 
256 Id. § 331. 
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On specific positions (such as limiting habeas corpus, supporting al-
ternative dispute resolution in lieu of adjudication, or life tenure for 
bankruptcy judges), the Conference members have not polled the many 
sitting judges before opining. 257  Of course, were one to espouse a theory 
of virtual representation, this system would suffice under the rationale 
that all judges (trial and appellate, life-tenured and not) are so situated 
as to hold similar views.258  As discussed above, that justification is likely 
viable on issues such as safety, security, and fair compensation.  But the 
hundreds of federal judges are not likely to subscribe to the same views 
on matters of constitutional law, statutory interpretation, or democratic 
process, which are implicated by stances taken by the Judicial Confer-
ence about whether access to federal courts should be limited (and for 
whom) or more decisions should be relegated (or delegated) to non-life-
tenured federal judges and to the state courts. 
Indeed, the elaboration of principles through adjudication assumes 
that judges differ.  In dialogic exchanges over time, questions are played 
out through the prism of the facts and relevant law of particular cases; 
judgments made by small cohorts of judges attentive to nuances shape 
the law.  Dissent has become an important part of these exchanges,259 yet 
norms of administration—expressed recently in the context of the con-
flict between the FJC and the AO260—now seek to damp down difference 
in order to forward judicial “policy” with a single voice. 
 Move beyond a perspective internal to the judges for whom the 
Chief Justice and the Conference purport to speak and turn to the con-
stitutional concept of the Article III judiciary, created not to “represent” 
anything or anyone, but to exercise “the judicial Power of the United 
                                                                                                                                 
257 In the era before district judges were permitted to sit on the Judicial Confer-
ence, the custom of the Conference was to elicit opinion by polling judges at annual 
circuit conferences.  But after 1957, when each circuit placed one district judge on the 
Judicial Conference, that practice abated.  See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 1, at 964-
65 (discussing debates within the Conference about the Conference’s ability to speak 
to and for federal judges).  On occasion, the Federal Judicial Center has conducted 
surveys.  See, e.g., PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE:  RESULTS OF A 1992 FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER SURVEY OF UNITED STATES JUDGES (1994). 
258 This form of representation theory animates rules creating certain kinds of class 
actions, with the representative being a person from within the class.  See John Bron-
steen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2003) 
(“There is no consent and no agency relationship in a class action, and as a conse-
quence interest representation is the only justification for conceiving class actions as 
representative lawsuits.”); Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure:  Mar-
tin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL 
L. REV. 189 (1992). 
259 See Post, supra note 11, at 1274-75. 
260 See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text. 
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States.”  Judges are not supposed to have an “interest” as an institutional 
matter in a particular interpretation of a legal rule, nor are individual 
judges—whether or not affiliated in the past with political parties—
supposed to bring a “party position” to bear.  Further, while pressures to 
democratize the judiciary are sometimes couched in the language of 
representation, once selected and confirmed, judges are not charged 
with pressing any point of view.  And the better argument for a diverse 
judiciary is not an essentialist one that all women or men of a particular 
color or class hold a certain view but rather that, as a matter of equality, 
the distribution of judgeships ought not to track exclusively one set of 
demographic characteristics.  When the Chief Justice and the Judicial 
Conference, however, put forth positions on federalism and the alloca-
tion of power to non-life-tenured judges and use their powers to shape 
programmatic agendas for the federal judiciary, they undermine the 
signature of adjudication as the activity of the disengaged, rendering 
judgments with no individual and no collective interest to be furthered. 
IV.   A CREATURE OF CONGRESS AND CUSTOMS, NOT THE CONSTITUTION 
A. Constitutional Opportunities 
We began by considering how, over the last century, the nature, 
shape, and work of the federal judiciary has changed, along with the 
range of persons seen as rightsholders and the obligations of democratic 
government to exercise its power in an accountable and transparent 
fashion.  We then detailed various forms of authority that have accrued 
to the Chief Justice and analyzed how, from a range of perspectives, the 
enlarged repertoire coupled with a life-tenured position as an adjudica-
tor is unwise. 
A distinct question is whether, as a matter of constitutional law, such 
a system is compelled, illicit, or revisable. As is discussed throughout this 
Symposium, the part of the Constitution devoted to establishing the ju-
dicial branch makes no mention of the office of the Chief Justice.261  Pe-
ter Fish put it well:  “[t]he American Constitution envelops the office of 
Chief Justice with silence.”262  The one and only constitutional reference 
                                                                                                                                 
261 U.S. CONST. art. III.  Although the constitutional text is sparse on this subject, 
many federal statutes advert to the position of the Chief Justice.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1 
(2000) (describing the Supreme Court as comprised of eight Associate Justices and a 
“Chief Justice of the United States”).  That usage began in the First Judiciary Act.  See 
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (describing the Supreme Court as 
consisting of “a chief justice and five associate justices”). 
262 Fish, Office of Chief Justice, supra note 3, at 9. 
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is found in the discussion of presidential impeachments—Article I speci-
fies that “the Chief Justice shall preside” when a President is tried by the 
Senate.263 
Under some schools of constitutional interpretation, textual silence 
leaves the structure of the chief justiceship wide open, with congres-
sional input possible.  Just as Congress has decided the number of Asso-
ciate Justices serving on the Court and has varied that number over 
time,264 so might Congress limit the years a person may serve as Chief 
Justice or redistribute aspects of the Chief’s powers.  But other ways to 
read the Constitution consider the intent of the Framers, precedent, 
structure, and practices, and, hence, more remains to be explored. 
Other contributions focus on the history of what was known about 
the attitudes of the Constitution’s drafters towards the chief justiceship.  
Given the occasional and largely tangential references to a Chief Justice 
in the records of the Convention,265 and that, according to Professor 
White, the debates on ratification made no mention of the Chief Justice 
at all,266 not much exists upon which to erect a theory that the current 
chief justiceship stems from the intent or the original understanding of 
the Framers. 
                                                                                                                                 
263 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
264 See 1 Stat. at 73; Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, §§ 1-5, 2 Stat. 420 (adding a new 
circuit court and a sixth Associate Justice); An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the 
United States, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176 (1837) (increasing the number of circuits and 
Justices to nine); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794 (adding a tenth circuit 
and Justice); Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209 (providing that no Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court would be replaced until the Supreme Court had only six 
Associate Justices); Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44 (setting the Court at its 
current size of nine Justices). 
265 Max Farrand’s collection of records from the 1787 convention includes only a 
few mentions of a Chief Justice.  Gouvenour Morris of New York suggested that the 
Chief Justice be included in the line of succession to the presidency.  Others men-
tioned a Chief Justice as one member of various councils proposed to advise the Execu-
tive.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 427 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (Aug. 27, 1787) (recording Gouverneur Morris’s objection to suc-
cession of the President by the President of the Senate and proposal that the Chief 
Justice be named instead); 2 id. at 367 (Aug. 22, 1787) (describing a proposed Privy-
Council to include the Chief Justice, the heads of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives, and “principal Officer[s]” of government departments, whose duty it would 
be “to advise [the President] in matters respecting the execution of his Office”); 2 id. 
at 335-37 (Aug. 20, 1787) (describing a Council of State to assist the President in “con-
ducting the Public Affairs” and to include the Chief Justice, expressly charged with 
“recommend[ing] such alterations of, and additions to, the Laws of the United-States 
as may in his opinion be necessary to the due administration of Justice, and such as 
may promote useful learning and inculcate sound morality throughout the Union”).  
None of these suggestions became a part of the constitutional structure.   
266 White, supra note 11, at 1465. 
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That neither the role of the Chief Justice nor its term of office were 
in focus at the founding is not surprising.  Then, the concern was on 
judges too dependent on the political branches.  Only in 1701 had Eng-
land rejected the practice that judges’ commissions ended with that of a 
given individual’s kingship; the Act of Settlement of 1701 created judges’ 
independence from the Crown by providing them with terms of office 
that could be concluded only through a formal request by the two 
Houses of Parliament.267  Further, when the United States was a fledgling 
country, its leaders had many opportunities for government service.  The 
job of federal jurist was not necessarily more desirable than other posi-
tions.  John Jay, for example, left the Supreme Court bench to become 
Governor of New York.268  As Table 1 detailed, more generally during the 
twenty-year period of 1789 to 1809, Justices averaged fourteen years of 
service. In contrast, today’s Justices average twenty-four years, bringing to 
the fore the problem of too long a tenure on the bench for all life-
tenured jurists.  Yet even as recently as the 1982 Virginia Conference on 
the chief justiceship, no mention was made of term limits.  Today, how-
ever, several proposals have been made for such constraints on the Chief 
Justice as well as for Associate Justices and lower court  judges.269 
Even if lacking much by way of text, consensus at the framing, or 
implicit structure, but nonetheless still interested in finding constitu-
tional prescriptions as to the length of term, the mode of selection, or 
the content of the job of the Chief, one could turn to another constitu-
tional interpretative technique—developing premises from an amalgam 
                                                                                                                                 
267 See Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 W. & M. 3, c. 2 (Eng.); see also DAVID LEM-
MINGS, The Independence of the Judiciary in Eighteenth Century England, in THE LIFE OF THE 
LAW:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 125 (Peter 
Birks ed., 1991) (concluding that, while creating a form of independence in one re-
spect, the Act of Settlement made judges more dependent on parliament as they 
sought “supplementary places and honours” and, hence, that some politicization of the 
judiciary resulted); Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 
YALE L.J. 1475, 1478 (1970) (discussing the Act of Settlement). 
268 Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 884 (1953) 
(criticizing Jay for leaving). 
269 See Morrison, Opting for Change in Supreme Court Selection, and for the Chief Justice, 
Too, supra note 41 (proposing a rotating chief justiceship wherein the President would 
designate the Chief from among the sitting Justices to act as Chief until the expiration 
of that person’s term on the Court, which for all Justices would be limited to eighteen 
years); Resnik, Democratic Responses, supra note 1, at 197 (discussing term limits for the 
Chief Justice); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts as Chief Justice of 
the United States, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 535-36 (2005) (state-
ment of Judith Resnik) [hereinafter Resnik Testimony] (suggesting limits and discuss-
ing their legality); see also REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 35 (collecting proposals 
and rationales for limiting the terms of the Justices of the Supreme Court). 
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of text and practice.270  Article III provides that the “judicial Power of the 
United States” shall vest in courts with judges holding “their Offices dur-
ing good Behavior.”271  The Constitution does not define either the 
words “hold” or “Offices” or the phrase “during good Behaviour.” 
Since the country’s founding, however, Article III judges have not 
had either a defined term of office or an age at which retirement is 
mandatory.  Further, since the founding, the practice has been for the 
President to nominate a Chief Justice and for the Senate to hold a sepa-
rate confirmation hearing even when an individual (such as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist272) has already been confirmed for an associate justiceship.  If 
one reads the prescription that judges hold their offices “during good 
Behaviour” to require an unfettered run, adds the fact that the nomina-
tion of a Chief Justice has been treated as a separate commission, and 
then invokes concerns that congressional intervention could violate 
separation-of-powers principles, one could mount an argument that the 
system currently in place—of an unending term of office for anyone tak-
ing the commission of the Chief Justice—is a constitutional require-
ment.273 
But competing interpretations are also possible.  First, one can argue 
that the lack of mention of the chief justiceship in the part of the Consti-
tution specifically devoted to the courts gives Congress a range of per-
                                                                                                                                 
270 That approach can be found in Article III case law, which is replete with exam-
ples of doctrine tolerating departures from text. The Court has often taken a function-
alist approach that sometimes, as Paul Bator argued, verges on the incoherent.  See 
Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture:  Legislative and Administrative Courts Under 
Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990).  For example, although Article III appears to commit 
the “judicial Power of the United States” to judges appointed through Article III proc-
esses and protected by Article III attributes, the Court has upheld significant delega-
tions of that power to non-life-tenured jurists (such as bankruptcy and magistrate 
judges) in courts and in agencies. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 
(1980); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see also 
Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 1, at 625-49. 
271 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
272 Chief Justice Rehnquist was the fifth Chief Justice to be elevated within the 
Court.  His predecessors—Stone, Hughes, Edward D. White, and John Rutledge—all 
received two commissions, first to be Justice and later Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court.  Rutledge, a recess appointment, was not confirmed for the chief justiceship 
and then resigned from the Court. 
273 At the hearings on the nomination of John Roberts, Professor Resnik proposed 
that Congress impose term limits for chief justiceships.  See Resnik Testimony, supra 
note 269, at 535-36.  Professor Charles Fried, who testified on the same panel of law 
professors, subsequently sent a letter to Senator Arlen Specter, the Chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, explaining that he thought the suggestion not constitutionally 
permissible.  Letter from Charles Fried, Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., 
to Senator Arlen Specter, with copy provided by Professor Fried to Professor Resnik 
(Sept. 16, 2005) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
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missible constitutional choices for restructuring—so long as the chosen 
congressional intervention meets the Article III requirements that jurists 
“hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and does not undermine the 
capacity of the Court or its Chief Justice to perform essential functions.274  
Second, one can bracket the administrative portfolio of the Chief Justice 
and argue that it does not merit Article III protection.  Doctrinal support 
for that analysis comes from the law of judicial immunity, in which the 
Supreme Court has held that when judges are sued for actions taken as 
they administer or promulgate rules, they cannot assert the defense of 
judicial immunity but can only rely on the kind of immunity accorded to 
officials from other branches discharging analogous functions.275 
 Third, were one tempted to claim that Article III commissions run 
exclusively to one particular office, that approach would render constitu-
tionally suspect congressional statutes, extant since 1922, authorizing the 
Chief Justice to license judges to “sit by designation” in districts and cir-
cuits other than those to which they had been appointed as well as to 
appoint some judges to specialized tribunals.  Further put into question 
would be innovations of the second half of the twentieth century, when 
Congress set term limits for the chief judgeships of the lower courts.276  
In short, a good deal of practical evidence supports an understanding 
that Congress can define different charters for sitting jurists without un-
dermining the constitutional guarantees of Article III. 
Another potential hurdle for enthusiasts of term limits for the Chief 
Justice is the meaning of Article III’s protection of service during “good 
Behaviour.”  That phrase has been of interest on various occasions, such 
as when members of Congress have sought to impeach a judge or to cre-
ate sanctions short of impeachment.277  For example, when members of 
                                                                                                                                 
274 The “essential function” theory of Article III is associated with several academ-
ics, including Henry Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts:  An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Con-
gressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 
(1960); and Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court 
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974). 
275 See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 731-34 
(1980) (holding that, when the Virginia Supreme Court promulgated and adminis-
tered disciplinary rules, that Court was not entitled to “judicial” immunity but rather, 
under a functional analysis, the forms of immunity accorded to either legislators or 
executive branch members). 
276 See 28 U.S.C. § 45(3)(A) (2000) (limiting the term of chief judges of circuit 
courts to seven years); id. § 136(3)(A) (limiting the term of chief judges of district 
courts to seven years). 
277 For example, in support of his argument that Congress has the power to define a 
breach of “good Behaviour” to include more than a “high crime and misdemeanor,” Pro-
fessor Raoul Berger noted that the phrase “hold[ing] their Offices during good Behav-
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Congress considered the problems of disabled or poorly functioning 
judges, the question emerged:  did the guarantee of service during 
“good Behaviour” preclude Congress from doing anything other than 
impeachment to stop judges from working in ways harmful to the ad-
ministration of justice?278  The answer has repeatedly been that it does 
not, as Congress has provided for certifications of disability279 as well as 
enacted the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disabil-
ity Act of 1980,280 which includes a range of sanctions administered by 
the judiciary.  Congress there authorized the judiciary to ask a judge to 
retire voluntarily or to certify that jurist’s disability yet not order “re-
moval from office.”281  The Act has survived the few challenges to its con-
stitutionality,282 with courts distinguishing ending the service of a judge 
from that judge’s “removal from office.”  These statutory examples sup-
port the proposition that the chief justiceship could be a term-limited 
job without breaching Article III’s “hold office” in “good behaviour” 
provisions. 
Additional support comes from congressional legislation (men-
tioned earlier) imposing term limits on the lower courts’ chief judges. 
                                                                                                                                 
iour” dated from the 1701 Act of Settlement, which protected judges “so long as they con-
duct[ed] themselves well,” while also creating procedural requirements to limit their terms 
of service.  See Berger, supra note 267, at 1478, 1530; see also id. at 1500-01 (discussing 
further the Act of Settlement); Burke Shartel, Federal Judges—Appointment, Supervision, 
and Removal—Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930); Note, 
Removal of Federal Judges:  A Proposed Plan, 31 ILL. L. REV. 631, 636-39 (1937). 
278 See RUSSELL R. WHEELER & A. LEO LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN 
THE UNITED STATES 49-54 (1979); see generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 17-32 (1993); Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture 
of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 340, 346-48 (1999); Richard L. Marcus, 
Who Should Discipline Federal Judges, and How?, 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993). 
279 Enacted in 1957, 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) authorizes circuit Judicial Councils to cer-
tify judges as disabled, thereby allowing the President to appoint an additional judge to 
serve on the circuit in addition to the disabled judge.  Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 
85-261, 71 Stat. 586.  The Chief Justice bears responsibility under this statute for certify-
ing the disability of the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade.  28 U.S.C. § 
372(b).  Statutes allowing certain judges to relieve disabled judges of their duties (but 
not their Article III commissions) date back as far as 1801.  For a historical overview of 
these statutes, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. 
PA. L. REV. 243,  271-76 (1993). 
280 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C., including §§ 351, 372); see generally Marcus, supra note 278 (assessing the 
costs and benefits of judicial discipline under the Act); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural 
Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 
1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1982). 
281 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(3)(A) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
282 See, e.g., McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability 
Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 64-69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (re-
jecting Article III and separation of powers challenges to the Act). 
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During the 1950s, Congress provided age limits for the chief judges of 
the lower federal courts.283  That innovation occasioned relatively little 
debate.  Proponents explained simply that constitutionality remained 
intact because a “distinction [was] made between the judge in his judi-
cial capacity and in his administrative capacity;” and the statute proposed 
only to take away administrative tasks.284  In short, the federal system 
could (as several academics now propose)285 meet its obligation to insu-
late jurists in general from retribution by having a fixed endpoint to 
their service286 and could do so specifically for the Chief Justice of the 
United States.287 
Thus, a better reading of the Article III requirements is that, so long 
as a person retains the office of a federal judge with salary protected, 
both reassignment from one particular post to another and divestiture of 
administrative responsibilities are permissible.  Moreover, given the ab-
sence of a mention of the chief justiceship in Article III, no special rule 
about “holding office” attaches to that post.  Therefore, the Constitution 
would permit a rotating chief justiceship similar to that of some state 
courts288 and of the lower federal courts,289 with the position of chief jus-
tice moving by seniority or some other system.   
Two constitutional caveats are required.  Article I requires the Chief 
Justice to preside at impeachment trials of the President.  A statute fixing 
term limits for the chief justiceship would have to provide for that 
                                                                                                                                 
283 See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
284 S. REP. NO. 85-1780 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3526, 3528. 
285 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court:  
Life Tenure Reconsidered, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 35, at 15.  But see Stephen 
B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II:  Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 (2006). 
286 See Resnik, Democratic Responses, supra note 1, at 182 (identifying the United 
States as anomalous in not imposing term limits). 
287 See id. at 181-201. 
288 Several state constitutions provide for rotation of the chief justiceship, creating 
a term for that office that is shorter than the general term of service as a justice on the 
court.  See, e.g.,  ALASKA CONST. art. 4, § 2(b) (providing that the members of the 
Alaska Supreme Court shall select a new chief justice every three years); IDAHO CONST. 
art. V, § 6 (providing that the justices of the Idaho Supreme Court shall serve six-year 
terms but that the chief justice shall be selected by the other justices of the supreme 
court to hold office for a term of four years); WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 3 (providing that 
the Washington Supreme Court judges, who serve seven-year terms, shall select a chief 
justice from among them to serve a four-year term).  The state of Colorado authorizes 
its supreme court to select one of its members to serve as chief justice “at the pleasure 
of a majority of the court.”  COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 5.  For a complete overview of 
states’ methods of selecting chief justices and states’ designated terms for the position, 
see infra Appendix C, Tenure and Methods of Selection of State Chief Justices. 
289 See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
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unlikely contingency by including automatic extensions of a Chief Jus-
tice’s term if an impeachment trial were underway.  Further, Article III 
protects against the diminution of judicial salaries and, currently, the 
Chief Justice receives a small increment in compensation over that paid 
to Associate Justices.290  To avoid violating the non-diminution mandate, 
the salaries of all Justices could be equalized or the person who serves as 
Chief could continue to receive that modest premium after ceasing to 
hold that special post. 
Another constitutional question would then need to be addressed—
how to select successor Chief Justices.  Could Associate Justices select the 
Chief Justice (as in some state systems291), or does that proposition vio-
late the Appointments Clause, with its mandate to the President to ap-
point “Judges of the supreme Court?”292  Once again, constitutional si-
lence (no mention of a special appointment or designation process for 
the Chief Justice) makes difficult the claim of a constitutional breach, so 
long as the President has nominated the person to the Supreme Court.  
Further, given the tradition of inherent judicial powers and statutes that 
authorize self-governance of the judiciary,293 selection from within by 
other jurists could be seen as supportive of the independence of the Su-
preme Court. 
That Congress could constitutionally alter the term of the Chief Jus-
tice does not mean that either the President or the Congress could 
shape the job in a way that undercuts the Court’s capacity to work.  The 
more general rubric of separation of powers requires the preservation of 
the Supreme Court specifically (and of the federal courts more gener-
ally) as a coordinate branch of government, not to be micromanaged by 
Congress, which could, through thousands of small cuts, immobilize the 
federal judicial system.  Were Congress, for example, to require that the 
chief justiceship change for each case or each month, such a statute 
would be unconstitutional.294  Similarly, if either the President or the 
                                                                                                                                 
290 For 2006, the Chief Justice is to be paid $212,100, while Associate Justices are to 
be paid $203,000.  Exec. Order No. 13,393, 70 Fed. Reg. 76,655, 76,660 (Dec. 22, 
2005). 
291 See infra Appendix C, Tenure and Methods of Selection of State Chief Justices. 
292 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
293 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035. 
294 See, e.g., Starrs v. Ruxton, 2000 J.C. 208 (H.J.C. 1999) (Scot.) (relying on Article 
6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to 
conclude that too short a term of office is a violation of the right to “an independent 
and impartial tribunal,” as a judge in such a position “might be influenced by his hopes 
and fears as to his prospective advancement”).  Some Canadian cases address a compa-
rable concern.  See, e.g., Reference re Territorial Court Act (N.W.T.) s.6(2) [1997], 152 
D.L.R. (4th) 132 (N.W.T.). 
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Congress were to reappoint Chief Justices at brief intervals, or the Presi-
dent were to use every opening to put a new person in the chief justice-
ship, the ability of the Court to function would be disrupted. 
In contrast, if the person who served in the position of the Chief Jus-
tice did so for seven years (to parallel the length of service described in 
the statutes addressing the chief judges of the district and appellate 
courts), and afterwards retained the status of a federal judge or Justice, 
that person’s tenure would be protected but that person’s power cab-
ined.  Such a rule would also enable an orderly succession of service that 
in turn has administrative advantages. 
B.  Statutory Innovations and Occasions for Self-Restraint 
Given the constitutional possibilities, we turn then to whether Con-
gress should act.  Because the chief justiceship as we have come to know 
it is, in large measure, a creature of Congress rather than the Constitu-
tion, congressional restructuring seems particularly appropriate to con-
strain the entrenchment of power and the disproportionate impact that 
one individual can have on American law through unduly long terms.295  
Action is appropriate despite the allure, for some, of strong executive 
power.  Term limits and reduced statutory powers—sketched below—
would not prevent a Chief Justice from continuing to be a visible and 
                                                                                                                                 
295 At a few points in the last decades, proposals to constrain some of the functions 
of the Chief Justice or the Court have been made.  For example, in 1986, the ABA 
Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements urged creation of an office of 
“chancellor” to identify an individual designated as the head of the judicial system and 
to relieve the Chief of administrative duties other than those related to the Supreme 
Court.  See Letter from Daniel Meador to Hon. Joseph F. Weis (May 8, 1989) reprinted in 
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION, MANAGEMENT, AND STRUCTURE, 
in 2 WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE Part IV.K. (1990) (discussing and enclosing the 1986 recommendation).  
The congressionally created Federal Courts Study Committee, described supra notes 83 
and 120, acknowledged the ABA proposal for a “chancellor” but deferred to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion that the issue of reconfiguration be assigned to a Judi-
cial Conference committee.  See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, 
supra note 83, at 145-46.  The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that 
“very careful and extended consideration by knowledgeable persons under the aegis of 
the Chief Justice” be given to the “chancellor” proposal, but that whatever conclusion 
is reached, the Chief Justice should remain “the acknowledged head of the entire fed-
eral judiciary.”  Id. at 146. 
 In 1995, the Judicial Conference’s Long Range Plan concluded that an additional 
administrative post was unnecessary.  The Long Range Plan recommended that “[t]he 
Chief Justice of the United States should remain the head of the federal judicial sys-
tem, retaining the traditional authority and responsibility of that office in matters of 
judicial administration.”  See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 120, at 77, 166 F.R.D. at 137 
(detailing Recommendation 41); see also Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note 141, 
at 120 (discussing the proposal for a chancellorship). 
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important spokesperson for a set of issues, such as judicial independ-
ence, when the need arises. 
To explore how to alter the length of tenure, discussion of more of 
the history of term positions for the chief judges of the lower courts is 
useful, as is some understanding of current economic incentives to serve 
long terms.  The interest in limiting the tenure of chief judges of the 
lower courts came from within—in light of concerns that some individu-
als holding the position of chief judge were either inept administrators 
or too old to handle the workload.  In 1956, a committee of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States commissioned a survey of chief judges; 
learned was that the average age of circuit chief judges was about sev-
enty-two.  Chief judges of the district courts were somewhat younger, 
averaging about sixty-five years of age.  The terms of office for both 
groups averaged about eight-and-a-half years.296 
The Conference concluded that, while many judges of older years 
did “excellent work,” the “toll of years has a tendency to diminish celer-
ity, promptitude, and effectiveness.”297  These concerns reflect what has 
come to be standard advice for other organizations—that ensuring regu-
lar turnover in leadership enables an institution to revitalize its practices. 
The Conference proposed that Congress enact legislation to “relieve 
chief judges of the circuit and district courts from their administrative 
duties upon reaching the age of seventy-five, so that they may devote 
their entire time to the law work of the courts and not to the administra-
tive details.”298  With support from the Department of Justice and the 
Judiciary, an age limit—set at seventy—became law.299 
In the 1970s, in a report from a Commission on Revision of the Fed-
eral Court Appellate System, the issue was revisited.  Noted were the 
problems with a straight seniority system, including that no account was 
taken of the abilities of an individual for administration.300  Rejecting 
election by one’s peers as politicizing the decision, the Commission rec-
ommended that a chief judge serve a single term of a maximum of seven 
years.  The results can be found in statutes providing that, upon a va-
                                                                                                                                 
296 S. REP. NO. 85-1780 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3526, 3527. 
297 Id. at 3528.  More recent commentary on the difficulties that age imposes for 
Supreme Court Justices and the role played by older Justices includes David J. Garrow, 
Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court:  The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000); and Epstein, Knight & Shvetsova, supra note 242, at 25-27. 
298 S. REP. NO. 85-1780, supra note 296, at 3526. 
299 See Act of Aug. 6, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-593, 72 Stat. 497 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 45(3)(C), 136(3)(C) (2000)). 
300 Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System: Structure 
and Internal Procedures:  Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 274-75 
(1975). 
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cancy, chief judges of both trial and appellate courts are to be those per-
sons “senior in commission” who are sixty-four or under, have served for 
one or more years as a judge, and have not previously been the chief 
judge; such persons then have an opportunity to serve a seven-year term 
as chief.301 
 An alternative to a mandatory length of service is to create economic 
incentives to prompt the Chief Justice to relinquish the post.  As the ta-
ble contrasting different average lengths that justices and judges have 
served over the last two centuries indicates,302 federal judges now serve, 
on average, about twenty-four years.  While many factors have helped to 
produce the growth in the length of service of life-tenured judges,303 a 
key variable is the pension system which, as currently configured by 
Congress, creates economic incentives for judges to stay on the bench.304  
Specifically, when Article III judges or Justices retire by taking “senior 
status,” they open up a judgeship slot (allotted by statute) for the courts 
on which they serve.305  But they need not resign in order to take a form of 
retirement that permits a new appointment to be made.  Moreover, the 
current structure makes continuing to work economically attractive.  
Thus, many retirees on the lower courts continue to sit as judges, and, as 
Professor Albert Yoon has detailed,306 still shoulder a significant amount 
of judicial work.307 
 Congress could use its pension system differently by providing sig-
nificantly better pension benefits with special bonuses to Chief Justices 
who serve for no longer than a set period.  Economic models could assist 
                                                                                                                                 
301 See Stephen L. Wasby, The Work of a Circuit’s Chief Judge, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 63, 66 
(2003) (discussing examples in which individuals stepped aside before their seven-year 
term ended to enable others, who would have missed the opportunity because they 
would have become sixty-five, to serve as chief judge); see also supra note 276. 
302 See supra Table 1, Lengths of Service of Article III Judges: Contrasting Snap-
shots, 1800s/2000s. 
303 See Albert Yoon, The End of the Rainbow:  Understanding Turnover Among Federal 
Judges 13-14, available at http://www.irs.princeton.edu/seminars/yoon.pdf (last visited 
May 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript).  Further, in recent decades, selection proc-
esses have focused on judges serving at a lower court as a pool from which to draw 
jurists for higher courts.  Relying on a career ladder for appointing judges produces 
jurists with more total years in the judiciary.  Whether being a federal judge correlates 
with longevity is another possibility. 
304 See id. at 31-32. 
305 28 U.S.C. § 371(d) (2000) (providing that the President shall appoint a succes-
sor to the retiring judge or Justice). 
306 See Albert Yoon, As You Like It:  Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of 
Judicial Tenure, 2 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 499 (2005). 
307 See id. at 495, 515, 522 (estimating that senior judges comprise thirty-seven per-
cent of all sitting Article III judges and that, on average, a senior district court judge 
carries sixty-three percent of the caseload of an active district court judge). 
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in fashioning an optimal intervention, similar to some universities’ pack-
ages of benefits and salary that have prompted tenured professors to 
take early retirement.  Yet for persons of significant or sufficient inde-
pendent means, monetary rewards are less enticing, making an incentive 
system operate differently depending upon an individual’s wealth or that 
of the person’s household.  A more direct and helpful intervention 
would thus be to impose statutory limits.  As for the constitutional ques-
tion of whether such a provision could apply to a sitting Chief Justice, 
prospective application would avoid the issue.  And, the Chief Justice 
then in office could choose whether to set a voluntary example by follow-
ing the new regime. 
 Turning from the length of the term to the scope of the powers, 
Congress is the body that endowed the Chief Justice with the task of 
presiding at the Judicial Conference and the power to assign sitting 
judges to special courts.  Thus, the legislature can—and should—
revisit these grants of power.  The idea of restructuring the tasks as-
signed to the Chief Justice is not new; proposals have surfaced peri-
odically for a “Chancellor” or other officer freed from oversight by the 
Chief Justice but accountable to the Judicial Conference.308  Similarly, 
an inter-branch commission has been suggested to focus on the needs 
of the judiciary.309 
One way to begin the process of revision is to review the statutes 
giving powers to the Chief Justice, which are set forth in Appendix B, 
and which are listed to be comprehensive rather than classified by im-
pact.  The Chief Justice need not be the jurist assigned to chair the 
Judicial Conference or to pick the members of its committees.  Alter-
natives include requiring that the chair rotate among judges who serve 
on the Conference or that members of the Conference select their 
own chair, again for a specified and limited term.  Congress should 
                                                                                                                                 
308 See, e.g., Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, supra note 
205, at 1047-53 (proposing both the creation of a position of a high-level assistant (to 
be filled by a person already serving as an Article III judge) to aid the Chief Justice and 
the creation of a new and relatively independent administrative position held by a per-
son not under the supervision of the Chief Justice); Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
supra note 141, at 120 (discussing such proposals).  Chief Justice Burger discussed the 
creation of an office of Circuit Justice for Administration (to be filled by a federal 
judge with trial and appellate experience) but did not elaborate the content of a port-
folio for the proposed position.  See Burger, Address at the American Enterprise Insti-
tute, supra note 206, at 1047; see generally RUSSELL R. WHEELER & GORDON BERMANT, 
FEDERAL COURT GOVERNANCE:  WHY CONGRESS SHOULD—AND WHY CONGRESS 
SHOULD NOT—CREATE A FULL-TIME EXECUTIVE JUDGE, ABOLISH THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE, AND REMOVE CIRCUIT JUDGES FROM DISTRICT COURT GOVERNANCE (Fed. Jud. 
Ctr. 1994). 
309 See Geyh, supra note 218, at 1234-41. 
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also revisit how specialty courts are created.  Appointments to courts 
such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court could be 
through mechanisms like random selection from various circuits 
rather than by the Chief Justice. 
As for the Chief Justice’s power to appoint lower court judges to 
special courts and to select senior executives, that power is not without 
its problems, for appointments can provide opportunities for patron-
age.  Yet Congress has and can continue to “vest the Appointment” of 
“inferior Officers” in the “Courts of Law,”310 and may give the 
Chief Justice the power to appoint various court officials.  But  Con-
gress ought to explore alternatives not only for special tribunals but 
also for two senior positions, the Director of the AO and the Director 
of the FJC, both of which could either be subject to confirmation, as 
are many other senior executive positions in the federal government, 
or be chosen by committees or commissions operating independently 
of the Chief Justice.  The Administrative Assistant, in contrast, working 
directly and closely with the Chief Justice, ought to remain a person 
selected by the Chief Justice. 
Change need not come only from Congress.  Just as Chief Justices 
have in the past been the source of so many aspects of the current job, 
so could the new and future Chief Justices affect expectations and re-
shape customs.  The new Chief Justice could alter practices either by 
sharing the work within or by going to Congress to seek revision of 
some of the statutory charters that run to that office.  Some evidence 
of interest in broadening participation has come in the months since 
Chief Justice Roberts was appointed.  After the resignation of Ralph 
Mecham, the most recent Director of the AO who long served Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice appointed a committee of several 
                                                                                                                                 
310 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883, 888-92 
(1991) (construing “Courts of Law” to include the legislatively created Tax Court and 
rejecting petitioners’ challenge to legislation that authorized the Chief Judge of the 
Tax Court to appoint special trial judges within that court).  Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, concurred in part, but Justice Scalia objected 
to the conclusion that the Tax Court was a “Court”—opining that the Tax Court was a 
“‘Departmen[t]’ and the Chief Judge [was] its head.” Id. at 901 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
The majority agreed that the appointment power had been designed to “ensure that 
those who wielded it were accountable to public force and the will of the people,” and 
stressed that the “power of appointment to offices” was, at the time of the founding, 
understood as a serious source of “despotism.” Id. at 884 (majority opinion) (quoting, 
as the source of the term “despotism,” GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 79 (1969)); see also id. at 904-06 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing that the appointment power was originally understood as a source of 
patronage).   
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judges to advise him on the replacement.311  That collaborative effort 
could be the beginning of other similar decisions as the new Chief 
Justice puts his stamp on the office. 
Corporate theorists might not expect a leader with such an un-
structured and generous grant of power to relinquish any of it volun-
tarily.  The burden of this contribution, however, is to make plain the 
need for the federal judiciary to be as peculiar a bureaucracy as possi-
ble, regularly violating Weberian expectations of organizational behav-
ior because of judges’ deeper commitments to the task of adjudica-
tion.  The judiciary wants to be free of micromanagement by other 
branches and able to decide a host of internal matters as it provides its 
specialized services of adjudication.  But the judiciary can properly 
invoke judicial independence as a justification for its freedom only if it 
does not act like an ordinary agency pursuing programmatic ends.  
Chief Justices of recent eras have made that more difficult, but this 
rare occasion—a new Chief Justice—could mark a moment of change 
and, by doing so, make such moments less unusual in the future. 
                                                                                                                                 
311 See Steve Lash, Top Judge Seeks Top Administrator, CHIC. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 16, 
2005, at 1 (noting that the Chief Justice had created a committee, chaired by the Hon-
orable Michael Boudin of the First Circuit, to help review applications for the new 
Director of the AO). 
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APPENDIX A 
Tenure of Chief Justices of the United States, 
of Directors of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
and of Directors of the Federal Judicial Center 
      
 
Name of Chief Justice Term Began  Term Completed 
John Jay October 19, 1789 June 29, 1795 
John Rutledge August 12, 1795 December 15, 1795 
Oliver Ellsworth March 8, 1796 December 15, 1800 
John Marshall February 4, 1801 July 6, 1835 
Roger Brooke Taney March 28, 1836 October 12, 1864 
Salmon Portland Chase December 15, 1864 May 7, 1873 
Morrison Remick Waite March 4, 1874 March 23, 1888 
Melville Weston Fuller October 8, 1888 July 4, 1910 
Edward Douglass White December 19, 1910 May 19, 1921 
William Howard Taft July 11, 1921 February 3, 1930 
Charles Evans Hughes February 24, 1930 July 1, 1941 
Harlan Fiske Stone July 3, 1941 April 22, 1946 
Fred Moore Vinson June 24, 1946 September 8, 1953 
Earl Warren October 5, 1953 June 23, 1969 
Warren Earl Burger June 23, 1969 September 26, 1986 
William Hubbs Rehnquist September 26, 1986 September 3, 2005 
John Glover Roberts, Jr.  September 29, 2005  
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Name of AO Director 
Term 
Began 
Term  
Completed 
Service Under 
Chief Justice(s) 
Henry P. Chandler 1939 1956 Hughes, Stone, 
Vinson, Warren 
Warren Olney III 1958 1967 Warren 
Ernest C. Friesen 1968 1970 Warren, Burger 
Rowland F. Kirks  1970 1977 Burger 
William E. Foley  1977 1985 Burger 
Leonidas Ralph Mecham 1985 2006 Burger, Rehnquist, 
Roberts 
James C. Duff 2006  Roberts 
 
 
 
 
Name of FJC Director 
Term 
Began 
Term 
Completed 
Service under 
Chief Justice(s) 
Hon. Tom C. Clark  1968 1970 Warren, Burger 
Hon. Alfred P. Murrah  1970 1974  Burger 
Hon. Walter E. Hoffman  1974 1977 Burger 
A. Leo Levin  1977 1987 Burger, Rehnquist 
Hon. John C. Godbold  1987 1990  Rehnquist 
Hon. William W Schwarzer 1990 1995  Rehnquist 
Hon. Rya W. Zobel  1995 1999  Rehnquist 
Hon. Fern M. Smith  1999 2003  Rehnquist 
Hon. Barbara Jacobs Rothstein 2003  Rehnquist, Roberts 
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APPENDIX B 
Statutory Duties of the Chief Justice of the United States 
 
  
2 U.S.C. § 135 The Librarian of Congress purchases law books under the 
direction of the Chief Justice. 
2 U.S.C. § 352 The Chief Justice appoints two of the eleven members of the 
Citizens’ Commission on Public Service and Compensation.  
5 U.S.C. § 5520a The Chief Justice or the Chief Justice’s designee is responsible 
for promulgating regulations to implement garnishment of 
pay provisions for the judicial branch.   
5 U.S.C. § 5582 The Chief Justice or the Chief Justice’s designee is responsible 
for promulgating regulations allowing judicial branch em-
ployees to designate beneficiaries.   
8 U.S.C. § 1532 The Chief Justice appoints the five district judges who consti-
tute the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.   
8 U.S.C. § 1532 The Chief Justice designates the chief judge of the Alien Ter-
rorist Removal Court from among the members of that court. 
10 U.S.C. § 942 If a vacancy occurs on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, the Chief Justice may, upon the chief judge of 
that court’s request, appoint an Article III judge to fill the 
vacancy. 
18 U.S.C.  
app. 3, § 9 
The Chief Justice prescribes rules to protect against disclosure 
of classified information held by the federal courts.  
19 U.S.C. § 3432 The Chief Justice approves judges who have been identified by 
circuit chief judges as eligible to participate on NAFTA dis-
pute settlement panels and submits a list of approved judges 
to the Trade Representative. 
20 U.S.C. § 41 The Chief Justice, the President, the Vice President, and the 
heads of executive departments constitute the Smithsonian 
Institution. 
20 U.S.C. § 42 The Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution is com-
posed of the Chief Justice, the Vice President, three Members 
of the Senate, three Members of the House of Representa-
tives, and nine other persons who are not Members of Con-
gress.  
20 U.S.C. § 72 The Board of Trustees of the National Gallery of Art includes 
the Chief Justice, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, ex offi-
cio, and five general trustees. 
20 U.S.C. § 76cc The Board of Trustees of the Hirshhorn Museum and Sculp-
ture Garden includes the Chief Justice and the Secretary of 
the Smithsonian Institution, who serve as ex officio members, 
and eight general members.  
20 U.S.C. § 4502 The Chief Justice recommends two members of the judiciary 
to serve on the James Madison Memorial Fellowship Founda-
tion Board of Trustees. 
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28 U.S.C. § 1 The Supreme Court of the United States consists of a Chief 
Justice of the United States and eight Associate Justices, any 
six of whom constitute a quorum. 
28 U.S.C. § 42 The Chief Justice may allot the Justices among the circuits if 
such allotment is necessary while the Court is in vacation. 
28 U.S.C. § 45 The Chief Justice receives the certification of a circuit court 
chief judge who decides to step down and to resume service as 
a circuit judge. 
28 U.S.C. § 49* The Chief Justice appoints three Justices or circuit judges to 
compose a body, called the Special Division of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to appoint independ-
ent counsels. 
28 U.S.C. § 136 The Chief Justice receives the certification of a district court 
chief judge who decides to step down and to resume service as 
a district judge. 
28 U.S.C. § 258 The Chief Justice receives the certification of a Court of In-
ternational Trade chief judge who decides to step down and 
to resume service as a judge on that court. 
28 U.S.C. § 291 Upon request of the chief judge or circuit justice of that cir-
cuit, the Chief Justice may temporarily assign a circuit judge to 
another circuit. 
28 U.S.C. § 292 Upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief 
judge or circuit justice of that circuit, the Chief Justice may 
temporarily assign a district judge to another circuit. 
28 U.S.C. § 292 Upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief 
judge of that court, the Chief Justice may temporarily assign a 
district judge to the Court of International Trade. 
28 U.S.C. § 293 Upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief 
judge of that circuit, the Chief Justice may temporarily assign 
a judge from the Court of International Trade to serve in any 
circuit. 
28 U.S.C. § 294 The Chief Justice may designate a retired Justice to serve as a 
judge or circuit justice on a court of appeals. 
28 U.S.C. § 294 The Chief Justice maintains a roster of retired district and 
circuit judges willing to undertake judicial duties. 
28 U.S.C. § 295 The Chief Justice may revoke designations of district and cir-
cuit judges to other courts. 
28 U.S.C. § 297 The Chief Justice may assign judges to serve on the courts of 
the freely associated compact states when officials of those 
courts certify necessity and the assigned judges agree. 
28 U.S.C. § 331  The Chief Justice calls annual and special meetings of the 
Judicial Conference and designates the time and place for 
such meetings. 
28 U.S.C. § 331 The Chief Justice presides over meetings of the Judicial Con-
ference. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
*
The Special Division’s authority to appoint independent counsels lapsed in 1999.  
The Special Division continues to oversee previously initiated investigations and to 
dispose of petitions for attorneys’ fees in concluded matters. 
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28 U.S.C. § 331 Every judge summoned to the Judicial Conference shall at-
tend unless excused by the Chief Justice.  If a judge desig-
nated as a member of the Conference is unable to attend, the 
Chief Justice may summon a replacement judge. 
28 U.S.C. § 331 If the Judicial Conference elects to establish a standing com-
mittee for judicial discipline matters, the Chief Justice ap-
points the members of that committee. 
28 U.S.C. § 331 The Chief Justice may order subpoenas to be issued in con-
nection with Judicial Conference judicial discipline proceed-
ings. 
28 U.S.C. § 331 The Chief Justice may summon the Attorney General to re-
port to the Judicial Conference on matters related to the 
courts and, particularly, related to the United States as a party 
before the courts. 
28 U.S.C. § 331 The Chief Justice submits to Congress an annual report of the 
proceedings of the Judicial Conference and its recommenda-
tions for legislation. 
28 U.S.C. § 360 Judicial Conference investigations for judicial discipline pur-
poses cannot be disclosed unless authorized by the judge be-
ing investigated and by the Chief Justice, the chief judge of 
the circuit, or the chairman of the standing committee. 
28 U.S.C. § 371 The Chief Justice must certify annually that a Justice sitting as 
a Senior Justice continues to qualify for that status. 
28 U.S.C. § 371 The Chief Justice certifies the temporary or permanent dis-
ability of a Senior Justice.  
28 U.S.C. § 372 The Chief Justice signs certificates of permanent disability 
authorizing the voluntary early retirement of Justices and 
chief judges. 
28 U.S.C. § 372 The Chief Justice may present a certificate of permanent dis-
ability to the President to recommend involuntary retirement 
of the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade. 
28 U.S.C. § 601 The Chief Justice appoints and can remove, on consultation 
with the Judicial Conference, the Director and Deputy Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
28 U.S.C. § 611 The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts may elect special retirement coverage by filing a writ-
ten form with the Chief Justice. 
28 U.S.C. § 621 The Chief Justice serves as the permanent chair of the Board 
of the Federal Judicial Center.   
28 U.S.C. § 629 The Chief Justice appoints three of the seven members, in-
cluding the chair, of the Federal Judicial Center Foundation 
Board, which receives gifts and property for use by the Federal 
Judicial Center.   
28 U.S.C. § 671 The Chief Justice authorizes the Supreme Court Clerk to re-
move deputy clerks.   
28 U.S.C. § 671 With the approval of the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court 
Clerk appoints and sets compensation for deputy clerks. 
28 U.S.C. § 672 With the approval of the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court 
Marshal appoints and fixes compensation for assistants. 
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28 U.S.C. § 673 With the approval of the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court 
Reporter appoints and fixes compensation for assistants.   
28 U.S.C. § 673 The Supreme Court Reporter, under the direction of the 
Chief Justice or the Supreme Court, prepares the Supreme 
Court’s decisions for publication.  
28 U.S.C. § 674 With the approval of the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court 
librarian appoints and fixes compensation for assistants and 
sets the rules governing the use of the library. 
28 U.S.C. § 675 The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme 
Court may appoint law clerks and secretaries whose salaries 
shall be fixed by the Court. 
28 U.S.C. § 676 Either the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court selects the Su-
preme Court’s printer.  
28 U.S.C. § 676 Either the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court determines the 
manner in which Court decisions are printed. 
28 U.S.C. § 677 The Chief Justice appoints the Administrative Assistant to the 
Chief Justice and determines the level of compensation and 
duties for that position. 
28 U.S.C. § 677 The Chief Justice approves compensation for additional em-
ployees needed by the Administrative Assistant to the Chief 
Justice. 
28 U.S.C. § 677 The Chief Justice approves acceptance of volunteer services by 
the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice. 
28 U.S.C. § 1407  The Chief Justice may transfer a judge from the judge’s dis-
trict or circuit to a court to which multidistrict litigation has 
been transferred. 
28 U.S.C. § 1407  The Chief Justice appoints the seven members of the Multidis-
trict Litigation Panel.  
28 U.S.C. § 2109 If the Supreme Court does not have a quorum to hear a case, 
the Chief Justice may order the case remitted to the court of 
appeals for hearing by either, at the Chief Justice’s discretion, 
three judges or the court en banc.  
40 U.S.C. § 6102 The Chief Justice approves the Supreme Court Marshal’s regu-
lations for protection and maintenance of the Supreme Court 
building. 
40 U.S.C. § 6112 The Chief Justice approves the hiring of employees for the 
maintenance of the Supreme Court’s building and grounds. 
40 U.S.C. § 6121 The Chief Justice approves the Supreme Court Marshal’s regu-
lations for the Supreme Court police.  
40 U.S.C. § 6122 Under the general supervision and direction of the Chief Jus-
tice, the Supreme Court Marshal designates Supreme Court 
employees as members of the Supreme Court police. 
40 U.S.C. § 6502 The Chief Justice or the Chief Justice’s designee was charged 
with approving the final architectural plans for the Thurgood 
Marshall Federal Judiciary Building.   
40 U.S.C. § 6503 The Chief Justice appoints two of the thirteen members of the 
Commission for the Judiciary Office Building.  
40 U.S.C. § 6506 The Chief Justice was to determine what space was needed by 
the judiciary in the Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary 
Building and to inform the Architect of the Capitol.  
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40 U.S.C. § 6506 The Chief Justice notifies the Architect when the judiciary 
requires additional space in the Thurgood Marshall Federal 
Judiciary Building.   
42 U.S.C. § 659 The Chief Justice may promulgate regulations for the judicial 
branch to implement consent to income withholding, gar-
nishment, and similar proceedings for enforcement of child 
support and alimony obligations.  
44 U.S.C. § 2501 The Chief Justice appoints a member of the judiciary as one of 
the fifteen members of the National Historical Publications 
and Records Commission. 
44 U.S.C. § 3318 The Chief Justice appoints a member of the judiciary as one of 
the seventeen members of the National Study Commission on 
Records and Documents of Federal Officials.   
48 U.S.C. § 1424b The Chief Justice may assign a circuit or district judge from 
another circuit to serve temporarily as a judge in the District 
of Guam whenever such assignment is necessary and the as-
signed judge and the chief judge of the assigned judge’s cir-
cuit consent. 
48 U.S.C. § 1614 The Chief Justice, after obtaining the consent of the assigned 
judge and the assigned judge’s circuit, may assign a circuit or 
district judge to serve temporarily on the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands. 
48 U.S.C. § 1821 The Chief Justice, after obtaining the consent of the assigned 
judge and the assigned judge’s circuit, may assign a circuit or 
district judge to serve temporarily on the District Court for the 
Northern Mariana Islands. 
50 U.S.C. § 1802 The Chief Justice, with the concurrence of the Attorney Gen-
eral and in consultation with the Director of National Intelli-
gence, establishes security measures for maintaining the At-
torney General’s certification for electronic surveillance to 
acquire foreign intelligence. 
50 U.S.C. § 1803 The Chief Justice appoints the eleven district judges who 
make up the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.   
50 U.S.C. § 1803 The Chief Justice appoints three district or circuit court 
judges to serve as an appellate board to review any denial by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of an application 
by the government for surveillance authorization. 
50 U.S.C. § 1803 Proceedings under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
are conducted under security measures established by the 
Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and 
the Director of National Intelligence.   
50 U.S.C. § 1822 The Chief Justice, with the concurrence of the Attorney Gen-
eral and in consultation with the Director of National Intelli-
gence, establishes the security measures under which the At-
torney General’s certifications of the need for physical 
searches, conducted for foreign intelligence surveillance pur-
poses and undertaken without court orders, are to be kept. 
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50 U.S.C. § 1822 Records of proceedings under the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act, including applications made and orders 
granted, shall be maintained under security measures estab-
lished by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence. 
50 U.S.C. § 1842 The Chief Justice appoints a U.S. magistrate judge to hear 
applications for and grant orders approving the installation 
and use of pen register or trap and trace devices under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
50 U.S.C. § 1861 The Chief Justice appoints a U.S. magistrate judge to hear 
applications for the production of tangible things under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.   
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 APPENDIX C 
 
Tenure and Methods of Selection of State Chief Justices (as of 2005) 
 
 Chief Justice Other Justices  
States Tenure  Selection Method Tenure  Selection Method  
  
Alabama 6 years 
 
ALA. CODE § 
12-2-1 
Popular election 
 
ALA. CODE § 12-2-1 
6 years 
 
ALA. CONST. art. 
VI, § 154(a); 
ALA. CODE § 12-
2-1 
Popular election 
 
ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152; 
ALA. CODE § 12-2-1 
Alaska 3 years 
 
 
 
 
ALASKA CONST. 
art. IV, § 2(b) 
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 
2(b) 
10 years 
 
Initial term = at 
least 3 years 
 
ALASKA CONST. 
art. IV, § 6 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5-
6 
Arizona 5 years 
 
 
 
 
ARIZ. CONST. 
art. VI, § 3  
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 3 
6 years 
 
Initial term  = at 
least 2 years 
 
ARIZ. CONST. art. 
VI, §§ 4, 37(C) 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, §§ 37-
38 
Arkansas 8 years 
 
ARK. CONST. 
amend. 80, §§ 
2(B), 16(A) 
Popular election 
 
ARK. CONST. amend. 9, § 1; 
ARK. CONST. amend. 80, §§ 
2(A),(B), 18 
8 years 
 
ARK. CONST. 
amend. 80, § 
16(A) 
Popular election 
 
ARK. CONST. amend. 80, §§ 
2(A), 18  
California 12 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a,b
CAL. CONST. 
art. VI, § 
16(a); CAL. 
ELEC. CODE §§ 
9083, 13109  
Governor nominates after 
review by Commission on 
Judicial Nominees Evalua-
tion; Commission on 
Judicial Appointments 
approves; retention elec-
tion 
 
a,b
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 
16(a), (d); CAL. ELEC. 
CODE §§ 9083, 13109 
12 years 
 
Initial term  = 
until next  
gubernatorial 
election 
 
 
CAL. CONST. art. 
VI, § 16(a), (d); 
CAL. ELEC. CODE 
§ 9083 
Governor nominates after 
review by Commission on 
Judicial Nominees Evalua-
tion; Commission on Judi-
cial Appointments approves; 
retention election 
 
 
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(a), 
(d); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 
9083, 13109 
 
Colorado Serves “at the 
pleasure of a 
majority of the 
court” 
 
COLO. CONST. 
art. VI, § 5(2) 
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 
5(2) 
10 years 
 
Initial term  = at 
least 2 years 
 
COLO. CONST. 
art. VI, §§ 7, 20 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 
25 
Connecticut 8 years 
 
 
 
CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 
51-44a(h) 
JNC proposes; governor 
nominates; legislature 
appoints 
 
CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
51-44a(h) 
8 years 
 
 
 
CONN. CONST. 
art. V, § 2 
JNC proposes; governor 
nominates; legislature ap-
points 
 
CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-
44a(h) 
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 Chief Justice Other Justices  
States Tenure  Selection Method Tenure  Selection Method  
  
Delaware 12 years 
 
 
DEL. CONST. 
art. IV, § 3 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate consents 
 
DEL. CONST. art. IV §§ 2, 3; 
Exec. Order No. 4 
12 years 
 
 
DEL. CONST. art. 
IV, § 3 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate consents 
 
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; 
Exec. Order No. 4  
District of 
Columbia 
4 years 
 
 
 
D.C. CODE § 
11-1503(a) 
Designated by JNC 
 
 
 
D.C. CODE § 1-204.31(b)  
15 years; manda-
tory retirement 
at age 74 
 
D.C. CODE § 11-
1502 
JNC nominates; President 
appoints; senate consents 
 
 
D.C. CODE. §§ 1-204.33, 11-
1501(a) 
Florida 2 years 
 
 
 
 
c
FLA. R. JUD. 
ADMIN. 
2.030(a)(2)(A) 
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(b); 
FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 
2.030(a)(2)(A) 
6 years 
 
Initial term = at 
least 1 year 
 
FLA. CONST. art. 
V, §§ 10(a), 
11(a) 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10(a), 
11(a) 
Georgia 2 years 
(no more than 
4 years) 
 
c
1999 Ga. 
Supreme 
Court 
Administrative 
Minutes  
Court selection 
 
 
 
GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, 
para. 1 
6 years 
 
 
 
GA. CONST. art. 
6, § 7, para. 1 
Popular election 
 
 
 
GA. CONST. art. 6, § 7, para. 
1 
Hawaii 10 years; man-
datory retire-
ment at age 70 
 
HAW. CONST. 
art. VI, § 3 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate consents 
 
 
HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3 
10 years; manda-
tory retirement 
at age 70 
 
HAW. CONST. 
art. VI, § 3 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate consents 
 
 
HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3 
Idaho 4 years 
 
IDAHO CONST. 
art. V, § 6  
Court selection 
 
IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6 
6 years 
 
IDAHO CONST. 
art. V, § 6 
Popular election 
 
IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6 
Illinois 3 years 
 
 
ILL. CONST. art. 
VI, § 3  
Court selection 
 
 
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 3 
10 years 
 
 
ILL. CONST. art. 
VI, § 10 
Popular election; retention 
election 
 
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12 
Indiana 5 years 
 
 
 
 
IND. CONST. 
art. VII, § 3  
JNC appoints 
 
 
 
 
IND. CONST. art. VII, § 3 
10 years 
 
Initial term  = at 
least 2 years 
 
IND. CONST. art. 
VII, § 11  
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10-
11 
Iowa 8 years 
 
 
 
 
IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 
602.4103 
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
IOWA CODE. ANN. § 
602.4103  
8 years 
 
Initial term = at 
least 1 year 
 
IOWA CONST. art. 
V, § 17 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
IOWA CONST. art. V, §§ 15, 
17 
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 Chief Justice Other Justices  
States Tenure  Selection Method Tenure  Selection Method  
  
Kansas Duration of 
service 
 
 
 
KAN. CONST. 
art. III, § 2 
Seniority 
 
 
 
 
KAN. CONST. art. III, § 2 
6 years 
 
Initial term  = at 
least 1 year 
 
KAN. CONST. art. 
III, §§ 2, 5 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
KAN. CONST. art. III, § 5 
Kentucky 
 
4 years 
 
KY. CONST. § 
110(5)(a)  
Court selection 
 
KY. CONST. § 110(5)(a) 
8 years 
 
KY. CONST. § 119
Popular election 
 
KY. CONST. § 117 
Louisiana Duration of 
service 
 
LA. CONST. art. 
V, § 6 
Seniority 
 
 
LA. CONST. art. V, § 6 
10 years 
 
 
LA. CONST. art. 
V, § 3 
Popular election 
 
 
LA. CONST. art. V, § 22(A) 
Maine 7 years 
 
 
a
ME. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4 
Governor appoints; senate 
confirms 
 
a
ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 
8 
7 years 
 
 
ME. CONST. art. 
VI, § 4 
Governor appoints; senate 
confirms 
 
ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 8 
Maryland 10 years; man-
datory retire-
ment at age 70 
 
 
 
 
a
MD. CONST. 
art. IV, §§ 5A, 
14 
Governor designates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14 
10 years; manda-
tory retirement 
at age 70 
 
Initial term = at 
least 1 year 
 
MD. CONST. art. 
IV, § 5A 
 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate confirms; 
retention election 
 
 
 
 
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A; 
Md. Exec. Order 
01.01.2003.09 
Massachusetts 
 
 
“[G]ood be-
havior;” man-
datory retire-
ment at age 70 
 
a
MASS. CONST. 
pt. 1, art. 29; 
MASS. CONST. 
pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 
1 
Governor appoints; gover-
nor’s council consents 
 
 
 
a
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, 
§ 1, art. 9 
“[G]ood behav-
ior”; mandatory 
retirement at 
age 70 
 
MASS. CONST. pt. 
1, art. 29; MASS. 
CONST. pt. 2, ch. 
3, art. 1 
Governor appoints; gover-
nor’s council consents 
 
 
 
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 
1, art. 9; Ma. Exec. Order 
No. 470 
Michigan 2 years 
 
c
MICH. CT. R. 
7.323 
Court selection 
 
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 3; 
MICH. CT. R. 7.323 
8 years 
 
MICH. CONST. 
art. VI, § 2 
Popular election 
 
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 2 
Minnesota 6 years 
 
a
MINN. CONST. 
art. VI, § 7 
Popular election 
 
a,b
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7; 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
204B.06(6)  
6 years 
 
MINN. CONST. 
art. VI, § 7 
Popular election 
 
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7 
Mississippi Duration of 
service 
 
MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 9-3-11  
Seniority 
 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-11 
8 years 
 
 
MISS. CONST. art. 
VI, § 149 
Popular election 
 
 
MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 145 
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Missouri 2 years 
 
 
 
 
c
MO. CONST. 
art. V, § 8; MO. 
SUP. CT. R. 
82.01 
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
MO. CONST. art. V, § 8; 
MO. SUP. CT. R. 82.01 
12 years 
 
Initial term= at 
least 1 year 
 
MO. CONST. art. 
V, § 19; MO. 
CONST. art. V, § 
25(c) 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a), 
(c) 
Montana 8 years 
 
MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 3-2-101 
Popular election 
 
MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-2-
101  
8 years 
 
MONT. CONST. 
art. VII, § 7; 
MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 3-2-101  
Popular election 
 
MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-2-101  
Nebraska 6 years 
 
Initial term = 
at least 3 years 
 
NEB. CONST. 
art. V, § 21(3) 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention elec-
tion 
 
 
NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21 
6 years 
 
Initial term = at 
least 3 years 
 
NEB. CONST. art. 
V, § 21(3) 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21 
 
Nevada  Generally two 
years 
 
NEV. CONST. 
art. 6, § 3; NEV. 
REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 2.030 
Seniority 
 
 
NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 3; 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
2.030 
6 years 
 
 
NEV. CONST. art. 
6, § 3; NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 
2.030 
Popular election 
 
 
NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 3; NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.030 
 
New Hamp-
shire 
“Good behav-
ior;” manda-
tory retirement 
at age 70 
 
a
N.H. CONST. 
pt. 2, arts. 73, 
78 
Governor appoints; gover-
nor’s council approves 
 
 
 
a
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 
46-47 
“Good behav-
ior;” mandatory 
retirement at 
age 70 
 
N.H. CONST. pt. 
2, arts. 73, 78 
Governor appoints; gover-
nor’s council approves 
 
 
 
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 46, 
47 
New Jersey “Good behav-
ior;” manda-
tory retirement 
at age 70 
 
Initial term = 7 
years. 
 
a
N.J. CONST. 
art. VI, § 6, ¶ 3 
Governor appoints; senate 
consents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 1
“Good behav-
ior;” mandatory 
retirement at 
age 70 
 
Initial term = 7 
years. 
 
N.J. CONST. art. 
VI, § 6, ¶ 3 
Governor appoints; senate 
consents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 1 
New Mexico 2 years 
 
 
N. M. STAT. 
ANN. § 34-2-1 
Court selection 
 
 
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-1 
8 years 
 
 
N.M. CONST. art. 
6, § 33 
Popular election; retention 
election 
 
N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 33 
New York 14 years 
 
 
N.Y. CONST. art 
VI, § 2(a) 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate confirms 
 
N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 2 
14 years 
 
 
N.Y. CONST. art 
VI, § 2(a) 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate confirms 
 
N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 2 
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North Caro-
lina 
8 years 
 
N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 
7A-10(a) 
Popular election 
 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-
10(a) 
8 years 
 
N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 7A-10(a) 
Popular election 
 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-
10(a) 
North Dakota 5 years or until 
term on court 
expires, which-
ever occurs 
first 
 
N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 27-02-
01 
Selection by judges of 
supreme and district 
courts 
 
 
 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-02-
01 
10 years 
 
 
 
 
 
N.D. CONST. art. 
6, § 7 
Popular election 
 
 
 
 
 
N.D. CONST. art. 6, § 7 
Ohio 6 years 
 
OHIO CONST. 
art. IV, § 
6(A)(1) 
Popular election 
 
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 
6(A)(1) 
6 years 
 
OHIO CONST. 
art. IV, § 
6(A)(1) 
Popular election 
 
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 
6(A)(1) 
Oklahoma 2 years 
 
 
 
 
c,d
OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 5, ch. 
1, app. 7, App. 
Div. R. 1 
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2; 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 
1, app. 7, App. Div. R. 1 
6 years 
 
Initial term = at 
least 1 year 
 
OKLA. CONST. 
art. VII, § 2; 
OKLA. CONST. 
art VII-B, § 5 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B 
Oregon 6 years 
 
OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 2.045 
Court selection 
 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
2.045  
6 years 
 
OR. CONST. art. 
VII, § 1 
Popular election 
 
OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1 
Pennsylvania Duration of 
service 
 
PA. CONST. art. 
V § 10(d) 
Seniority 
 
 
PA. CONST. art. V § 10(d) 
10 years 
 
 
PA. CONST. art. V 
§§ 13(a), 15(a) 
Governor appoints; senate 
consents; retention election 
 
PA. CONST. art. V §§ 13(a), 
15(b) 
Rhode Island “Good behav-
ior” 
 
 
 
a
R.I. CONST. 
art. X, § 5 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; consent of Sen-
ate and House of Repre-
sentatives 
 
a
R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4 
“Good behavior”
 
 
 
 
R.I. CONST. art. 
X, § 5 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; consent of Senate 
and House of Representa-
tives 
 
R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4 
South Caro-
lina 
 
10 years 
 
S.C. CONST. 
art. V, § 3; 
S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-3-10 
Legislature selects 
 
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 14-3-10 
10 years 
 
S.C. CONST. art. 
V, § 3; 
S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-3-10 
Legislature selects 
 
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-10 
South Dakota 4 years 
 
 
 
S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 16-1-2.1 
Court selection 
 
 
 
S.D. CONST. art. V, § 8; 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-1-
2.1 
8 years 
Initial term = at 
least 3 years 
 
S.D. CONST. art. 
V, § 7 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7 
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Tennessee 4 years 
 
 
c
TENN. SUP. CT. 
R. 32 
Court selection 
 
 
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
102 
8 years 
 
 
TENN. CONST. 
art. VI, § 3 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3; 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-
112, 17-4-115 
Texas 6 years 
 
TEX. CONST. 
art. V, § 2 
Popular election 
 
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 
6 years 
 
TEX. CONST. art. 
V, § 2 
Popular election 
 
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 
Utah 4 years 
 
 
 
 
UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2-1 
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-1 
10 years 
 
Initial term = at 
least 3 years 
 
UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2-1 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate confirms 
 
 
 
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 8 
Vermont 6 years 
 
 
a
VT. CONST. 
Ch. II, § 34 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate consents 
 
VT. CONST. Ch. II, § 32 
6 years 
 
 
VT. CONST. Ch. 
II, § 34 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; senate consents 
 
VT. CONST. Ch. II, § 32 
Virginia 4 years 
 
VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 17.1-300 
Court selection 
 
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-300 
12 years 
 
VA. CONST. art. 
VI, § 7 
Legislature selects 
 
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 
Washington 4 years 
 
WASH. CONST. 
art. IV, § 3  
Court selection 
 
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3   
6 years 
 
WASH. CONST. 
art. IV, § 3 
Popular election 
 
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3 
West Virginia 1 year 
 
c
W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 51-1-2; 
Order Re: 
Designation of 
Chief Justice 
Rotation by seniority 
 
d
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-2 
12 years 
 
W. VA. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 2 
Popular election 
 
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 
Wisconsin Duration of 
service 
 
WIS. CONST. 
art. VII, § 4 
Seniority 
 
 
WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4 
10 years 
 
 
WIS. CONST. art. 
VII, § 4 
Popular election 
 
 
WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4 
Wyoming 4 years 
 
 
 
 
d
WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 5-2-102 
Court selection 
 
 
 
 
WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4; 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-102  
8 years 
 
Initial term = at 
least 1 year 
 
WYO. CONST. art. 
V, § 4 
JNC nominates; governor 
appoints; retention election 
 
 
 
WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4 
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Methodological Note 
The term “chief justice” refers to the presiding justice or judge of 
a state’s highest court. 
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“Court selection” means that a chief justice is selected by the other 
justices of that court. 
The terms “popular election” or “election” refer to selection by a 
state’s electorate; such elections are sometimes required to be “non-
partisan.”   
The abbreviation “JNC” stands for a Judicial Nominating Commis-
sion, which is the phrase often used to describe a group chartered to 
propose justices.  Other appellations for such groups include a Com-
mission on Appellate Court Appointments, Judicial Selection Com-
mission, or Judicial Qualifications Commission. 
Most sources are cited directly in the body of the chart.  Addi-
tional information comes from the monograph, State Court Organiza-
tion 1998 (2000), by David B. Rottman, Carol R. Flango, Melissa T. 
Cantrell, Randall Hansen & Neil LaFountain of the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, as well as from court rules, court 
orders, and telephone interviews.  In a few instances (California, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont), denoted (a), the source cited 
does not expressly address the tenure of the chief justiceship. The in-
formation reported is the tenure provided for members of that state’s 
high court.  For California and Minnesota, denoted (b), we relied on 
such general provisions, supplemented by information from those 
states’ election laws.  Further, in discussion of Florida, Georgia, Michi-
gan, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia, marked (c), 
the reported information comes from court orders or rules rather 
than statutes or constitutional provisions.  And, for Oklahoma, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming, denoted by (d), our sources were telephone 
interviews, as supplemented by the monograph, State Court Organiza-
tion 1998, cited above. 
